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This thesis examines the British port of Maryport. with aD emphasis on its coastal trade.
During the period 1855 through 1889 Maryport boasted a lively trade, exteDding from Wales
to Scotlaod and across the lrish Sea. Although a variety ofproduets wete involved.. the lion's
sl:we ofMaryport's shipping, especially across the Irish Sea, was based on the coal industry.
This trade, involving Marypol1 and larger centres such as Belfast. Dublin, Londondeny and
Liverpool., will be examined with a focus on three specific facelS. The first is coastal capital.
that is the actual ships involved aDd the investors who bought them. Second., there is the
human capital, the crews who manned Marypol1's coasters, from masters down to
apprentices. Third.. we wiU look at the actual voyages made by coastal vessels. This section
will also focus attention on the lrish Sea and the coal industry-the physical boundary of the
voyages and the industry which spum:d many of them.
This study is one of the few to examine specifically the coastal trade of a single
British port. Although there are numerous essays on the general shipping of UK ports. most
study foreign or colonial shipping. with only passing reference to the portion of trade
comprised by coasters. Since the tonnage of British coasting prior to the 18905 was much
greater than deep-sea shiPPin&;. it stands to reason that a substantial part ofmany ports' trade
was accounted for by coasters.1 This was certainly the case in Maryport. where coasting
accounted for a third ofall shipping tonnage entering and clearing as late as 1900. Since so
Derek AIdcroft, "The Eclipse of British Coastal Shipping 1913-21." The Journal
ofTransport History lV (1963): 24.
little has been written on this portion of any port's trade, this thesis makes an important
contribution to the literature.
This study demonstrates that Maryport coasting retained much of its sail charncter
well into the "age of steam." Despite this, the coastal trades continued to be important into
the new century. This is another side of British coasting, where the bulk of scholarly work
has been done on trades most receptive to technological change. It also challenges the belief
that only innovative trades enjoyed long-tenn success, particularly in the late Victorian
period. The essentially local nature ofMaryport's shipping, both in terms of investors and
the men who actually crewed the vessels, is stressed. From the middle of the nineteenth
century, extensive sea links were maintained with western England, Wales, Scotland and
Ireland's east coast. In this respect, the thesis is not only the story ofa single port but also
says much about the Uniled Kingdom's Irish Sea trade in general.
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lntroduction
Maryport
lbis study examines the British registry port of Maryport. Although important components
of its trade were concerned with foreign and colonial shipping, the focus here will be on its
coastwise trade. In the nineteenth century coasting was part ofthe "hometl'ade," which might
involve commercial traffic around the British Isles. or to the near continent from the River
Elbe to Brest in France. In Maryport's case we will deal only with trade around the United
Kingdom. specifically from Scotland to Wales and across the lrish Sea.
An obvious question might be raised at this point Why study a British coasting port
at all? The study of Britain's nineteenth-century coastal trade is important for several
reasons. Although these arguments will be reiterated throughout the essay, they will be stated
here for the sake of clarity.
In the first instance, coasting as a branch of maritime history has seldom received the
attention it deserves, particularly compared to the deep-sea trades. Indeed, it has also suffeml
compared to railways. its nineteenth-eentury competitor. Both railways and Bluewater
shipping have. on the other hand, generated thousands of books and articles. The entire
corpus of British coastal shipping studies amowtts to fewer than 400 works in total. This has
been pointed out most eloquently by John Amlstrong, with whom we will deal in Chapter
I. This case can be overstated, naturally. Quite a few maritime historians devote a portion
oftheir work to coasting. Nonetheless, the volume ofcoastwise literature on Britain, greatest
maritime power ofthe nineteenth century, is rather puny. Clearly this is an area with many
gaps and offers fertile opportunities for the researcher.
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This brings us to the second justification for coastal research in the British context-
its importance to UK internal trade and even its scope compared 10 foreign trades. As
Annstrong argues. the coaster's role in prewar British transport was crucial: coasters carried
22,900,000 tons of goods per annum. by 1913. Yearly tonnages grew by two percent from
the 18305,1 Derek Aldcroft. remarks of the coasters:
Hundreds of little coastal vessels...collected cargoes from the large ports and
distributed them to the many small ports dotted around the British Isles, or
brought cargoes into the principal ports for lranshipmc:nt ahroad...For much
of the nineteenth century lhe tonnage of coastal traffic was substantially
greater than that of ocean shipping. Only from the 18905 onwards did the
latter tonnage exceed the fonner. l
As Aldcroft's article suggests, ports were an important part of the coastal transport
netWOrk., bringing us to the next point-why study a port'? Although certain areas of coasting
have been reasonably well docwnented-tt'lldes where the incorporation of new teclmology
was very rapid and coaster relationships with the railways-some areas are clearly lacking.
One such area is coastal port studies. At present there are no book-length studies specifically
on the coastal trade of any port and precious few articles. As the port is one of the basic
components of coasting such studies may pave the way one day for a general synthesis.
Maryport is a good candidate for study since for much of the nineteenth century it
John Armstrong, "A Revised View of the Transport History of the Nineteenth
Century-The Neglected Role of the Coastal Ship," History Teaching Yearbook VI
(l992): 63.
Derek Aldcroft. 1be Eclipse of British Coastal Shipping 1913-21." The Journal
ofTransport History rv (1963): 24.
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maintained a thriving coastal export trade in coal and iron along Britain's west coast and
particularly across the Irish Sea. Maryport was also part of the trading network of larger
centres such as Belfast, Dublin and liverpool. The town also maintained a large coastal trade
into the 1880s based largely on sail. The successful use ofolder technology on coastal routes
has often been overlooked by historians in favour of those cradcs that adapted quickly to new
advances. There is nothing intrinsically wrong in this emphasis. but Maryport serves as a
reminder that other strategies were employed to considerable effect. With this in mind it is
now appropriate to look at the port's background.
Maryport has a rich tradition of interaction with the sea. For the historian there is
ample ground to explore the town's maritime past. Yet, to date there is a deanh of good
academic research on any aspect of this. Not only the coastal trade but also the foreign and
fishing fleets ofMaryport have escaped the attention of historians. This allows a wide scope
for new stUdies of Maryport seafaring. although the lack of secondary resources can be
frustrating.
Mary-port is located in the modem British county of Cumbria.., near the Scottish
border. Pan of the Lake District of nonhwestem England, Cumbria as a geographic entity
would have been unknown to Victorians. During the period under study Maryport was
situated in the old county ofCumbertand, a short train ride from the city ofCarlisle. Today's
Cumbria consists of this former county plus Westmorland and parts of Lancashire. Then as
now, Maryport was located on and greatly influenced by the sea Its harbour is in form much
as it was a century ago, although its fleets of cargo vessels are long gone. Through the
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries agriculture formed the basis of Cumberland's
economy, but Maryport's shipping was built upon the region's extractive industries.J
Maryport's modem history can be traced to the late eighteenth century when the town
grew from a small village into a town of more than 1.000 persons. At the time most people
were employed., directly or indirectly, in coal mining. According to L.A. Williams this is a
good example afthe impact that expanding coal production can have on urban growth.~ [0
fact, much of Maryport's development can be traced to Cumbria's extractive industries and
the need to transport the output to markets.
Coal fields extending from Marypon to St. Bee's Head contributed the majority of
a total Cumberland production of 500.000 tons of coal per year by the 1780s. As early as
1828 coal exports from Marypon itselfamounted to 40,000 tons annually. fron was another
pillar of the Marypon economy, with the Napoleonic wars stimulating production. Although
it fell following the end of hostilities, output rose once more in the 18405. By 1849 100,000
tons ofhaematite ore annually were being exported from Cwnberland-a fifth of the United
Kingdom's production. Exports ofthis iron ore gIeW until the late 18605. Maryport itseLfwas
David Clarke, "Maryport: A Late Coastal Switch 10 Steam Propulsion. 1865-
1910." Proceedings ofthe Steam at Sea Conference (Hull: University of Hull.
Forthcoming), 4-5. There arc a nwnber of good studies ofCumbria as a region.
the best arc: J.D. Marshall and John K. Walton, The Lalee Counties From 1830 to
the Mid-Twentieth Century (Manchesler: Manchester University, 1981). 64 and
Roy Millward and Adrian Robinson, Landscapes ofBritain-Cumbria (London:
Macmillan, 1972).
L.A. Williams, Road Transport in Cumbria in the Nineteenth Century (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1975), 21.
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one centre ofa Scots-run iron industry in the region. The Gilmour family was early furnace
owners in the town, but produced only pig-iron and went out of business in 1893. At mid-
century production of Bessemer steel became important. The proportion of meta.! workers
increased from 3.3 to 13.53 per cent of West Cumbria's workforce between 1851 and 1911.'
The town was dependent on available shipping facilities for the export of local
mineral resowces. By the second quarter aCthe nineteentb-century, however. the quantities
of these commodities being shipped out through Maryport made the harbour facilities
inadequate. In 1836 a floating dock, known as Campbell's Dock, was constructed to handle
the increased traffic. This was about the same time. in 1838. that ships were first registered
at Maryport.6 Prior to this the port had fallen under the jurisdiction of Whitehaven. In
keeping with the town's new status. a customs house and harbour office were constructed.
Concurrently, however, the port's infrastructW'e became inadequate, as trade continued to
expand. aided greatly by rail Iinkages.1
The building of the Maryport to Aspatria Railway in 1840 allowed easier access to
Williams. Road Transport. 92; Clarke. "Maryport," 5; Herbert and Mary Jackson.
Holme Shipping Line: Maryport-1873 to 1913 (Workington: Firpress. 1991).7.
See also: Oliver Wood. Development a/the Coal, Iron and Shipbuilding
Industries a/West Cumberland, 1750-1914 (Unpublished PhD Thesis. University
of London, 1952).
Vessels were owned in the town much earlier. but formal registry facilities were
Dot established until this date,
Herbert and Mary Jackson. Holme Shipping Line: Maryport-1873 to 1913
(Workington: Firpress. 1991), 8; Annie Robinson. Maritime Maryport
(Whitehaven: George Todd, 1978). 11.
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the North of Cumbria's. Along with the Whitehaven Junction Line in 1847, this railway laid
the groundwork for substantial increases in Maryport's coal traffic. Coal exports in 1839
amounted to 110,000 tons, rising to 333,871 tons in 1857. By 1865 the port shipped as much
as 12,000 tons ofcoal during exceptional weeks. Another line, the Maryport and Carlisle,
trebled the coal traffic coming into Maryport by 1844. The importance aCthe coal industry
to railways radiating from Maryport can be gleaned from newspaper reports oftbe day. When
in 1865 it was decided "to bring a tine to join the Maryport & Carlisle Line near Ellengrove
and runnel through by the quarries." the cooperation of coUiery owners was considered
crucial to success,'
In 1854lhetown's Board of Trustees decided to construct another dock to deal with
the increased coal traffic. Although nearly scuttled by lack of funds, the project was
eventually completed and the Elizabeth Dock opened on 20 October 1857. The new dock
required the construction of an entirely revamped transportation system, authorization for
which had been granted by Parliament in 1855. This meant that in addition [0 the dock
Maryport now had an improved rail traffic system with new lines and bridges. Coal hurries
were also erected to allow for more efficient processing ofmaterial.9
In time Elizabeth Dock, at six hundred feet in length and two hundred forty feet
breadth, itself became 100 small for Marypon's mineral traffic. especially with the growth
Williams. 144-6; Maryport Examiner. 20 October 1865 and 2 and 17 November
1865.
Jackson and Jackson, Holme Line, 10.
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of the iron trade. Spanish iron ore was imported through Marypon and taken by rail to
Workington. IO The opening of the Maryport Haematite Iron Company in 1868 and the
Solway Haematite Iron Company in 1871 created further demand for the ore. During this
same period the region's own exports of pig iron continued to increase. Larger ocean-going
craft engaging in the trade were unable to use lhe Elizabeth Dock and a bigger facili[y was
clearly needed. By 1879 a £100,000 dock was being proposed. Although it 100 was plagued
by setbacks during construction, the Senhouse Dock. measuring eight hundred fifty feet by
three hundred feet and covering an areaofsix acres. was opened in May 1884. From that date
until 1902 the town's total imports and exports rose by 131 per cent. During the last four
years ofthis period the Seahorse Dock bandJed an average ofabout sixty-nine percent ofall
Maryport's import andexpon traffic. A great deal of this must have been part ofthe coasting
trades. 1I In 1899, for example, Worlcingtoo's iron industry accounted for fifty-seven percent
ofSenhouse Dock's tonnage entered and c1eared. 12
For example. in 1890 the ship Dunboyne transported coke to Australia. Steel rails
were also traded to the southern colony. as witnessed by a voyage of the Ladas in
1895 to Newcastle, New South Wales. Steel rails were also shipped to foreign
ports, an example being the Midas' voyage to Valparaiso in 1896. See Herbert and
Mary Jackson Tragic Maryport Sea Captain's Leiters (Workington: Firpress,
1991).
This supposition cannot be tested with any rigour since none of tile surviving
official sources distinguishes between coastal and deep-sea shipping on a
systematic basis.
Jackson and Jackson, Holme Line, 11-12. F. Kelly, Maryport Harbour and Docks
- A Report by the Clerk ofHarbour Commissioners, 1902; Maryport and
Workington Advertiser, 2 January 1885.
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Such extractive products. increasing in volume over time, were transshipped from
Maryport as part of both the foreign and coastal trades. It is difficult to pin down which
cargoes travelled on what particular vessel. but this certainly translated into large increases
in shipping traffic -By 1870 the town ranked eleventh ofeighty -lhree British coasting ports
in terms orooth vessel numbers and tonnage registered. In the coastal context, coal and coke
were mainly shipped to Ireland, a trade by its nature requiring seaborne carriage. As late as
1910 the city of Dublin alone imported 30,000 tons ofMaryport coal per annum. In 1870.
coastal tonnage entering and clearing Maryport totalled 299.969 tons. Although these
numbers contracted somewhat during the next three decades. by t900 entrances and
clearances by coasters peaked at 356,1 S4 tons and remained well above the 200.000 ton mark
until the outbreak of World War 1,13
With credentials such as these. including the obvious links 10 railway history. it is
Great Britain. House of Corrunons, Parliamentary Papers (BPP), Annual
Statement ofNavigation and Shipping. 1890. 33843; BPP. 1872. LVl.l64-7;
Maryport's shipping also spawned numerous ancillary industries. A number of
shipbuilders called the port borne from the Georgian through Victorian periods
such as: Peat & Co. (1773.1840); Wood & Co. (1790-1862): I. Middleton (1816-
1837); Huddleston & Ritson (1831-1840) and Ritson & Co. (1841-1906). In
addition there were nwnerous service industries catering 10 sailors. not the least of
which were taverns and inns. By 1910 sixteen such establishments existed. Some
acted as coaching and posting inns and their names reflected the town's port
status. lbese included The Lifeboat. Royal Oak, Hope and Anchor and Sailors
Return. Although such businesses are not a focus of this work. they provide
evidence of important economic spinoffs of shipping in Maryport. See: Michael
K. Stammers, "The High Character Obtained by Cumberland Ships-A
Shipbuilding District in the Nineteenth Century," International JournDl 0/
Maritime History X (1998), Forthcoming., 8; Jackson and Jackson, Holme Line,
4; Robinson, 28.
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unfortunate that Maryport's coastal trade has not anrac:ted much scholarly attention. (n the
chapters to foUow this oversight will be addressed. There are a nwnber of important areas
which need to be explored ifa clear picture ofMaryport coasting is to cmc:rge. First. there
are the ships themselves. along with the individuals. men and women. who owned them.
Second come the mea who crewel! these vessels. from masters down 10 unpaid apprentic:~.
Third are the voyage patterns of the ships and men as they plied the coasts of the United
Kingdom in search ofcargoes. Before looking at these specific facets of Maryport coasting,
however. a review of the literature available on coasting in general is appropriate to provide
an intellectual context for the chapters to follow.
Chapter I
The General Coasting Trade: Put Commentaries
British coastal shipping bas not attracted. the attention of scholars to the extent that her
bluewater trades have. Still, there exists a range of material to interest the researcher.
Although some studies take the form ofbooks. scholars have generally written articles on the
coasting trades. The corpus of works on UK coasting amounts to less than four hundred
books and articles. l But even this IS an exaggemtion. since many works are not scholarly.
Some are simply antiquarian compilations of statistics which are not placed in any wider
context. Other works on coasting do little more than list vessels owned by a particular
company. The Iiterarure review to foUow will emphasize the serious academic treatments of
the subject. leaving popular history aside. for the most part. Although no comprehensive
overview has yet to be written. many facets of British coasting have been examined. The
present focus will be on the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. although r will not
ignore works on earlier eras.l The scholarly treatment of British coasting generally falls
within several broad categories. These include port studies. examinations ofspecific trades.
and general overviews of UK shipping which include some material on coasting. It is on the
basis of these demarcations that we will proceed to review the Iitemrure.
To date. the most unsatisfactory treatments of coasting are the overviews. Many
The most comprehensive guide to these publications is John Armstrong. "An
Annotated Bibliography of the British Coastal Trade," The International Journal
o/Maritime History VII (June 1995): 117·\92.
These parameters reflect the temporal range of the thesis to follow. All periods.
from ancient times on. have received some attention from scholars. Ibid., 1\9.
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comprehensive essays have been produced on British shipping generaUy, but there are no real
counterparts for coastwise trades.] In this century, however, a small number ofcompetent
general studies have appeam1 and studies of the coastwise trades are often found as part of
these. But for the serious scholar interested in coasting, the available volumes are superficial.
Consisting of at most a chapter or two in much larger texts. these sections give only a
skeletal picture aCthe topic. Researchers are left to fill in the gaps themselves. The situation
is much the same concerning more specific aspects of shipping such as the social lives of
sailors and the ships tbemselves.4
Of the volwnes which do concentrate exclusively on general coasting, one of the
earliest is the anonymous volwne. The Coastwise Trude ofthe Uniied Kingdom. Published
in 1925. the slender book came at a time ofcrisis for Britain's shipping industry, at least
compared to her Victorian successes. The inter-war period saw a decline in the proportion
Such general works include Adam W. Kirkaldy. British Shipping: Its History.
Organization and Importance (London. 1914; reprint, New York: A. M. Kelly,
1970); Ralph Davis. The Rise ofthe English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth
and Eighteenth Centuries (London: Macmillan & Co., 1962); A. G. Course, The
Merchant Navy, A Social History (London: F. Muller. 1963); Ronald Hope, A
New History ofBritish Shipping (London: lohn MUITay, 1990).
For a detailed treatment of works that include (or ignore) the topic ofcoasting see
lohn Armstrong. "The Cinderella of the Transport World: The Historiography of
the British Coastal Trade," Coastal and Short Sea Shipping: Studies in Transport
History, in Armstrong (ed.), Aldershot: Scolar, 1996). ix-xxiv. See also Knut
Weibust, Deep Sea Sailors: A Study in Maritime Ethnology (Stockholm: Nordiska
Museet, 1969); Judith Fingard,Jack in Port: Sailor Towns ofEostern Canada
(forcnta: University ofTorcnto Press, 1982); Basil Greenhill, The Ship: The Life
and Death ofthe Merchant Sailing Ship (London: HMSO. 1980).
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ofwortd tonnage accounted for by British bottoms. In 1914 British !Imps comprised 39 per
cent of the total; dropping to 33 percent in 1921; to 29 per cent in 1931; and finally to 26 per
cent on the eve of World War n.' Ofcourse, Britain's sbare of world tonnage had no direct
relevance to the coasting trades. Nonetheless, the condition of British coasting was
deplorable in its own way. According to Derek Aldcroft:
[well before the outbreak ofthe Great War it was clear] tbat...thecoastal trade
was nOl keeping pace either with the growth of traffic passing through the
major ports or with the needs ofthe population and industries grouped around
the smaller pons...coastal shipping was expanding more slowly than other
(enns oftransport.6
The disruptions of the First World War compounded the problems experienced by
the United Kingdom's coasting trades. By the early 1920s tonnage figures for British coastal
movements were less than halfthosc for 1913 (see table 1.1).7
Despite these trends. the book exudes a jingoistic belief in the Empire's continued
strength. There is a genuine conviction about Britain's dominance on the world stage.
British hegemony, is considered a vital factor to future success. The author believes that.
notwithstanding the postwar downturn., Britain remains unchallenged as a sea trader. As
proof he offers tonnage figures for the United Kingdom's fleet compared to those of other
Hope, A New History ofBritish Shipping, 359.362.
Derek H. Aldcroft.. "The Eclipse of British Coastal Shipping 1913-21," The
Journal ofTransport History 1st Series, VI (1963): 24. In fact. this essay is
reprinted in Armstrong's compilation Coastal and Short Sea Shipping,
For an analysis of why UK coasting declined during this period see: A1dcroft..
"The Eclipse of British Coastal Shipping."
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nations,· Despite an overall decline, Britain retained a leading role in shipping. The author's
figures reflect this, but tend to gloss over the implications of this decline which would have
undermined the idea that Britain remained Wlchallenged at sea. In addition, the author gives
no references, making his figures impossible to verify.
Table 1.1
Arrivals and Departures of Vessels With Cargoes in the General Coasting Trade of the
Source. Derek H. Aldcroft, The Echpse of Bntlsh Coastal Shippmg 1913-21, The Journal
afTransport History)SI series, VI (1963): 25.
United Kimzdom (excludim! Ireland).
Year Total Trade. 000 net tons
1913 45,066
1918 14,333
1919 20,267
1920 25,820
\921 21,073
,. ..
The author next reviews the history of his nation's shipping, coasting in particular.
Again, the focus is on establishing British credentials as a first-rank oceanic power. Given
Britain's maritime credentials, this hardly seems necessary. The author's statistics might be
of more use to a researcher. For example, he notes that from 1750 to 1795 the number of
British coasters in service rose 87 per cent, from 6,3% to 11,964 vessels, with tonnage rising
130 per cent.' Again, the figures' value is compromised by a lack of references. Although not
Anon. The Coastwise Trade ofthe united Kingdom Past and Present and its
Possibilities (London: William Clowes & Sons, 1925), 5.
Ibid., 25. The figure of 11,964 coasters is highJy suspect, since only about twice
that number were in service in 1913. Again, a lack of references makes checking
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atypical ofthe period. this can still be frustrating roc contemporary scholars.
The book is most useful as a contemporary view of the indifference shown to the
coastal tJade., despite its benefits and innovations. But this volume is also an early
recognition of coasting's contribution to British economic success. Moreover. the writer
perceives the willingness of coaster owners to employ new technology: he spends several
pages on the adoption ofsteam by coasters and the use of inventions like iron ventilators on
cross-c.hannel canle ships. These positive features weigh against government's lack of
anention to coastal infrastructure, including inefficient ports and loading facilities. This
neglect caused delays brought about by the need to use docks and the necessity [0 wait for
proper tides; by the failure of pon authorities to modernize entrances to older docks to
accommodate modem shipping; and finally by the failw-e of gove:mment to provide national
funding for facility modemi23tion." lmprovemc:nts suggested include "the development of
facilities for transshipment of cargoes in...ocean pons"; lowering costs of bunkering coal
through improvements in equipment and the colliers themselves; provision of better quay
accommodation; and reversing the tendency to afford coasters only the most inadequate dock
accommodation. Such progressive ideas marie. the author as an early champion against
relegating coasting to second-place status in favour of deep-sea trades. I I
accuracy difficuJt.
fbid.• 80-95.
fbid.
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When a further volume on British coasting appeared in 1938. the industry remained
in a slump. T.S. Willan's The Eng/ish Coasting Trade 1600-/750 is a more modem
academic study than its anonymous predecessor. It is neither a lament for better times past
nor a celebration of a hoped-for glorious future. Willan simply explores the mode of
transport with an eye to understanding its nuances more fully. The book contains extensive
shipping figures for the period and these are of greater value than his predecessor's. All are
extensively footnoted, allowing the researcher to verify their accuracy. Willan's work is more
open to collegial criticism and more accowltable as a serious academic study. Furthermore.
the author includes a number of useful appendices and an extensive bibliography. 12
Willan's study is useful not only for its meticulous referencing. but also for valuable
insights into the role played by early modem coasting in shaping British-and consequently
world-history. Coal is a prime example of this process. Willan brings out the overlooked
fact that coo. as a valuable coastal good, predated the industrial revolution by a century and
a half. He states "that symbol of later industrial change shared with com the proud place of
staple commodity.,,1} Indeed., the coal trade had implications in the period's politics. When
the Scots and Royalists were suspected of interrupting the coal trade in 1643 to control the
Tyne and Sunderland.. Parliament intervened. This standoff was not resolved until the
T. S. Willan, The English Coasting Trade 1600-/750 (2nd ed., Manchester.
Manchester University Press, 1967).
Ibid, 55.
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Roundheads defeated the Royalist garrison at Newcastle in 1644.1C
Willan can be little faulted for his quality of research-rus book is still considered the
standard text for pre-l1S0 coasting. Unfortunately, decades after the first and second editions
appeared, few academics have taken up the study of coastWise trade. This is something
Willan lamented in the preface to his 1967 edition. n After thirty years few new works had
surfaced, with the situation only improving recently. Willan's study, though focussed on
coasting in a fairly broad sense, is limited temporally. Covering only 150 years. the
nineteenth centwy remains beyond its purview. As yet, no similar volwne exits for the latter
period. This lack of research makes general surveys the area most lacking in coastal shipping
history. Fortunately. the literature on specific branches of coasting is more fertile. One
prolific area. by coasting standards, examines specific trades and services.
One of the most important of these services was the transport of passengers. Britain.
as an island. relied on the sea for many travel needs prior to the advent of more advanced
modes ofttansport. This became more important as internal modes of travel had been long
neglected by British governments.16 Understandably, this movement of people had a role in
national development and has attracted the attention ofhistorians. Although articles dominate
the literature on coastal shipping, an important look at British passenger services is a fuJl-
Ibid, 56-57.
Ibid., vii.
James A. Williamson and Donald Southgate, A Short History ofBritish Expansion
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967),7.
2'
l<ngth book.
The Short Sea Route by Frastt G. Macbaffie chronicles lrish Sea passenger traffic
from the seventeenth century through the 19705. For current purposes the focus will be on
sections dealing with the nineteenth century. Machaffic's wodc is useful not only for its
description of events. but also for its thematic links to other areas of coasting research.
including the relationship between coasting and the railways and the role of technology.
The railways were especially important as r.heir construction often provided the
impetus for establishing packet services. This was the case in 1862 when railways tirst
reached the harbour at St:ranraerand the port aflame was linked by rail to Belfast Although
the sea link failed. the Straruaer and Lame Steamboat Company became lhe first '"fixed
schedule service between London and Belfast....7
The other point of interest., technological change. permeates the entire wodt.
especially tha1 portion dealing with the steam revolution. Chapttt 2 deals with steam services
prior to mid-century, which focussed not on passenger but on mail runs. In any event. the
services were often interlinked as passengers frequently travelled on mail packets. The
subject of mail packets will be discussed later in this chapter when looking at Philip
Bagwell's work."
As with the mails, Irish Sea passenger routes were also pioneers regarding the early
Fraser G. Machaffie. The Short Sea Route (Prescot: T. Stephenson and Sons.
1975). XIII, 51-2.
Ibid., 17-32,36.
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deployment ofsteam technology. The first regular Glasgow-Stnll1l'8er link was provided by
the steamer HighJandChi~.ftainasearly as 1822 By the early 18605 routes such as Belfast·
St:ranraer had established flXed, schedules using ~Jiable .steamers. This~t of
technology continues later in the book as Macha.ffic relates a debate over the relative merits
ofpaddle wheels and screws.. His narrative points out that technological adaptation continued
on such routes beyond the nineteenth century. In 1910. the King Edwardwas laWlChed and
she became the testing ground for tlte new technology of steam turbines. 1be vessel was used
successfully into the 1930s. 1•
Although much ofMachaffic's book is a straighd"orward narrative, describing events
relating to the passenger trade, its discussion of railway-coaster links and the role of
technology reflects a widcr view of coasting. With this in mind we may rum 10 Bagwelrs
essay which looks at a similar trade and lhemes as Macbaffic.
In addition to moving people., coasters were important in the carriage of the mails.
Even for an island nation. tbecarriage ofmail is tIlOf"eclosely associated with overland than
sea transport. Nonetheless, coasters played a vital role in this service. especially across the
Irish Sea. Philip BagweU's '"The Post Office Steam Packets., 1821-36, and lhe Development
of Shipping on the Irish Sea.... looks at this service during the early steam era and explores
the implications ofthc new technology.
In Bagwell's opinion, prior to steam the Irish Sea mail service was nOloriously slow
Ibid, 49, as, 100.
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and unreliable. The Howth-Holyhead run, normally taking eight hours. on one occasion
required fifty-one. With the introduction ofprivatcly-<lwned steamer.>, government mail ships
immediately became obsolete. Initially reluctant 10 use steamers. competitors forced
government to reassess its position. By the early 1820$ post office steamers had established
viable year-round steam services on the Irish Sea. The government service lasted only fifteen
years, however. and private operators were the trUe innovators in steam mail provision.20
The service trades. particularly the mail and passenger nms, were suited 10 the
incorporation of technological advances. Both were areas of high return. where speed plus
regular service were oftheessence.21 In some cases, this argument could be made for cargo
trades as well. This was especially so where items like manufaetlJrei goods. which generated
high returns in relation 10 their bulk, made the inttoduction ofcostly steamers viable. In the
case of lower-value bulk trades, innovation was generally late. Sailing vessels were
preferable when low costs rather than speed were imponant to the shipper. Some other goods
were fragile and required a slower approach to loading. Included in this bracket were clay
pipes and bricks.:!2 Where any of these conditions existed, change came slowly.
Philip Bagwell, "The Post Office Steam Packets., 1821-36, and the Development
of Shipping on the Irish Sea," Marilimt! Hislaryl (April 1971): 5.
See: J. Graeme Bruce, "The Contribution of Cross-Channel and Coastal Vessels
to Developments in Marine Practice," Journal a/Transport History IV
(November 1959): 65-80.
John Armstrong, "Management Response in British Coastal Shipping to Railway
Competition," Norlhern Mariner/Lt! Marin du Nord [ (January 1997): 15-17.
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Although much has been wrinen on high-value trades, the bulk trades have proved
similarly attractive to historians. This is particularly so in the case of mineral products., such
as metals and especially coal. Since coal was so important to British growth, it is logical that
historians should comment on its value to the wider economy. This is one area where a true
debate bas arisen concerning UK. coasting. In his 1987 article, "The English Coastal Coal
Trade. 1691-1910: How Rapid was Productivity GrowthT' William Hausman addresses
productivity change in the coal trade liom the northeast to London over two centuries. One
important issue. according to Hausman. concerns ship size. In deep-sea trades technological
changes caused a fall in freight rates, both nominal and real. from the 1820s to 1900.
Hausman's main contention is that no such decline occurred in the coastal coal trade. He
argues that the century after 1760 saw little growth in the average tonnage ofcolliers. Despite
size increases occasioned by steam colliers. freight rates did not fall subsequently.23
Hausman asserts that the mid-eighteenth century saw few changes in the size ofships
employed in London's coal trade. He believes the 17505 were marked by an increase in the
number of smaller craft making the ron between the northeast and London. Although coal
imports rose less than 2 per cent during this time, vessel movemenlS were up by 35 per cent.
The most drn:rnatic change, according fO Hausman. came with the introduction of steam, in
response to railway competition. Seven years after the 1845 connection of London to the
WiIliamJ. Hausman, "The English Coastal Coal Trade, 1691-1910: How Rapid
was Productivity GrowthT' &onomic Hislory Review Second Series, XL (1987):
588-596,589,595. (The article is a response to Simon's Ville's article "Total
Factor Productivity," which appeared in an earlier issue ofthe same journal).
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midland coal fields by rail, the first iron steam collier, the John Bowes, was constructed.
Within a decade the wooden sailing collier had virtually disappeared. Hausman finds it
surprising that shipping costs did not fall under these circumstances.14
Hausman observes a remarkable growth in the industry during his study period. Coal
shipments by sea 10 London went from about 400.000 tons in the late seventeenth century
to nine million in the early twentieth. Nonetheless. Hausman does not credit the shipping
industry with any great role in the process of change. In his opinion, the changes in coasting
had little direct impact 00 the larger economy. This is especially so in the context of other
industries. Echoing Ralph Davis. he allows that while shipping was important to the
industrial revolution, it made no contributions ofany "special character to the transition...15
This assertion seems quite extreme. Indeed, given Willan's evidence on the early sea
transport crecal, ooe might argue that Britain's extensive coastline and inland waterways
facilitated the transition to industry. By efficiently providing fuel coal prior to overland
alternatives. coasting may have given the United Kingdom an edge over its rivals. As with
any monocausal explanation. this is overly simplistic. Taken as a contributing factor.
however. the evidence is hard to ignore. With this in mind we turn to Simon Ville's
rejoinder.
Ville's article. "Defending Productivity Growth in the English Coal Trade During the
Hausman, "The English Coastal Coal Trade," 595.
Hausman, "The English Coastal Coal Trade," 595; and Ralph Davis, The English
Shipping Industry, 393.
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Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," is a response to Hausman. Ville believes Hausman's
conclusions, while interesting. do not change his own views on coastal coal rates. Ville
argues thaI "most...productivity growth [in the coal trade) was due 10 rising output rather
than to savings in shipping costs:,26 In addition. real price declines are not a true gauge of
the impact created by productivity changes. According to Ville. Hausman accepts that
"productivity gains may enable prices to remain constant when demand pressures would
otherwise cause them to rise...27 Without these gains there would have been a dramatic rise
in shipping costs. As a result coal prices in London would have been much higher. In this
situation it would be unlikely that development could have proceeded apace. Ville is
surprised at Hausman's apparent agreement on this point while still supporting Davis'
interpretation. Even if costs were constant, Ville asks how readers can accept that coal
shipments played less of an economic role in Britain than the cotton industry.2' Although
Ville's argwnent appears sound. it is not the final word on the coastal coal trade. This debate
has since been taken up by John Armstrong.
Annstrong's recent article, "Late Nineteenth-eennny Freight Rates Revisited: Some
Evidence From the British Coastal Coal Trade," reopens the debate on the economics of
Simon Ville, "Defending Productivity Growth in lhe English Coastal Coal Trade
During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," Economic History Review 2nd
series, XL (1987): 601.
Ibid,601.
ibid., 601-602.
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seaborne coal. Echoing Ville, he feels the industry did playa role in industrialization. To
Armstrong. the deciding factor in the expansion of the coal trade lay in the good's final
market price. With a lowering of transport costs, certain products find new markets as prices
become competitive. Demand is further stimulated by these new markets, which induce
producers to improve production and extraction. This lower unit cost would be symbiotic.
benefiting the industry and consumer alike. Armstrong allows that the price of transport is
not necessarily the most important detenninant in the success or failure of a product
although the nature ofcoal meant that, in this instance, it was. As a low-value bulk good,
coal was less able to stand increased transport costs than luxwy items. The freight ratc
accounts for mare afthe total cost and any increase will more greatly impactoD final prices.:?9
The presence of inland transport and rival coasting firms made for a competitive
industry, hastening the decline in freight rates. In this setting collier owners remained viable
through a variety of methods. One was to increase their vessels' mean carrying capacity to
take advantage ofeconomies of scale. Larger vessels, although able to carry more. did not
require proportional amounts of fuel. equipment, or manpower to operate, increasing
profitability. This fits in with Hausman's hypothesis on technological adaptation, but
Armstrong gives it less importance than prices. In addition, collier owners constrained the
wages ofthe more numerous ranks of seamen. As time went by, Annstrong argues, capital
John Armstrong "Late-Nineteenth Century Freight Rates Revisited: Some
Evidence From the British Coastal Coal Trade," International Journal of
Maritime History, VI (1994): 46.
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returns increased along with collier efficiency, due mainly 10 increased speed and faster
turnaround in ports. This allowed a profitable coastal coal trade despite the long·term trend
toward low mtes.JO
The crux of Armstrong's argument is that from 1875 to 1899 coastal freight rates
plunged more steeply than the cost-of-Iiving index. at least in the capital. a trend that
continued into the twentieth century. Coastal rates likewise fell faster than the price aCthe
product carried. meaning cheaper coal for London and possibly all ports receiving sea-borne
coal. This translated into a lower costofliving.l' AJthough it may be little more than theory,
Armstrong makes the case that:
...coastal shipping made a positive contribution to [Britain's] economic
growth and welfare. The continued evolution of urbanization and
industrialization--dependent almost wholly on coal for heat, light and power-
would likely have been retarded ifthe operating costs of the coastal ships had
not been reduced so drastically.n
Although arguably the most important British extractive product, coal was not the
only one traded coastwise. Given its role in the British economy. however, coal dominates
the literature. Despite this, there have been scholarly works on the shipment of metals. for
example. One was the nineteenth-centwy copper are trade in south-west England.
Peter Stanier's piece illustrates how this sector was intertwined with the industrial
Ibid.. 69-77.
Ibid., 68.
Ibid.
33
revolution and Great Britain's emergence as an industrial power. Although nonferrous
mining bad a long history in southwest EnglaDd, the trade only became significant in the lale
eighteenth cc:ntwy with iodusr:riatization.. 56.000 tons ofcopper ore were produced in 1800.
rising to an average annual production of 140.000-150.000 tons by mid-century. The trade
had nearly vanished by 1900 due to foreign competition.n
This trade also highlights the importance ofcoal in industrialization while illustrating
how cenain industries could feed off one another. To smelt and refine the ores great
quantities ofcoal were needed. After 1760 ores were shipped up the Bristol Channel to the
coal source, principally smelters at Swansea.. L1anelly, Neath and Port Talbot. This was the
most economic way to conduct the two combined bulk trades. The trade employed a large
volume of shipping, with the vessels collectively being named the "Welsh Fleet.~ The ore
trade. Stanier notes. was considered one ofllie gTQll1unenc:s for seamen" in the period.. An
estimate bas placed the number of sailors engaged in the trade as high as 800.J.I
In Stanier's view, the ships themselves were the "important link" in the southwest
and Welsh copper trade. These craft initially were small. but quickly increased from an
average of60 tons in the late 1700s to around 100 tons for most oCtile ninet~th century.
Peter H. Stanier. "The Copper Ore Trade ofSouth West England in the
Nineteenth Cennuy," The Journal a/Transport History V (1979): 18.
Ibid. 19. Part of my own findings on Maryportcrews suggests that coastal
seamen were not infrequently middle·aged. This may suggest the coastwise trade
as a place of later employment for expmenced seamen as opposed to being a
training ground for the deep-sea trades.
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Brigs were the vessels of choice in the early 1800s. replaced by two-masted SChOOoeIS in the
18605. Stanierdoes not explain why this occurred. but it likely relates to the schooner's great
manoeuverability. a plus in coasting trades and lower man-ton ratios. Allbaugh larger. these
later vessels remained vulnerable to the weather due to the deadweight carried. Stanier's
thesis is that this nineleenth-eennuy trade was dependent upon the small sailing coasters that
carried many tons of copper ore needed by British industry.Js
starner's article, like many examined thus far, contains interrelated themes.
Prominent among these is the notion of coasting competing with other modes of transport.
[0 terms of the literature. the bulk of research concerns the rivalry between coasters and
railways. Also prominent is the role of technology in the development of coasting,
particularly in the post-1850 period.
The paucity of material on certain areas of coasting is well illustrated by the subject
of technological change. One article has become the standard reference for most works
bearing on this topic. Although much coasting research includes the theme. the sole
concentration on technology makes J. Graeme Bruce's,. "The Contribution ofCros~hannel
and Coastal Vessels to Developments in Marine Practice," almost unique. Indeed, many
coastal surveys concentrate on trades which fit his thesis; that is, where technological change
Ibid, 24-32. To an extent these findings are consistent with my research on
Maryport. In this case bulk cargoes, of which coal and iron ore predominated.
were also earned by fairly small coasters. As in the case of the south west copper
trade, sail was predominant until the late nineteenth cenfUr)'. See Clarke,
"Marytport."
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was inlrOduced early 00.)6 This is not so much a critique of more recent scholars as a
complement to Bruce's insightfulness.
The "lack of gJamour" associated with deep.sea trades frequently obscures the
leading role coasting played in sea-transport as a whole. Although coaster owners in certain
trades were innovators. this fact was scldom recognized prior to Bruce.)7 The crux ofBmce's
argument is that coastal routes bred new ideas. He states in his introduction:
...the chronological record shows that the fIrst experiments and applications
of many successful and familiar techniques [in sea-transport] were to be
found. not on the ocean-going liners or in the navies aCthe world. bUlamong,
river, coastal. and cro~hannel passenger shipping.JI
In the British context it was not until the turn afthe twentieth century that steamers
of all types comprised a greater amount of tonnage than sail. This resulted from the
inefficiency ofearly steam engines. Their need for large amounts of coal precluded using
steam on long voyages. This was coupled with a streak of unreliability, not to mention high
costs. On coastal routes, owners were less likely [0 suffer disastrous losses through the
destruction of capital. This nacurally made owners of coastal bottoms more willing to
Clarke, "Maryport." 1·3. One article which explores the reasons for the delayed
adoption of new technology is Gmydon R. Henning and Keith Tmce. "Britain and
the Motorship: A Case of the Delayed Adoption of New Technology,'" The
Journal ofEconomic History XXXV (1975): 353·385.
In this case "seldom" does not imply never. See: Anon, The Coastwise Trade, 39-
44.
J. Graeme Bruce, "The Contribution ofCross·Cbannel and Coastal Vessels to
Developments in Marine Practice," The Journal o/Transport History IV (1959),
65.
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experiment with new ideas. According to Bruce. coastal companies wen:: at the forefront of
not only steam propu.lsion but also ship construction, reciprocating engines. turbines and
paddlewheels. only being left behind on screw propellers and diesels.J9
Bruce's work remains a prime justification for studying coasting. There is.
unfortunately, a downside to which we will return. like few other works, Bruce's essay
removes the trade from the shadow oflong-distance routes. Bruce's assertions are further
strengthened by tonnage figures in the Parliamentary Papers. By 1870 steam tonnage in
British coasting was almost on a par with sail-l 1.783.902 tons and 12,423.673 tons.
respectively. Indeed. sailing coasters had been on the decline since 1845..00 Bruce's
arguments for innovative thinking in the coastal trades are convincing even today.
The most noticeable failing of Bruce's article lies not in the work itself. but in the
way it has been used. Coastal innovation provides a solid justification for researching the
trade, but it is not lhe only reason. Still, most historians ofcoastal shipping continue to adopt
Bruce's research agenda. From the other persp«:(:tive, this same thinking might have led to
a neglect of trades that were slower to modernize. Works similar to Stanier's on the copper
are trade are exceptions. Bruce's successors have tended to look in the same direction as he
did. Just as deep-sea trades are "'more glamorous" than coasting, coastwise trades exhibiting
Ibid. 65-80.
BPP. Annual Statement a/Navigation and Shipping; Maryport Vessel Registries
(1871); John Armstrong, "A Revised View of the Transport History of the
Nineteenth Cennuy-The Neglected Role afthe Coastal Ship," History Teaching
Review Yearbook VI (1992).
37
the greatest cbange are coosidered most fit for study. Bruce's thesis is reasooable as it staods.
but it must be kept: in mind that it does oot apply to all trades. especially those where low-
value cargoes are conccmed. Many important components of British coasting-the trades
emanating from Maryport being Doe example--relied on the older methods well into the late
nineteenth century.
This criticism does not mean. however. that there are not alternative research
agendas. A number of historians have been more concerned with the relationship between
railways and coasting. Peter Perry's article, "The Dorset Ports and lhe Coming of the
Railways." is a good example.
In the nineteenth century. Dorset contained six ports. of which Poole. Weymouth.
Bridpon and Lyme Regis "were primarily concerned with general trade derived from their
local hinterlands... According to Peny, the azrivaJ of railways bad greater significance to the
region and its ports than any other evenL This may be ovastated~o~ factors including
changing markets must have been a factor over time. Peny does not appear to have canied
out an extensive survey to confinn his thesis. but nonetheless. railways een.ainly had an
impact on Dorset's trade. In the 18305 and 18405 these foW' ports handled cargoes including
coal, timber, grain. bricks and soap. These commodities were almost exclusively conveyed
by ship. The situation changed with the first railway. built in 1847. and especially during a
spate ofconstruction between 1857 and 1863. At once. coastal shippers lost that portion of
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their bulk cargoes not directly linked to a port's immediate locality.~' Perry nextoutIines lhe
long-term effects of the new arrival on coasting. He suggests these were not necessarily
negative.
Although railways co-opted much purely local traffic. substantial portions ofa port's
trade often remained-normally of the coastal variety. Deep-sea routes were largely absent
from Dorset by the mid-nineteenth century. but coasting remained important. The trade left
to coastal shippers became very specialized over time. Clay emerged as the major commodity
in Poole. rising from 38 per cent ofexports in 1846 up to 50 or 60 per cent in the 18505 and
1860s. Poole coasters vacated the importation of Portsmouth hides and London groceries.
for example. soon after the railway's arrival. In certain instances, trades not immediately
taken over by the railways continued to be the province ofcoastal ships until 1914.~2
Coaster owners adapted not only by specialization in cenain ttades. but also by
adopting profit maximization strategies. On sailing coasters, crews were frequently reduced.
more economical rigs employed, and equipment and maintenance standards lowered. fn the
Dorset trades deterioration of quay accommodation, plus tiny, ill-equipped harbours like
Lyme Regis, sometimes undermined this strategy. In these cases commercial decline
ensued.~J
Peter Perry, "The Dorset Ports and the Coming of the Railways," Mariner's
Mirror LIIl (August 1967): 243·246.
£bid, 246-248.
£bid, 248.
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Generally, the railways provided efficient service and cheap fares, although coasters
could often undercut their prices. Perry believes the railways were not without failings. Poole
clay and Portland stone accounted for 100,000 tons of material a year until the outbreak of
World War I. Both trades remained the purview of coasters, yet Pcrry does not credit the
shippers themselves with this success. In his view, it was the "operational problems, high
costs and even gross inefficiency" on the part of railways that allowed coasters to remain in
the game. Pcrry concludes that railways brought considerable change to Dorset transport.
This was a result primarily of their ability to lure local trade away from their competitors.44
This is a pessimistic view of the situation that does not allow for creativity and adaptation
by shipowners. Among historians, John Annstrong in particular takes a more positive view
of coasters. It is likely, however, that relative success by either mode of transport was not
precipitated by only their own, or their rival's actions, but by a combination ofboth.43
Perry's study was a forerunner oflatcr railway/coaster studies. Its basically negative
view of coasters differs, however, from most recent essays. Although Perry acknowledges
the success of coastal traders up to 1914, this is attributed mainly to failings by the railways.
That coasters could only remain in trades unnoticed by railways, or by cost-eutting, does their
economic contribution no credit. There were certainly railway shortcomings to be exploited.
Ibid., 248·249. As a side note, Perry does credit the motor lorry with the eventual
decline of Dorset coasting. This is, however, more applicable to the post·1918 era.
This is not to mention a myriad ofother factors--prices, markets, labour and the
presence of foreign competition, to name a few.
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It does not foUow that coasters were wtable to compete as a viable, in some cases superior.
alternative. TIlls positive view ofcoasters versus the railways has been brought out ever more
strongly in the years since Pcny's article. An article by T. R. Gourvish is one exampie.
Gourvish's "The Railways and Steamboat Competition in Early Victorian Britain"
is one ofa small number ofworks which centre more on the railways than coasters. This may
reflect a maritime mstory concern with coaster/railway interaction. Railway historians have
traditionally paid less anention to coastal shipping-Gourvish is one oftheir nwnber who has
not. From the point of view of railway owners., he contends that while steamboats could
provide linkages beyond terminals, they were nonetheless considered a dangerous rival.
Steamer traffic was larger numerically than competing modes of transport and had the
additional advantage of an exemption from a tax on passenger carriage. Independent boat
companies could offer low prices. comfortable through travel. and quick response to
lechnological change..&6
The railways fought back in a number of ways. Over longer hauls the advantage of
speed lay with the locomotives. not the coasters. In advertising the railway tended to
emphasize speed rather than comfort or cheap fares. A major strategy adopted by railway
owners was the purchase of steamers as feeder services. This presented a problem as
railways. under a fonn of government anti-monopoly policy. could not legally own
steamships. As with many contemporary business restrictions. this could be circumvented.
T.R. Gourvish. "The Railways and Steamboat Competition in Early Victorian
Britain,"Transport History rv (March 1971): 1-2, I I.
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Certain directors invested in steam tonnage privately, as on the Blackwa.ll.Gravesend
passenger route. The Wee railway boats did little to aid the railway. In the end they simply
increased competition on the routc and most passengers continued making the journey by
sea. A similar scenario occurred with the Glasgow, Paisley & Greenock railway. Again. the
use of railway boats was a mistake. The railway steamers were costly to run and only
antagonized independent coaster companies.H
Gourvish concludes that railway-steamboat links were genemlly unprofitable.
Passengers responded more to lower fares than speed. Therefore, the railways' main
advantage over their rivals was negaled. The small profits made on rail traffic ended up
paying off losses accrued by steamship feeder services.~· Prior to the 1850s:
The railway was unable to exploit fully its potential advantage over a rival
which had successfully adapted steam-power to waler transport. The
newcomer, intending to defeat rather than supplement the steamboat, was
forced into a relatively subordinate position until the logical implications of
railway building produced a network capable of reaching most towns
previously served by water transpon.'9
Gourvish feels that with lower overheads. the smaller boat companies could bener
adapt to changes in demand than railways. Overall. the attempt by early railways to crush
their competition was "a failure."5O This assessment is important to the study of coasting.
Ibid. 4-6. 12.
Ibid.• 17.
Ibid.• 17-18.
Gourvish. "The Railways and Steamboat Competition." 18.
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First. it provides a positive look at the strength of coasting, aJbeit from a rival perspective.
Second.. Gourvish's study reinforces the view of coasting as a vibrant industry contributing
to the British economy. The drawback., from the perspective of this study, is the period he
reviews. The 18305 and 1840s were decades when raillinkagcs were in an embryonic stage.
This changed rapidly, but it constitutes a different situation than in the 18505 and beyond.
Steamship technology itse1fwas making rapid strides in the period. Paddle wheels gave way
to the screws, and innovations like the reciprocating engine would greatly increase steamer
efficiency. For this reason Gourvish's implication that coasters did well in his period by dint
of incomplete rail links appears at least slightly unfair. Just as the railways evolved.. so too
did steamboats. Even when much of Britain became fully integrated by rail, the coasters
continued their work. In some trades. their share of traffic actually increased. With this point
in mind. we tum our attention to John Armstrong's work.
The competition between coasters and railways is a frequent theme in Armstrong's
essays. His article "Management Response in British Coastal Shipping Companies to
Railway Competition" is especially pertinent here. The article makes an ideal counterpart to
Gourvish's work. Where the latter author looks at strategies by railway executives 10 deal
with coasting firms, Annstrong does me same for their opposite nwnbers. Other writings by
Armstrong contribute 10 the coaster/railway theme.
Annstrong begins by discussing coasting's role in Britain prior to the establishment
of rail lines. An important facet of this era, according to Armstrong, was the revolutionizing
of coaslWise trade with the advent of steam propulsion. Despite a primary focus on the
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coaster/railway debate, Armstrong feels the technology of steam is an important part of the
rivalry to follow.'! Indeed, this is of great relevance to the coasting literature. Like much
recent coastal literature, this article demonstrates the value of interlocking themes.
Section two deals with the pre-1850 period. when railways first came into their own.
Armstrong's conclusion differs greatly from GoUIVish's, perhaps because of its different
perspective. According to Armstrong, early rail construction did not constitute a "failed
attempt" by rail directors to crush coasters. He feels the rivalry was a boon 10 the coastal
£inns, which benefited from the carriage of materials for railway construction and by acting
as feeders. Annstrong believes early railways enhanced the value of coasters by "channelling
trade onto [thecoastersJ. as many ran from the interior to a port and hence did not compete
for traffic. but rather generated it for coastal shipping:.s211tis conclusion does not necessarily
contradict Gourvish's findings. Ifearly railways were a benefit to coasters, it may still be true
that coasters were perceived as threats by railway executives. Indeed, the failure of railways
to defeat coaster firms decisively and replace them with their own stups may partly explain
the contemporary expansion of coasting.
Armstrong's article proceeds chronologically to the post-I 840s, when the railways
began a period of explosive growth. In Armstrong's view, this was when they were fust
Armstrong, "Management Response... I. This section argues that steam power
great.ly increased the usefulness of coasters. Many of the themes Armstrong brings
out have been discussed previously.
Ibid., 6.
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perceived as threats to coasting firms. Comprising a "truly national network." the railways
from this point on were better suited to the rapid carriage of goods. For perishable items
especially, the railways became a more attractive alternative to coasters. For a time certain
bulk trades were even co-opted by the railways. By 1867. despite increasing use of screw
colliers, railways claimed a lion's share of the London coal trade.S)
If there was a threat from the railways, or at least the perception that a problem
existed., how did coaster owners respond? This question is addressed in Annstrong's next
section. He feels the coaster firms moved to reduce competition. Conferences. including the
Octuple Agreement of 1851 and lhe HwnberConference of 1855, allowed a degree of price
control plus the sharing of proc«ds on long-distance routes. In the long-run, conference
agreements did not disadvantage coaster companies. Armstrong takes the idea of
collaboration one step further in suggesting the railways themselves might have been part of
the process. He suggests that coaster and railway companies may have entered into their own
conferences. appraising the other of mtes. Having similar price structures allowed for
"comparison shopping" by potential shippers. With their cheaper fares this tended [0 work
in favour of the coasters.~ (fthese conferences were of any value, the railways must have
also benefited. If not. railway directors would never have participated. This is a point not
brought out explicitly in Armstrong's essay.
fbid.7-9.
fbid,9-13.
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Correct. or not, the view of coaster owners as more savvy than their railway
counterparts recurs. The: technological advances noted by Bruce formed part of a strategy in
dealing with the railways. Quite simply, upgrading technology in coasters made them more
efficient. Railways themselves were by no means static and coasters had to keep up. if they
hoped to maintain the loyalty ofcustomers. Some oftbese changes have been outlined in the
discussion of Bruce, but they included replacing stone with water ballast, using winches and
other machinery for loading and improving dock facilities. Such improvements allowed the
coaster to maintain lower average costs than the railways and still give superior service.
Water ballast, for example. was free and could be laken on simply by opening sea cocks. and
then pumped out when no longer needed. Also. it could be done in transit and cost nothing
to load or unIoad.n This technological race brought out the strengths of each mode of
transport. Here. Annstrong focuses much more on the coasters. To move large volumes of
bulk commodities, coasters became the preferred means. Annstrong concluded lhat at worst
these changes helped coasters maintain their relative position, but may have actually
improved their "cost structure and allowed a greater price differential."56
Aside from these strategies, Armstrong outlines a number ofchanges which evolved
in both coasting and railway finns in response to the other. Coasters increasingly varied the
range of services offered to customers. Thus a shipper could find everything from cheap, but
Armstrong, "Late Nineteenth-Century Freight Rates Revisited," 78.
Annstrong, "Management Response," 13-14.
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slow sailing coasters to state oCtile art screw vessels. To en.sure success.,~ railways and
sea-aaders occasionally tooIc similar measures.. This is best reflected by the tendency toward
mc:rgers.. Perceiving coasters as a thIea1, railways were encouraged to join fon::es. In 1870 and
again in 1913. the ten largest railways 3CCO\Dlted forthm:-quarters orall revenue. Although.
coasting firms were slower 10 employ this strategy, they did follow suit. In fact., Armstroog
notes numerous examples ofcoastal liner companies taking over single-ship finns. From the
18905 this trend. was accelerated and fonnalized. By the late 19205 the provision ofcoastaJ
liner services was a virtual monopoly of a few large finns. n
How did these strategies affect the coastal finns' performance? Armstrong feels the
strategies adopted by coaster companies were successful for the most part. After all, coasters
performed greater work over the period. were more important than railways on longer and
bulk cargo trips and accounted for similar [Do-mileage. Until the First World War the role
ofcoasters in British trade remained unchanged. Alternatively. Armstrong believes coastal
firms could DOt have done more to secure their positions. The railways were something of
a Goliath to the coasters' David. For example. the Col)' Coasting Company was valued at £2
million in 1897 while the North Eastern Railway had a net worth of£60 million. Although
Armstrong never says so. it can be assumed such disparities were fairly typical. In addition
to this size difference. coasters never made much of an inroad on the valuable passenger
trade. Nonetheless. Armstrong concludes that the late nineteenth century was a time of
lbid.,17-19.
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general harmony between the two forms of transport. It was maintained because the
alternatives would have benefited neither side.'I
Anatherof Annstrong's articles. "The Role ofCoastal Shipping in UK Transport.,"
provides a further account ofthe railway-eoasterrivalry. Unlike the above work. this article
is very narrow temporally. Focussing on the year 1910, it sununarizes the continued role of
coasting in UK internal trade. Armstrong estimates that there remained 8,671,781 tons of
shipping in the coal and coke trade. In addition. there were 23.293,302 register tons of
shipping engaged in otber coastal trades in 1910. Fortbe year a total ofmore than 81,000,000
million tons ofcargo was carried by coaster, according to Armstrong's calculations. This can
be broken down into a straightforward conclusion which fits Annstrong's perception of the
coasta.l trade-lilat it remained vitally important in transpOrtation. Even by (910 the railways
had by no means superceded it. As Armstrong concluded. "In tenns of ton mileage. coastal
shipping in 1910 provided at least as great a freight transport service for the United Kingdom
as did the railway system."SOl
As noted above, this important service encompassed a variety of trades, although it
is often referred to in the singular. Aside from looking at commodity-based trades, it is
equally relevant to look at those based aroWld a geographic area. We have examined the coal
Ibid, 19-20.
Armstrong, "The Role of Coastal Shipping in UK Transport: An Estimate of
comparative Traffic Movements in 1910," The Journal ofTransport History 3rd
series VIII (September 1987):164-178.
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trade. especially that supplying the city of London, the copper ore trade ofsouthwest England
and the goods carriage of Dorsct with a focus on the arrival of railways. Regionally-based
studies notwithstanding, an even clearer micro-view of the industry may be through port
studies. There are a number in existence. of which two will be reviewed in-depth here.
In 1989, the book Liverpool Shipping, Trade and Industry appeared. One oftbe
contributions was a port study. "Liverpool's Mid-Nineteenth Century Coasting Trade," by
Valerie Burton. Burton perceptively notes that in 1989 and even today, "Few previous
attempts have been made 10 describe. let alone quantify and analyse the coasting trade ofany
port in the nineteenth century.''060 This point has been stressed previously in a general sense
and holds equally trUe for coasting ports. Indeed, the need for further research lies at the core
of this work. Using as her principal data source the Liverpool Bills of Entry, Burton profiles
the port fortbe months of March. July and October 185].
Burton illustrates many facets of Liverpool coasting, at least for the one year. First,
Liverpool is a prime illustration of Bruce's technological thesis. As Burton notes. the returns
make no distinction between sail and steam. Fortunately statistics are available showing
Liverpool to be the period's preeminent user ofcoastal steam. There is likewise information
concerning the position of Liverpool coasters in relation to railways. For example. south
eastern British pons tended to trade commodities to/from Liverpool by canals or railway. In
this case distances overland were less than by sea. Despite this. Liverpool coasters still
Valerie Burton, "Liverpool's Mid·ninetecnth Century Coasting Trade," in Burton
(ed.), Liverpool Shipping Trade and industry (Liverpool: Icon, 1989): 27.
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ranged 240 miles to the north and 300 south. In addition. they made frequent trips across the
Irish Sea. This would suggest • healthy trade, despite competition. Liverpool imports also
connect with broader coastal themes. It bas been noted by historians thai: much oCthe traffic
retained by coasters comprised bulk goods.. Liverpool. even at this early stage. fit the trend.
As Burton points out.. the most numerous coastwise imports were coal and iron. For her study
year imports ofcoal averaged 15.000 tons monthly. Copper was imponed coastWise as well.
to the tune of 8,000 tons per annum. This was mainly used in sbipbuilding on Merseyside.
Coal formed the second largest of Liverpool's exports. Although small compared to its later
scope, the trade was surpassed in volume only by iron."
[n addition (0 general coasting lie-ins. Burton makes a number of observations
peculiar to Uverpool. The unique character of each pan is one reason port studies are vital
to understanding British coasting. Burton's findings are numerous.. but we can coocenttate
on a select few. A seldom noted trend in liverpool coasting concerns the origin of many
goods. Many trades reviewed thus far have concentrated on products aCme British Islcs..like
copper and coal, or on providing services. Burton notes. however, that many items shipped
coastwise between Liverpool and London were not ofdomestic manufacture. Much trade
actually entailed the re-distribution of overseas imports among subsidiary ports. This
phenomenon held true for trade with not only London. but also with Leith, Bristol. Swansea.,
Ibid. 28-32. 34, 37.
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Dublin. Whitehaven. Marypon. Greenock, and Glasgow.62
Aside from these transshipped goods, Liverpool was an entrcpot for a large number
of trades. These included lead and silver ores as well as sulphur, soda ash and lime-for
"chemical. soap and glass manufacturers. n Liverpool was the main centre for coastal imports
used in the pottery industry. A large portion of imports to Liverpool from the southwest was
comprised of china clay. In all, about 12,000 tons a month reached Liverpool from the
region. From across the Irish Sea linen was the chief import, accounting for 5.253 boxes and
baIes in July 1853.63
After dealing with imports Burton goes on to examine Liverpool exports more:
closely. Her aim is "To demonstrate the importance of Liverpool's coastal shipping as an
agent of inter-regional trade." Foodstuffs. according to Burton. were possibly the most
important component. These items arrived at Liverpool from Ireland and overseas. and then
were transported to other British and Irish ports. Liverpool was also an important
transshipment point for foreign imports-hides, guano, timber, tobacco, palm, oil and dye
woods. Liverpool acted as distributor for the products of South Lancashire and Cheshire.
especially salt and coal. A wide distribution. Burton believes. indicates widespread demand
for the products Liverpool exponed.6< The importance of the pon to UK internal trade may
!b;d,32.
!b;d., 38-41.
[Md.,45-48.
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be summed up in her own words:
Coastwise exports, then, were widely distributed from Liverpool...Long
before the mid·nineteenth century coastwise shipping was the chief external
link of many coastal regions of Britain...during the second quarter of the
nineteenth century the tonnage deployed in Liverpool's coasting trade more
than doubled and the volume of cargo carried increased to an even greater
extent. Liverpool's enhanced role as an entrepot ofoverseas trade was central
to this developmcnt.65
Burton's study provides an in-depth snapshot ora coasting port and its trading sphere.
The drawback is its concentration on a single year. This limits the degree to which change
over time can be accounted. Nonetheless, the article gives a very detailed account of the port
at a certain point in its history. Burton's emphasis on Liverpool's trade as an influence on its
trading partners is also important. It serves as a reminder that single·port studies lead
naturally into a network of trade involving multiple locales. In Burton's article. a prominent
pan. of Liverpool's trade network includes Maryport. This leads into the next port study and
from there into the wider thesis.
My own 1996 article, "Maryport: A late Coastal Switch to Steam Propulsion," might
JUSl as easily fit the category of technological change as that ofa port study. This preliminary
essay, while exploring general aspects of Maryport coasting, takes as its specific focus the
transition from sail to steam by the port's coasters. The argument grows out of Bruce's
article, though from another perspective. The idea is that despite rapid technological
advances in certain trades, this scenario was by no means universal. Maryport is an example
Ibid., 51.
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which does not fit the outlines of Bruce's thesis. This is important, as many coastal studies
following Bruce's work have focussed on cases of rapid change. Maryport's slow shift from
sail to steam, while surely not unique, is one of the few cases to be studied. This is similar
to the trade in re-exported foreign goods coastwise from Liverpool. My case is that Maryport
was no trend setter in investing in stearn. In fact, in the three decades after 1865 Maryport
shipownern lagged behind the nation as a whole in the percentage of its coasters using steam
propulsion.66
Using the Annual Statements of Navigation and Shipping and lhe Shipping and
Mercantile Gazette as the main sources, a data base was compiled for the years 1865 through
1910. The popularity of sail in relation to stearn gives an overview of the time Maryport
shipowners took to switch to the new technology. In 1865, Maryport had not begun the
transfer to steam on a large scale. Another decade elapsed before substantial amounts of
steam tonnage entered and cleared the port. In Maryport. it would be nearly the tum of the
century before steam movements accounted for more tonnage than sail. Even then,
Maryport's sail tonnage (28 per cent), remained higher than the nation as a whole (25 per
ccnt).67
For sail tonnage to have remained popular for so long there must have been some
advantage to owners in not switching to new methods. The crucial factor may be in the
Clarke, "Marypon," 3.
Ibid.. , 3-14.
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cargoes carried by Maryport's coasters, along with the influence of port infrastructure.
However, the primary sources employed are limited when examining cargoes. The
Parliamentary Papers, like newspaper accounts, often fail to note cargoes carried on any
particular voyage. Nonetheless, what there is can be used to infer the owners' motivations.
Although certain high-end goods were found at Marypon vessels' ports-of-call, their cargoes
often consisted of bulk goods. In addition, many ports at which Maryport's vessels called
lacked modem infrastructure. Low-value bulk goods require low-cost transport above
reliability and speed. Ports having little in the way offacilities exacerbate this situation. Sail
vessels require less capital outlay than steamers and are especially suited to waiting out
inefficient loading procedures. This is a truncated summary of the argument. but it will be
taken up in detail in the following chapter.68
This chapter was written to provide a context in the form of an examination of the
state ofcoastal history at this time. In a number ofareas historians. despite a limited output.
have done a good job chronicling the industry. These include railway versus coaster
competition, various trade studies and the impact of technological change. The latter topic
resurfaces in the Maryport context. Of the areas which have not generated much interest one
of the most glaring are general swveys. Another concerns the topic ofspecific ports and their
coastal activities. While many works exist which study a particular port in general, very few
focus solely on the coastal aspect of trade. This is often referred to, but usually takes a back
Ibid.., 15-17.
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seat to foreign and colonial trades. This gives the reader an impression thai coasting
comprised only a small share of most ports' trade. This was cenainly not the case in
Marypon. There, coasting comprised more than a third ofall shipping activity up to the tum
of the century. It is only by understanding these constituent partS of Britain's coastal trade
network on a micro level that we can move to the macro level ofgeneral surveys. In addition,
there is another important reason for studying places like Maryport. This relates to the
techno!ogical"revo!ution" in shipping. Since Graeme Bruce's article, coastal historians have.
as noted, emphasized areas most innovative in terms of technology. Maryport is a reminder
to historians that not all successful centres of coasting were quick to adopt newer methods.
It will be demonstrated that the town was a successful coasting port well into the final quarter
of the nineteenth century, despite retaining large amounts of sail tonnage. With this in mind
we begin OUI discussion of Maryport coasting by looking at investors in tonnage and the
forms the capital generally took.
Chapter 2
Owuen aad Capital
[n all forms of shipping, whether foreign, or coasting, liner, or tramp. the central piece of
capital is the ship itself. The argwnent might be made that the vessels employed in a
particular trade represent little more than moving containers. Indeed. the cargoes being
carried.. human. or othetWise. provide the impetus for owning merchant tonnage in the first
place. Without passengers a ferry is an unnecessary expense. Similarly. clippers represent an
enormous investment, justified only by copious amounts of tea and other high value
commodities. Despite this, it is the ship. as much as its cargo. which made trade over water
possible in the pre-aircraft era. I
From the earliest reed boats to modem supertankers. the need for merchant shipping
ofvarious designs has turned commercial seafaring into a specialized occupation. If all water
borne goods traffic could be handled by a simple raft anyone could be a shipowner and
conceivably a mariner. The development of multi·masted and trade specific craft turned the
tar into a skilled worker. lncreasing specialization over time likewise created "technological
mariners" such as engineers. wireless operators and now computer tedmidans. The great
cost of investing in such capital insured that the owner became something ofa specialist over
In the period before the telegraph, ships also filled the role of information
exchange mediwn. The ability of ships to traverse long distances allowed their
crews to both pass on and absorb the latest news and culture. Ships also allowed
the transport of media such as leners and newspapers. Prior to the mid-nineteenth
century, ships were perhaps the closest thing to an information superhighway. for
a discussion of the role of ships see Eric W. Sager with Gerald E. Panting,
Maritime Capital: The Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada 1820-1914.
(Montreal: Mcgill-Queens University Press, 1990),47.
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time. From the beginning, the risks enlailed precluded aU but the adventurous businessperson
who could afford the possible loss of his investment. From the risk taking of such
entrepreneurs. the shipping industry developed. Whatever their failings in some regards. they
set the wheels in motion. 1be place occupied by these owners and their capital invesnnents
makes it fitting to discuss them fimas pattofMaryport's coastal trade.
The ships employed in Maryport's coasting trade. display a Dumber of cbaracteristics
which changed somewhat in the period 1855-1889. To begin.. we will examine the vessel
[}'Pes which came onto Maryport registry during this time. Although vessels registered
outside Maryport were frequent visitors. they will be excluded. Instead. only those craft
actually registered in the port will be considered. The port's vessel registry documents
provide the temporal range of this study.
The Board ofTmde 108 Vessel Registry Series covers the period 1855-89. The BT
108s give infonnation concerning the length, tonnage. place/date of build. previous
registrations and details concerning the current owner{s) ofa port's vessels. This provides
infonnatioD on particular ports, including the form shipping capital took. For convenience,
this thesis spans the duration of the BT 108s. The BT 108s present problems in separating
coasting from foreign trade vessels since they do not clearly distinguish between the two. In
fact, such demarcations may be impossible to do with complete prttisioD. There was nothing
to prevent a vessel's deployment in both trades, if OWDers chose to do so. Indeed, there is
evidence from The Empire Agreements and Accounts ofCrew, discussed in Chapter m. that
some vessels served in both the deep-sea and coasting trades. Still, this difficulty can be
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surmounted. Extant coastal agreements provide a profile against which the fleet can be
measured.
The agreements studied indicate a dear preference ofMarypon coaster owners for
small vessels. Eighty-eight per cent of agreements searched were bonoms of less than 200
register tons.! Another eight percent were accounted for by vessels between 200 and 300
hundred tons. Thus. it is reasonably certain that Maryport's coastal fleet consisted
predominantly of craft. under 200 tons. Although some vessels may have been used in the
home trade to the near continent, their small size makes it WJ.1ikely any were regular foreign.
or colonial traders.J
Maryport registries contain seven main vessel rigs, two of which were most closely
associated with the coastWise trade. The ship, a square rigger with three or more masts, was
usually employed in ocean-going trades due to its large size. Other vessel types include three·
masted barques and barquentines plus brigantines and. most numerous of all, brigs. The last
two vessel types carried two masts, with brigs having square sails on both the fore and aft
masts. Since much ofMaryport's shipping was involved in the low-value bulk coal trade. this
made sense. As Simon Ville remarks. "[two masters1pennitted economies in manning and
Unless otherwise: indicated., all tonnage figures given are in register. as opposed to
gross, or net tonnage.
Crew Agreements, Various years.
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facilitated access to the cargo hatches for rapid loading and discharge.... This pair of rigs
comprised the bulk of Maryport'scoasta.l fleet. Fifty-three percent of vessels represented in
the Crew Agreements were brigs. while twenty-seven per cent were brigantines. There were
a number of barques and as schooners as well. Compared to brigs and brigantines. neither
of these craft showed up in significant numbers. No coastal agreements were located for
other rig types.S
Evidence from the Crew Agreements allows some precision in defining the coaster
fleet's net size. To estimate this figure only vessels most likely employed as coasters will be
examined. that is craft under two hundred register IOns, rigged as brigs. or brigantines.
Likewise, steam tonnage played only a small role. Although steamers came to dominate new
registries late in the century. they accounted for few aCthe coastal agreements examined.
Brigs and brigantines continued to serve Maryport's coasting needs into the mid-1880s.
These small vessels had a life expectancy ofjust under a decade. The average for a brig was
Simon Ville. "Patterns ofShipping Invesunent in the Port of Newcastle on Tyne,
1750.1850," NOr/hem HisloryXXV (1989): 209.
Crew Agreements. various years. It is surprising that schooners. the coaster of
cnoice in locales such as Newfoundland, are so poorly represented. Although
twenty schooners under two hundred tons appeared on the town's registry between
1855.1889, few were represented in the Crew AgreeDlents. It is likeLy some were
coasters, but were perhaps employed in the fishery, as in the Newfoundland
context. For these reasons, the discussion of coasting will be based on brigs and
brigantines only.
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8.5 years and just under nine for brigantines.6 This is not especially long-lived.. but the
majority ofthese vessels were purchased second-hand. Table 2.1 gives an indication of the
average net size of Maryport's registered coastal fleet. These figures consist of newly
registered shipping minus those leaving the registry.
Table 2.1
Net Size of Maryport's Registered Coastal Fleet 1855-1889.
DrillS < ZOO Rei' ttr Toas Bri2antines < 200 Reeiskred Tons
Years Average Average Average Average Annual
Annual Annual Vessels Annual Vessel numbers
Tonnage Numbers Tonnage
1855-59 677 77 0.6
1860-64 2,683 21 592
1865-69 2.953 22 1,420 11
1870-74 1,509 12 2.879 2.
1875-79 1.087 2.027 16
188O-ll4 1,010 1.618 13
1885-89 569 1,017
Source. Marypon Vessel Reglstnes. BT 108s, vanous years.
Accepting these small brigs and brigantines were coastal traders allows a number of
observations concerning Maryport's coastal fleet. 1be first is the surprising number of less
than 200 ton brigs registered in Marypon and ostensibly used for coasting. In the 1860s
especially, the tonnage ofbrigs outstripped that ofbrigantines. This is unusual as brigantines,
Great Britain, Marypon Vessel Registries, Board of Trade 108 Series, various
yea<s.
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like the rarely observed schooners., have a comparative advantage in the coasting, since their
fore-and-aft sails afforded considerable rr..:moeuverability along a coastline. However. much
of Maryport's coastal trade did not involve such voyages. The most common trade was
across the lrish Sea, where square: sails might be a more efficient choice. Such short-sea trade
accounted for 152,068 tons entering aod c1earing Maryport in 1875. compared lOonly 30,321
tons of general coastal shipping. Prior to this date the trades were not separated in official
documents. For sail coasters these proportions changed little during the next decade.7
Another striking feature ofMaryport'scoastaI sail fleet was its temporal span. Rising
quickly in numbers and tonnage between 1855 and 1865, the fleet declined steadily after
1875. The onset of the growth period coincided with developments in Cumbrian trade and
industry. In February 1845 the Maryport and Carlisle Railway was opened. linking the port
to inland coaJ pits and increasing its export trade. Two years later a further impetus to trade
was created by the connection of Macyport to Whitehaven and Hanington via the
Whitehaven lunction Railway. By 1853 Maryport exported 269,000 tons ofcoal by sea to
coastal and foreign markets. Equally important was the opening of the Elizabeth Dock for
coal traffic in October 1857. Successful from its inception. the dock opening corresponded
almost exactly with the beginning of huge-scale expansion ofMaryport's coasting fleet.'
Maryport Vessel Registries. BT lO8s. various years; Great Britain, House of
Commons. Parliamentary Papers (BPP) (1876, LXXII.289), (1886. LXIV. 373).
Herbert and Mary Jackson. Holme Shipping Line (Workington: Firpress, 1991); 9-
10; J. D. Marshall and John K. Walton, The Lake Counties From 1830 to the Mid·
Twenlieth Century (Manchester: Manchester University. \98\).34-35; Maryport
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A second growth period., at least for brigantines. began in the early 18705. A
noticeable decline by brigs relative to brigantines may have reflected the owners' desire to
maximize the value of tonnage. Neither square-rigged brigs. nor schooners were best suited
to both coastal and short-sea trading. One might suppose lhat the brigantine. with its
"combined" rigs., was the most flexible afthe vessels. Investors may gradually have realized
its suitability 10 Marypon's ttades. The expansion of brigantines may also have been spurred
by a OOorn in West Cumberland's iron industry. Coasters nOlonly carried the metal itselfbut
also the coal or coke used by county furnaces. As this trade, unlike coal. was centred on the
English coast., the more nimble brigantines might have garnered additional favour.9
The coastal sailing fleet declined almost as rapidly as it had expanded-its fall taking
little more lhan a decade. The fleet's absolute size began declining in the mid-l 870s. at the
same time steamers first made inroads into the trade. In Maryport this change was occasioned
by a few entreprenelUS such as the Hine brothers., Wilfred and Alfred and their investments
in the Holme Line ofsteamers. No long-term coastal steamer agreements were found during
this survey. apart from single passages between ports. Despite this. the Parliamentary Papers
and newspaper shipping reports indicate a steady rise in entrances and clearances by coastal
steam after the mid-1870s. In 1875, for example, 22,039 tons of coastal steam entered and
cleared Maryport with cargo. By 1885 this fi~ rose to 61,679 tons. Sail coasters still
Vessel Registries. BT I08s. various years.
Ibid; Marshall and Walton, 45.
62
accounted for a majority ofcoastwise movements. but time and technology~ catching
Up.11t
The strategy ofemploying sail tonnage late into the steam era worked for many yean
as trade expanded along with the sail Oeet's net size. By the laiC 181Os. however. the wisdom
of the continued usc of sail was in doubt. The: nwnbers of new registries declined
dramatically after mid4eeade, further reducing the fleeL During the decade 1875-1884.
Maryport's registry averaged about six new vessels per year in all trades. The period 1885-
1889 recorded only seven new vessels purchases in total. Although steam tonnage
movements increased from 1885-90. the vessels were more frequently registered outside the
port. Perhaps a strategy that had been successful for three decades was too ingrained to
abandon. or the alternative of switching to steam may have been 100 costly fOl" most local
investors. Whatever the reason. the halcyon days of Marypon coasting were coming to an
end by the I880s.II
One must wonder why these owners employed sail tonnage Wltil such a I~ dale. The
answer may lie in the nature ofMaryport's coastal trade. Let us asswne thaJ: Maryport owners
prior to the 1880s were unable to make a profit from sail tonnage. Given their position as
businessmen, such a situation could not continue unchecked. Logically, owners would try
to maximize profits by tactics such as reducing crew size relative to tonnage (the man-ton
Maryport Vessel Registries, BT 108s: BPP, (1876, LXXII. 289), (1886, LXIV.
373).
Maryport Vessel Registries, BT 108s, various years.
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ratio). If such schemes failed. a particular owner would have little choice but to convert to
steam in order to remain competitive. Failing this. he would probably be forced to quit the
business entirely. Since they did not make an early switch to steamers., or discontinue use of
sail craft, we can only assume that Marypon owners continued to reap a profit from their
sailing vessels. I~
Although this assumption is logical it does nOl explain the factors which allowed the
viable retention ofsail in Maryport coasting. The answer can likely be found in the cargoes
carried by such craft. and the port infrastructure of Maryport's trading partners. Here the
Shipping World Yearbook is a valuable primary source that describes nOl only the imports
and exports of these ports, but also their facilities. In the case of cargoes. however. such
information is only suggestive. The Yearbook gives no clues as to what any specific vessel
carried at any time. An alternative might have been the Bills of Entry. but they seldom list
cargo data for coasters. [}
Maryport sailing voyages were most concentrated to ports that lacked an improved
infrastructure. According to shipping intelligence published by the Shipping and Mercantile
Gazette, sail coasters generally favoured ports such as Dwnfries, Wigtown. Portaferry and
Strangford. Dumfries and Wigtown were both noted by the Shipping World Yearbook as
David Clarke, Maryport: A Late Coastal Switch to Steam PropuJsion. 1865-1910,
Proceedings ofthe Steam at Sea Conference (Hull: University of Hull Press.
Forthcoming),15.
Shipping World Yearbook (London: Gresham. 1887).
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having little modem equipment such as cranes. In addition. the harbour at Wigtown was dry
at low tide. Portaferry and StIangford do not even merit entries in the Gazetle. perhaps being
considered too insignificant by its editors. 14
To reduce operating costs in such small ports. the crews rather than stevedores, or
mechanical devices were used to load and unload vessels. This practice was done throughout
the period with sailing vessels but was anathema to steam. owners. Costs in primitive ports
could be further reduced by sailing the vessel onto sloping beaches at low tide. When the
craft came to rest on the bottom, cargoes could be loaded onto horse carts for transpon to
shore. By such means a lack of infrastructure. which was detrimental to high-cost steamers,
helped to create a definite niche for the older tcchnology.u
Sailing vessels maintained a comparative advantage where low transport costs were
imponant and there was no hurry to receive goods. Sailing tonnage generally cost less to
operate than steamers, since in many cases sail had a book value of close to zero. This
allowed shipowners to maximize profits on low-value cargoes. Certain cargoes such as
bricks. clay and chimney pots were best handled in a slow, deliberate manner to avoid
breakage. Steamers were most profitably employed when a customer needed quick and
reliable transport of a high-value product such as manufacture5.16 Neither Dumfries nor
Ibid.; Shipping and Mercantile Gazetre, various years.
John Annstrong, "Management Response in British Coastal Shipping to Railway
Competition," The Northern MarinerlLe Marin du NardI (1997), 15.
/bid., 15-17.
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Wigtown handled much in the way of such high-value commodities. The main products
passing lhrough the fonner port were general merchandise, potatoes, seeds and timber. The
Latter imponed pig-iron, timber, grain. coal and manwe. while exporting agricultural produce
and baled goods. None of these products was suited to steam transport and their trade was
certainly a factor in retaining sail tonnage. Another possibility has been suggested by Adrian
Jarvis. Although steamers preferred larger ports, Maryport's sailing coasters could also be
found there. Jarvis suggests that in Liverpool's Central Docks a form of"ghenoisation"
occurred. Coasters were often afforded the worst facilities and the lowest priority for entering
docks. It might be natural for coaster owners to invest in cheaper sail tonnage. which would
lessen the impact of costly delays.l?
Having suggested why Maryport owners long remained loyal to sail, we should
inquire as 10 where their coasters came from. As with most ports, tonnage came onto registry
from numerous sources both inside and outside the United Kingdom. Among British-built
vessels a wide variety of locales were represented. Including Aberdeen; Workington:
Sunderland; Liverpool; Belfast and Maryport itself. Most locales provided only one or two
vessels, with one-quarterofthe total coming from Marypon. '1 A few coasters came from the
Shipping and Mercanlile Gazelte, 1887. Adrian Jarvis, Liverpool Central Docks:
/799-/905 An fllwlrated Hislory(Bath: Bath Press 1991), 124-127. As for
foreign-going craft. these retained sail longer in any event. This was due to the
inefficiency ofearly steam engines over longer distances. See J. Graeme Bruce.
"The Contribution ofCross·Channel and Coastal Vessels to Developments in
Marine Practice," Journal ofTransport History IV (1959), 65·80.
Maryport Vessel Registries, BT 108s, various years.
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United States. The Ethiopian. owned by the engineer Henry Fisher, was built in New Haven,
Connecticut Other vessels came from Baltimore. Massachusetts and New York. Yet only
about three per cent had American origins. Even rarer were the occasions where lhat
Maryport owners bought vessels built in other European countries. Although there was one
French and one Prussian-built vessel. a reliance on European-built tonnage was never
common in Maryport's shipowning community.'Q
Table 2.2
Marvnort-New Coaster Re~istries bv Place ofQri"in
Built
M"'Y]>Ort
Other UK Locales
Canadian
Foreign
Pentatage of New Registries
9.6
29.8
47.1
4.8
UnknownlIlIegible 8.6
Source. Maryport Vessel Reglstnes, BT 108s, vanousyears. Numbers do not equal 100010
due to rounding.
The largest single soW'Cc of Maryport vessels was British North America. especially
from the mid-1850s through the 1870s. British North American ships In some years
comprised over half of aU new shipping of the Maryport register. with all coming from Nova
Scotia.. New Bnmswick. Prince Edward Island or Quebec.lO Forty·seven per cent of new
coaster registries from 1855·89 were Canadian-built. It is no exaggeration to say that
Ibid.
!bid.
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Maryport's coastal fleet had more ora Canadian than a British flavour. (See table 2.2).
It might be desirable to look briefly at the way such vessels became a trade
commodity. Certainly these vessels must have been an attractive option to British buyers in
terms of price. Eric Sager and Gerald Panting present evidence of a considerable price
advantage accruing to British north American tonnage from the 18305. Domestic vessels of
that period nonnally cost between £10 and £25 sterling per ton. Even the cheapest British
craft. those from Sunderland, commanded between £10 and £12 sterling a ton. while top US
bonoms were about $55.00 per ton (£11). This was considerably higher than Atlantic
Canadian vessels. whose prices remained relatively stable over a long period. Even by the
late 18605 a Nova Scotia or New Brunswick vessel with a five-to seven·year "A" rating at
L10yds cost only S30.00 to $40.00 per tOR (£6-8) fitted for sea. However, these numbers are
greater than what Maryport investors would nave nonnally paid. Sager and Panting's
statistics concern newly-built tonnage, whereas 96 per cent of Maryport's "Canadian fleet"
was purchased second_hand.21
There were a nwnber of reasons why British North American tonnage was so
attractive to buyers in Maryport and other British locales. Being largely of softwood
construction-usually pine or spruce-eolonial vessels had a natural price advantage over a
ship constructed of oak.. for example. For the British owner this could be a double-edged
Eric W. Sager and Gerald E. Panting, Maritime Capital: The Shipping Industry in
Atlantic Canada 1820-1914 (Montreal: Mcgill-Queens University Press, 1990).
68-70.
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sword. During the first balfofthe nineteenth century Canadian-built vessels had a reputation
for being short-lived. The softwood hulls were particularly vulnerable to dry rot and
deterioration. Compounding this problem were inferior construction techniques. such as the
use of improperly seasoned timber. Prior to mid<entury there was some justification in
calling colonial vessels "coffins ofdeath." But this did not continue.:!2
Table 2.3
A.,....... ..c Vessel Life bv Decade Built tNova Scotia and New Brunswick Fleets)
Ofl:ade Average Life (Excluding Traosfen)
18205 9.1
18305 9.5
1840s lO.3
18505 12.1
18605 11.5
18705 12.9
1880s 14.9
Source. Ene Sager and Gerald Pannng. Maritime Capital. The Shlppmg Industry In Atlanlle
Canada 1820-/914 (MontreaJ: Mcgill-Queens. 1990),66. These figures exclude transfers.
but marine disasters and~ registries are retained. Excluding such vessels. along with
those sold foreign, the numbers show greater stagnation in vessel life.
L10yds surveyors insisted on improved building techniques if Atlantic Canadian
vessels were to receive A ratings. A variery of improvements were implemented. which
Sager and Panting discuss in detail. and by 1850 it was not uncommon for New Bnmswick
vessels 10 receive an A rating for four years and sometimes as long as seven. From the 18205
Sager and Panting, Maririme Capiral. 62. 63.
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on. the average life ofsuch vessels continued to grow. By the 18705 L10yds ratings of A9 and
A10 were common for such oottoms. 1be tarnished reputation which had dogged these ships
was largely gone by the 18505, and British buyers continued to purchase them for use In any
trade where (ow price was a critical consideration.tl
Table 2.4
Avera"e Tonna"e ofNewIv Re"i~ered Coastal Vessels bv Decade and Rill'
Decade
1850s
1860s
Brig
126
196
BrigntiDe
129
135
Average
127.5
165.5
1870s 157 126 141.5
Source. Maryport Vessel Reglstnes, BT 108s, vanous years, Eric Sager and Gerald Panting,
Maritime Capital: The Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada 1820·l914, (Montreal: Mcgill-
Queens University Press. 1990),55.
Over time new registries in Marypol1., whether Canadian-built or otherwise. tended
toward a general increase in size. This was not the case for the coastal fleet, however.
Marypon's coastwise trade to small ports with little infrastructure provided a certain logic
to relatively static tonnages. Brigs and brigantines peaked during the sixties, declining on
average in the seventies. (see table 2.4). Even in the 18605 brigs only increased to an average
ofslightly less than 200 tons, with brigantines at 135 tons. In small poorly.equipped ports
such as Wigtown and Dwnfries, even two hundred tons was beyond the optimum operationaJ
size forvessels. 2•
Sager and Panting, Maritime Capital, 62-68.
Maryport Vessel Registries, BT 108s, various years.
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[f we accept these conclusions about the general nature of Marypon's coasting
capital. what of the people who invested in it? Just as officiaJ records give information on
vessels. they also provide evidence about Ma.JYlXH1's shipowning community. Then: are a
number ofquestions which Deed to be addressed concerning these individuals. including the
general uea from which they were drawn. their principal occupations and the pace at which
a specialization of shipowning developed.
New vessel shares on the Maryport registry were nonnally owned by individuals
under their own name. O'M\crship might take the Conn either of sole-ownersbip ofa vessel.
orpart-owncrship with one or more other investors. From 1854 all vessel shares were by law
measured in sixty·rowtbs. although this had been the nonnal pattern for some years.
Translated., this meant that a sole owner would possess sixty-four shares in any vessel. The
ownerofthirty-tWO shares owned haifa vessel and so on. Part-ownership operated under the
principle of'"'tenants-in-common."Under this system the death. oCa partner meant that shares
reverted to his heirs instead of the other partners. Owners of shares could dispose of them
as they wished wilhout regard to the prefc:n:nce offellowownen. Also, DO one was permitted
to sell or mortgage the shares of another investor. When shares were owned by a company
or partnership individual interests were not noted. In the case of Maryport this latter fonn of
ownership was insignificant as only one such "body corporate", the Maryport Steam
Shipping Company, was listed as an investor. Likewise, financial institutions such as banks
played no direct role in Maryport shipowning. As Simon Ville notes for Newcastle. "[This
reflected} the minimal role played by financial institutions in the financing of industry. Their
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role was viewed more in terms of providing working capital to masters during a voyage."
Although this comment refer.> to the late eighteenth century, it appears to nold true for
Victorian Maryport as well.2:I In Maryport the individual owner. albeit sometimes owning
shares jointly, was the backbone of shipping investment.
Decade
Re1!isrered
Table 1.5
Newly Registered Vessels by Number ofOwners (All Vessels)
Number 0 Owners on Remtrv
>6 .
18505· 16 2 2 I I II
48.48% 6.06% 6.06% 3.03% 3.03% 0% 33.33%
1860, 47 10 8 8 I 2 21
48.45% 10.31% 8.25% 8.25% 1.03% 2.06% 21.65%
18705 33 8 I 5 2 6 4
55.93% 13.56% 1.69% 8.47% 3.39% 10.17% 6.78%
1880s 20
68.97% 20.69% 3.45% 6.90"/a 0% ()OlD 0%
Source. Maryport Vessel Reglstnes. BT 108s, vanous years, Sarah Palmer. '"Investors m
London Shipping, 1820·50," Maritime History II (1972):51. -'ncludes the years 1855-59
only, the fonner date being the stan of the BT 108 series of registries. Rows may not equal
I()()O/O due to rounding.
This should not be taken to mean that Maryport-registered craft were overwhelmingly
owned by a single individual. Indeed, throughout the period 1855-89 jointly-owned craft
were common, although less so in later years. The pattern of ownership according to the
number of owners is Hlustrated in table 2.5.
Sarah Palmer, "Investors in London Shipping, 1820-50," Maritime History [I
(1972); 49-50; ViUe, "Patterns ofShipping Investtnent in the Port ofNewcast1e,"
212.
nThe single-owner vessel was by far the most important~ type in Maryport for
lhe entire period. (See table l.S) Yet, there were quite a few vessels with a large number of
owners.. During the: 18505 and 1860s it was not uncommon for over ten investors to be part-
owners of a single vessel. In a small Dlunber of cases the figure was over twenty. Sarah
Palmer notes certain advantages in co-ownership. For one thing. large numbers ofowners
could share costs and risks in the event of loss. By this means the individual minimized his
liability. At the same time. ofco~. Palmer admits that such arrangements could present
management problems.16
Perhaps the clearest trend illustrated by table 2.5. however, is the trend away from
multiple ownership anangements. From comprising over thirty per cent of all registries in
the 18505. vessels owned by more than six individuals fell to less than ten per cent by the
18705. This trend accelern.ted in the following decade when 00 vessels came onto registry
with more than four investors. Almost ninety per cent of newly-register'ed shipping now had
only one or two ownen. From an average of5.4 owners per vessel in the 18SOs. lhe nwnber
[ell to 1.5 investors thirty years later.!'
Palmer and Ville found similar trends in London and Newcastle. Both historians
speculated as to why investors might ·'go it alone" more often over time. By 1824, according
to Palmer, the price of shipping began to fall and thus remained in reach. of a single investor.
[bid.• 52.
Maryport Vessel Registries. BT 108s. Various Years.
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A similar trend may have been present from the 1850s. allowing Maryport buyers to
capitalize on cheap tonnage. The tonnage glut that began to develop in 1854 00 British and
international markets gives a further reason to believe this.~ trends Palmer and Ville
me:ntion may apply to Maryport buyers from the 1850$. but should also be treated with
caution. For example. the growth ofmarine insurance during the nineteenth century made
the possibility of losing an entire ship of less concern to the investor. Some insurance
companies funher reinforced the trend by making loans only on entire vessels. For the
coasting trade this line ofreasoning can be taken only so far, since coasters were not as likely
to be insured as deep-sea vessels.2t
Another bend emerging from the registries is the local nature of Maryport
shipowning.ln the thirty-four years after 1855 the overwhelming majority ofinvestots in the
town's shipping came from within its boundaries. Non-~ident owners, or ulcast those from
outside Cumbria. were almost non-existent. Aside from Maryport itself, the only locales to
appear with any frequency in the registries are other Cumbrian towns. such as Whitehaven
and Workington. A few owners were from Scottish pons such as Port Glasgow. Of from
coastal towns as far south as Liverpool. Generally speaking lhough.. investors were from
Cumberland.!J The gap between resident and non-resident investors was wide and increased
over time. (See table 2.6)
Palmer, "Investors," 52: Ville. "Shipping Investment.... 219.
Maryport Vessel Registries. BT lOSs. various years.
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Table 2.6
local Verses Outside Investment in Newtv re2i5tered ShiDDln2. All Vessels
v,..
1870
1875
1880
1885
66%
87.5%
75%
100%
Other Locales
34%
12.5%
25%
0%
1889 )000/0 0%
Source. Marypon Vessel Registries. BT 108s. 1870-1889.
IfMarypon's shipping investors were fairly nomogeneous in tenns of residence, they
were less so in terms of occupation. Between 1855 and 1889 well over thirty occupations
were given by shipping investors. Some were obviously linked to the sea. There were. for
example. masl:er mariners. sailmakers and shipbuilders. There were also individuals with no
occupational connection with the sea. like accountants. farmm. butchers and booksellers.
lbe connection ofthe first group to shipoy.ning is obvious but the secood group is less clear.
It is Likely that.. as Ville reasons. '"(they ~J quite simply...talcing advantage of the
oppommities shipping offered to the small. passive, non-specialist investor..,JO Ville's
hypothesis is supported by the Maryport data. When oon-maritime investors appear they are
routinely paired with persons Iin.lr:ed to the sea. For example. the Eliza. a 131-too brig. had
four owners. They were a masttr mariner with twenty eight shares. a merchant with sixteen
shares. and a butcher and a yeoman. also with eight shares. It is likely that owners with the
Ville, "Shipping Investment," 212·213.
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greatest connection to shipping had the more active role in management.J1
As one might guess. most shares were accounted for by those in sea-related
occupations. Master mariners. shipbuilders. shipbrokers. ship chandlers. ship riggers and
harbour masters owned about thirty-six per cent of all shares in new tonnage. Professional
shipowners accounted for the largest share-holdings in newly registered vessels with about
foIty per cent ofall new tonnage. All others accounted for less than a quarter of total shares.
Among this Janer group, however. are trades Ville considered maritime-related occupations.
Newcastle's economic prosperity, like Maryport's, relied in large measure on coal exports.
For this reason Ville placed coal workers among the maritime sector. The same could be said
of Maryport. which exponed much of its coal across the Irish Sea by ship. Therefore. the
numbers of maritime-oriented shareholders may be even higher than indicated. Among the
investors were listed a coal miner, coal agents, and coal trimmers. Nonetheless. the impact
ofthis group as owners should not be overstated. (0 most cases such persons owned only a
few shares of any particular craft.n
The registries do not indicate why any panicular group invested in shipping.
Prominent among non-professional shipowners in Maryport were master mariners. Palmer
indicates that in London it was common for masters to receive shares in a vessel as part of
wages. If a master owned part of a vessel he would be induced to playa very active role in
Maryport V~i Registries, BT 108s, various years.
Ibid.; Ville, "Shipping [nvestment," 21-213.
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profit ma"<imi23tion. This form ofownership by m.a..steI'$ played a smaller role in Maryport,
if it existed at aiL Acconfing to Palmer. masters geoera.I.ly owned but a small portion of most
vessels on Loodon registries.. In Maryport, however. the trend was lOwan:i masters owning
most or all oCa vessel. 10 addition. such master-owners tended to appear on a vessel's first
registry, an unlikely situation if the shares were received from the owners as part payment.
Obviously, those masters who owned vessels outright were oot being paid for service in
Palmer's London study. It is more likely Maryport masters simply invested on their own
initiative.JJ
Merchants were another imponant group ofowners mentioned by Palmer. This group
also was important in Marypon. The connection between merchants and shipowning. both
in London and Maryport, presents difficulties. The BT 108s are mute as to whether these
persons invested to carTY their own products or ifsbipowning was a separate venture. Palmer
fc:eis that Bills of Entry might establish such tinks. although she admits she has ootdone this.
"The london stUdy provides an example in the form. ofHenry Warburton. an MP who was
also a timber merclw1t. Warburton invested in his own ship to save wasted time chartering
timber lnmSpOIU. It might be assumed that similar motivations prompted Maryport's
merchant community to invest. Unlike Warbwton. however. Marypon's merchantso~
but a few shares in any particular vessel and their importance declined markedly over time.).!
Palmer, "Investors," 58: Maryport Vessel Registries. BT l08s, various years.
Palmer, "Investors," 56-7; Maryport Vessel Registries. BT 108s. various years.
Merchants were also concerned with keeping a vessel gainfully employed, the
nAnother imponant group were "professional and priva1e individuals," as Pa1mercalls
lhem. The Largest such grouping in Maryport referred to themselves as "gentlemen." Others
included cngioccrs.y~ painters and aa:ountants. Ville sums up this group in a way that
probably applies to Marypon as much as Neweastlc. "Many gent1mlCn were formerly in the
shipping industry. or the coal trade and had retired because ofmeir age. or wealth. or in the
belief that., having accumulated sufficient funds. they were above active involvement in
cormnerce."n Like merchants.lh.is group was especially important in the years priOfto 1870.
Maryport investors were mainly "groups of men." This categorization leaves out an
important component aCme IOwn'S sbipowning: women investors. The shipping registries
invariably record these women as either "spinsters" or "widows." This was a common
practice in the ninettemh..cenrury.~ women were routinely defined by their relationship
to men.. As part of their dowry young brides might receive vessel shares. Wldows also relied
on shares for an inc:ome. This was especially important in an age when: state welfare
programs were non-existent and werling women were less common than today. Ville refers
to ship shares as -a rather unsteady from of income" for these women. At least two Maryport
widows. however. owned a vessel outright. Mary Melmore's Hazard remained in her
possession for fourteen years before being wrecked at Kirkcudbrigbt. Likewise, Mary
Robinson's coaster Ama Mary was a source of income over a twenty-six year period. In fact,
converse of which could be more expensive than putting it [0 sea.
Ville, "Shipping Investn\enl.." 213.
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both women owned shares in a number of~~ls_ For these two widows shipownmg
must have Formed a substantial part of their incomcs_ Although women like Melmo~ and
Robinson are not common. the role of female shipownen in Maryport must not be
overlooked."
Table 2.7
Percentage ofNew Shipping Shares Owned by Occupational Groupings in Maryport
ShmesOwned
Year Shipowaen Maritime-Related Occupations Othen
1855 0% 43% 57%
1860 0% 63% 37%
1865 40% ZOO/O 40%
1870 32% 36% 32%
1875 87% 13% 0%
1880s· 40"/0 36% 24%
Scurce. Marypon Vessel RcgtStrtcs. BT lOSs. vanous years. -Due to the small numbers of
registries during the 188050 this portion of the table consists of a moving average from the
years 1880. 1885 and 1889. This will. bopefulJy. give a more balanced picture of share
holdings after the 1870$.
Table 2.'7 above indicates not only the distribution of shareholding but also gives
some indication of the professionalization of srupowning. Marypon's registries show
increasing specialization on !he part of investors over time. In 18S5 and 1860 no investors
yet defined themselves as shipowners. Perhaps this is not surprising, since the lenn
"shipowner" did not appear in London's trade directories until early in the century. Assuming
the occupation given ona registry constituted a person's primary means ofeaming a living.
Ibid. 213-214; Maryport Vessel Registries, BT 108s, various years.
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shipowning must have remained secoodazy to other concerns for most investors of the time.
As table 2.7 indicates, the percentage of investors who considered themselves shipowners
peaked in 1875. Through to 1889, however. professional shipowners remained the dominant
investors in Maryport tonnage.)7
IfMaryport shipping was, by the 1880s., dominated by professional shipowners. does
this mean that large numbers of men and women had acquired multi·vessel fleets'J'l' For the
most part. the answer is no. Although certain names recur as co-owners. a great many held
only a few shares in any particular vessel. For such pe~ns it is hardly appropriate to speak
of ownership ofan actual fleet of vessels. There were, however. a number of persons whose
shipowning interests went far beyond that of the casual investor. For these men-and they
were all men-owning their own tonnage, or at least a controlling interest, was a serious
business. The willingness of more persons to classify themselves as "shipowners'" attests to
this. While these men remained a small clique among Maryport owners their importance was
far larger than their numbers.
There were no more than ten to a dozen individuals who could claim to have bonafide
fleets based in Maryport. These included the Hine brothers; Robert Ritson and his partner
William Ostle; Thomas Benn and John Melmore. For our purposes we will examine the
fleets of all but the last of these men. BeM, Ritson and Ostle are especially important, as
Palmer, "Investors," 55.
From this point a "fleet" will be regarded as consisting only of those vessels in
which one individual owns a craft outright, or at least has a controlling interest.
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their vessels fit most closely the profile of Maryport's coaster fleet. Ritson and Ostle's
holdings include seven vessels. three owned entirely by them. for which Crew Agreements
were used in this study.19
Thomas Benn began acquiring shipping capital wilh the Gertrude in 1856. lbis
remained the only ship in wbich he owned controlling interest until the addition ofthe James
in 1859. Benn then bought no new vessels until 1864. It is from this date with the addition
of two further vessels.. that Beon's fleet may be said to date. For the next dozen years Benn
maintained a fleet ofbetween four and seven vessels, its peak size reached in 1870. In many
ways Senn's assemblage of ships reflects Maryport shipping in general during the period.
The majority ofms ships were brigs and included no steam. tonnage. At various times Bean
owned at least five ofms vessels outright. but sold offsomc shares over time. At one point.
for example Benn owned the brigs Gertrude and Wanderer on his own. By 1872 Senn had
sold rwenty-eight shares afthe Wanderer and by 1876 only retained sixteen shares. [0 that
same year Benn also had sold sixteen shares afthe Gertrude. This was about the time Benn
began liquidating his shipping interests and 1876 was the last year which he controlled
multiple ships. For the next two years only the Mandover remained of his fleet, and after that
nothing at all. At its height from 1864 until t876, however, Benn controlled an average of
5.4 vessels per annum.-40
Maryport Vessel Registries, BT 108s, various years.
Ibid.
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Robert Ritson began his fleet somewhat later than Thomas Benn. As an owner he is
a different case. Having come from an established shipbuilding tradition. Ritson usually
listed himself as a shipbuilder in the registries rather than as a shipowner. On the surface
Ritson appears somewhat unimportant as a fleet owner. having sole control of only one
vessel,lhe A/lerby. This perception is misleading. In fact, Ritson owned or held controlling
interest in a number of other vessels. but always jointly with either his business partner
William 0stIe. or members ofthe Ritson clan. Like Beon. Ritson's fleet was founded on sail
rather than steam tonnage, again not surprising considering his start before the 18705. Unlike
Benn. however. Ritson's fleet never numbered more than four vessels at anyone time.
Nonetheless. the Ritson fleet did number either three, or four craft per year from 1874 to
1888, with an average of3.6.~'
By far the largest fleet in Maryport was owned by Wilfred Hine. sometimes in
partnership with his brother Alfred, but more often alone. 1be vessels owned by the brothers
feU under the blanket designation afthe Holme Line. Hine began acquiring tonnage later than
either Benn.or Ritson, but soon eclipsed his competitors. From 1877 to 1889 the Holme Line
averaged 13.7 ships a year, more than double Benn and Ritson's numbers combined. By the
1880s the Holme line was the uncrowned king ofMaryport's shipping industry. Although
new purchases fell off markedly over time, the Hine brothers continued 10 acquire ships. Of
alilhe Maryport fleet owners, Wilfred Hine was the one who most frequently invested in
Ibid.
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tonnage on his own. In this way he represented a new breed of shipowner. The Holme Line
also relied on steamers as did no other of the port's investors. In addition., the Hines' were
given to buying new, rather than second-hand tonnage. This is not to say that the Holme Line
contained no sailing craft or older bottoms but rather that it made a decisive break with the
pon's older ways of doing business.~2Table 2.8 gives the average size of the three fleets
during their main decades ofoperation.
Table 2.8
Hine, Ritson and Beon Fleets during the 186Os, I870s and 1880s.
Avera2e Number ofShi os Per Annum
OwuerName
Wilfred Hine
Robert Ritson
1860.
NA
1.5"*
1870,
2.7
1880.
14.8
3.6
Thomas Benn 3.6 3.9 NA
Source. Maryport Vessel RegIstries. BT 108s. vanous years. ·This starts WIth the year 1875.
in which Hine began building his fleet. ··Inc1udes only the years 1868.9. Prior to this no
ships are recorded as being controlled by Ritson.
The stories of these shipowners have attracted the attention oflocal historians. which
is understandable given their importance 10 the towo's shipping industry. To flesh out this
discussion we will look briefly at the most important owner linked to coasting, Robert
Ritson. As a fleet owner Ritson was by nature atypical of the average investor. Despite this.
he is a good choice for study due both to the material available on him and his impact on the
Ibid.; See also Jackson and Jackson. Holme Shipping Line. This book contains a
good detailing of the Holme Line ships. including its sixteen sailing vessels and
lWenty·seven steamers.
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town's maritime life.~)
Robert Ritson's involvement in shipowning might seem minimal ifone takes only
a cursory glance at the documentation He considered himselfa builder rather than owner of
ships in me first instance. As table 2.8 indicates. he was the outright owner of much less
tonnage than the Hine brothers and owned less than Thomas Benn. However, Ritson's
importance to the port's maritime life cannot be overstated. During the course of his career
Ritson owned at least some shares in over twenty vessels registered in the port. lnc1uding
those in which he owned a controlling interest, usually jointly with Ostle or his sons John and
Thomas. this certainly qualified Ritson as one of Maryport's premier shipowners. Yet it was
his main business, along with ancillary interests, as much as investing which made him a
major player.
Robert Ritson's family connection with shipbuilding began with his father John. a
manager at Maryport's Peat & Co. Shipbuilding yard. Departing Peat's in 1830, Ritson
helped found the finn of Huddleston & Ritson. Located on Irish Street. the yard would
expand over time into Marypcrt's biggest yard. Over 100 vessels were finally constructed by
the finn, starting out with wooden sailing craft, and then to iron and steel and finally
Wilfred Hine, although the town's most important shipowner by tonnage, will not
be detailed at length as his fleet was primarily foreign·going. However, a portion
of his fleet was involved with coasting. One of Hine's steamers, the 41 ton clinker
Elizabeth and Ann, was employed specifically to carry coal from Maryport to
Belfast. Other ofHine's vessels including the Forest Holme. Greta Holme and
Isel Holme, also made voyages under coasting articles, although they were mainly
employed in the foreign and colonial trades. See Jackson and Jackson, Holme
Line, 64-5, 70-1, 77, 81.
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steamers. Ritson's had the capacity 10 both build new and. repair old vessels. the latter jobs
being carried out on patent slipways. After 1862. with the closing of its competitor KeIsick
Wood. the Ritson yard became the sole shipbuilder.> in Maryport. Situated on the River Ellen,
onJy sixty feet across at high tide. new constructions had to be launched broadsides. The
business was fairly long-lived, launching its last sailing craft in 1897. Their final vessel was
the steel steamer Lycidas in 1902:"
Robert and his brother William joined the business in 1840. At about the same time
lhe firm was renamed Robert Ritson & Co.• indicating Robert's importance to the company.
Jobndied in 1844. followed by William in 1866. From this point Robert look control ofthc
yard, bringing in his own. sons. The finn enjoyed a reputation for quality and its success was
reflected in the family. Robert. also a IP. erecled a fine red sandstone estale in 1850 which
he named '"Ellenbank." Another mansion. built by a brother. Thomas. in 1863 rounded out
the family holdings and the two residences remained the homes of their descendants for a
number of years. Robert himself died in 1887, having taken the family business to its
pinnacle of success. For much of the period Ritson remained at the fore of Maxyport's
nautical business community.~5
Herbert and Mary Jackson., Tragic Maryport Sea Captain's Letters Workington:
Firpress, 1991), 25; Jackson and Jackson. Holme Line, 22; Michael K. Stammers,
"The High Character Obtained by Cumberland Ships-A Shipbuilding District in
the Nineteenth Centwy" International Journal ofMaritime History X (1998),
forthcoming, 7,8.
Jackson and Jackson, Tragic Letters, 25-6.
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His links in this regard include a more indirect interest: railways. For many years.
starting in 1859. Ritson was a member of the Maryport and Carlisle Railway's board of
directors. His frequent partner in ship investments. William Ostle. was a director prior to this
and served until his death in 1875. In that year Ritson rose to the position of Deputy-
Chainnan of the committee, replacing his [ate friend. In fact., the Ritson connection to the
railway was begun by Robert's father John who. along with Ostle. sat on the original
management committee that proposed the railway in 1835.46
Ritson's interest in the railway was intimately linked to his position as an owner and
builder of ships. Much of the line's revenue was accounted for by iron and especially coal
exports, both of which were often exported by ship to both foreign and coastal ports after
reaching Maryport's docks via the railway. Coal in particular needed transport by sea,
especially to Irish ports. The importance ofthese trades to the Maryport and Carlisle railway
is illustrated by its half·yearly statement of revenue. Passengers. goods and cattle combined
brought in about £14,000 gross in 1867 and about £15,000 in 1868. Comparable figures for
coal products plus iron ore were approximately £25,000 each year. With the railway relying
on products requiring additional seaborne transport. it is hardly surprising lhat Ritson was
active in both sectors.~1 The ties between railway and shipping are further brought out in the
Directors' concern for maners relating directly 10 the harbour. The following quote, although
Cumbria Record Office (CRO). Maryport and Carlisle Railway. Half-Yearly
Reports, various years.
Ibid.
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from after Ritson's death. illustrates the point:
... we charge 2d. Per ton for any pig iron shipped by the iron or storage
companies as toll for the use of our lines at the head of the Elizabeth
Dock.... With reference to conversation at the Harbour Commissioners'
meeting yesterday: The Maryport HaematilC: £ron Company shipped a great
portion of their pig iron traffic...at the oorth-wrn side aCthe Elizabeth Dock
Basin by laying down a short curve from their Ellenborough Colliery High
Levelline.4I
Unfortunately me milway docwnents do not tell us ifsuch iron and coal cargoes were
being shipped by Ritson and OstIe's own vessels. or ifsome arrangement !lad been made
with an outside shipping company. T.R. Gourvish's ankle "The Railways and Steamboat
Competition in Early Victorian Britain" offers some clues in this regard. During the early
18405 the London & Blackwall railway engaged in competition with steamer companies over
lucrative passenger traffic. They were unable to co-operate wilh any of the steamer lines.
This meant the directors had to seek alternative means ofproviding feeder services. Railways
could not own steamships directly, but directors could invest in tonnage as private
individuals, as some did. Although railway documents do not say so, the ability to provide
their own feeder service for coal and iron exports, plus passenger services, may have
influenced Ritson and Ostle's investment in shipping.~g
CRO, Maryport and Carlisle Railway, "Letter From Secretary and General
Manager's Office," April. 1900.
T. R. Gourvisb, "The Railways and Early Steamboat Competition in Early
Victorian Britain... Transport HisloryIV (1971), 5,6. The importanceoflow-value
bulk cargoes to the railway may also justify why Ritson primarily invested in sail
tonnage. Of course Ritson's connection to the sea as a shipbuilder undoubtably
gave some impetus to his shipowning.
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These investors, like their smaller counterparts., provided the backbone for a thriving
coastal fleet in Marypon.. which only began winding down at the tum of the century. With
this in mind, we can swnmarize the main points of this chapter. The coastal fleet had a
number of distinctive characteristics. It was. in large measure. comprised of brig and
brigantine-rigged vessels of less than 200 register tons. As some of Maryport's coastal
trading partners like Dumfries were: very small and had limited infrastructure. this made
perfect sense. Although 811east a few barques and schooners were found among the coasters.
it is unlikely that their influence was very great. Three masted barques. with their large size.
were much bener suited to deep-sea trades. Schooners were more likely candidates for the
coastal trades. but cannot have been much ofa factor as few were on the Maryport registry.
Barquentines and the largest vessels. ships, were absent from the coasting agreements
examined.
The coastwise fleet. like Maryport shipping generally. consisted largely of vessels
built in the United Kingdom. or in British North Ameri~ few bottoms originated outside
these nations. Wherever they were built, Maryport's small brigs and brigantines had a life
expectancy ofjust under a decade on average. Their boom came in the early 1870s when net
annual tonnage averaged slightly over 4300 register tons per year. Their decline began after
mid-decade, bUI did oot become pronounced until Ihe late 18805. Although they resisted
change until thaI late date, the investors., finally succumbed. With the increasing use of steam
by outside investors, Maryport owners took lessofa share in their own town's coasting. The
1870s sail fleet quietly slipped away. This is not to pronounce the retention ofsailing tonnage
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a failure. Indeed, Maryport owners carried on for nearly sixty years after lhe first steam
experiments on coastal routes. [n addition to their capital investments. bowever. there must
have been other factors comributing to the success of Maryport coasting. One was certainly
the men who crewed the vessels. It is they whom we will examine next
Chapter 3
Crews
The Maryport Maritime Museum, fonnerly the Queen's Head Inn, stands near the old
Elizabeth Dock as a tribute to community members who dedicated their lives to working at
sea. In front of the museum stands a statue depicting two old mariners, possibly fishennen,
engaged in conversation. A young boy, the future of Marypon's nautical tradition, stands
looking at their catch. Even today memories of those who crewed Maryport's fleet remains.
Their legacy remains, embodied in the fishers who still call the town home.
These mariners were a vital pan of Maryport's coastal trade. Once an owner, or
owners, purchased a coaster many factors detennined the success enjoyed by the craft. The
vessel's state of repair and the decision whether to improve it might be the difference
between a long life expectancy, or foundering on a maiden voyage. Considering that vessels,
especially new ones, could represent large capital investments, owners were wise to be
vigilant when making decisions concerning their craft. An important factor in detennining
a successful voyage was the crew. A skilful crew could better ensure safe shipment ofgoods
while allowing satisfactory delivery times for customers. Even in the bulk trades, where
speed took second place to cost, a consumer could only wait so long for a cargo. For owners
the selection of a crew was indirect. Their interests would normally be guarded by their
captain, a man whom they could trust not only to make a profit but also to pick a suitable
The crews who signed on in the various lrish. Cumbrian and Scottish pons traversed
by the coasters shared a number ofcharacteristics, making possible a picture ofan "average"
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Maryport coastennan, It may be Wlfair to describe the average seaman, since each man was
an individual. but the exercise will provide useful insights into who was likely to sail on such
craft. To determine the common links between Maryport's coastal tars the main source of
information is the British Empire Agreements and Accounts ofCrew.
The Crew Lists were contracts signed between a master and crew prior to sailing. The
agreements spelled out specific details ofa voyage including its route, duration. provisions.
wages and other relevant details under which a mariner shipped. They also contain personal
information on each mariner such as name. age, birthplace. capacity and discharge. The
records also provide information pertaining to the voyage, about which more will be said in
the following chapter. On foreign voyages masters were required by law to have articles
stamped by an official. usually the British Consul, at each port of call. On coastal routes, of
most concern here, the record was normally kept by the master himself. or by the mate acting
aRmS behalf.'
The Crew Agreement is essentially a civil contract entailing the limited surrender of
a seaman's liberty for the length ofa voyage. The agreement had its origins in the days of
sail, when ships were most at the mercy of the elements. In this situation quick and fuji
obedience to the master's directives could make lhe difference between life and death. A case
brought before the US Supreme CoUIt in the 1930s used evidence from ancient civilizations
Lewis R. Fischer and Eric W. Sager, "An Approach to the Quantitative Analysis
of British Shipping Records," Business History XXII (July 1980), 137-38. For an
account of the British Consular Service see D.C.M. Platt, The Cinderella Service:
British Consuls Since /825 (London: Longman, 1971).
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to justify enforcement of such agreements. The court ruled that navigation required that a
seaman not desert his ship at a crucial juncture. Most maritime nations have provided
penalties against those who broke articles. As early as 900 Be the inhabitants of Rhodes
promulgated laws to punish captains or sailors who did so. Similar statutes were found in the
English thirteenth-centwy RuJes ofOleron.. as well as in codes promulgated by the Hanseatic
League and NaPJlconic France. Although many seafaring nations had variants ofthese laws.
the British. with their far-reaching commercial empire. took them to their logical limit.
British agreements were also developed to provide a national register of seamen in case of
emergencies such as war, although this scheme was not altogether successfuLl
The articles have limits to their usefulness, however. While they provide a reasonable
view of certain characteristics relating to seamen. they give little substance to the person
behind a particular name. Since coasting trades gave mariners more time with their families
lhan did d~sea pursuits, it is reasonable to asswne such considerations affected decisions
to serve on coasters. It would be of interest, for example, to compare the nwnber of married
versus unmarried men in the two branches of trade over time. The agreements also give no
indication ofthe role of women in coasting families. With husbands away at sea for weeks
at a time. a greater share ofthe burden ofchild-rearing must have fallen to these women than
was normal even in the Victorian period. Concerning such social questions. the agreements
James C. Healey, Foe's 'Ie and Glory Hole (New York: Greenwood, 1936), 14,
About seventy-five per cent of the extant British Crew Agreements are housed at
Memorial University ofNewfoundland's Maritime History Archive.
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aremutc.)
The best way to put flesh on the bones of these mariners would be to look at personal
cOrIeSpOndence, family records and census materials. Although few such documents apart
from the lauer are readily available. there are a few anecdotes in local popular histories.
These are not typical. however. since they often reflect the most interesting or tragic events
in the life of a seafarer and hence are by definition unusual. In addition. they tend to come
most often from masters as opposed to members of the iower ranks. Supplementing such
evidence are more general data on the lives of seamen in general. These include primary
accounts by social reformers such as Samuel Plimsoll and Thomas Brassey. These can be
useful if it is remembered that such persons. although sympathetic. often saw seamen from
a social distance.~
These coastermen and their counterparts in foreign trades have been referred to as
sailors, seamen. mariners and tars. Who exactly were these people as a class in society? To
Samuel PIimsoIl, "the Seaman's Friend," they were quite simply men aCthe working class.
albeit a peculiar portion. In typical Victorian fashion, PlimsoU regarded his nation's mariners
as being much like dry grinders, coal miners and construction workers in "not [being] given
For more information on the husband/wife relationship in seafaring families, see
Margaret S. Creighton, "Women and Men in American Whaling," [mematioMI
Journal ofMaritime History IV (June 1992): 195-218.
There are also modem studies of mariners such as Judith Fingard. Jack in Port:
Sailor Towns ofEastern Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982);
and Knut Weibust, Deep Sea Sailors: A Study in Maritime Ethnology (Stockholm:
Nordiska Museet, 1969).
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to calcuJating too nicely all probable dangers (of their job)." Plimsoll asserted that if such
persons were more aware aCme risks of physical labour. most of society's arduous tasks
would never be completed. The articles made life at sea especially dangerous. Penalties
imposed for breaking an agreement meant that sailors were forced to put to sea even when
they did perceive the risk of shipping aboard a particular vessel.' Plimsolrs definition ora
seaman is more useful for revealing class-based paternalism toward labour than for a
working definition ofasailor. For this we tum to a more recent work.
Writing in the 19305, James C. Healey began his book on American seamen by
reviewing what being a sailor entailed. Although his vision was somewhat romanticized. it
gave a good indication of what such a life represented. The sailor, Healey wrote. was ~among
lhe best known ofmen."ConlaCl and populareultw'e had transformed Mlack Tar" into a kind
of folk hero. To landsmen he was at the same time strange and fascinating., exuding an air
of mystery about where he would go~ and wba1 he would do. Despite this. ashore he was
mtx:h like other people. He dressed similarly and attended the same entertainments. Still the
mariner, in Healey's view. remained the supreme individualist.' He: said of the breed:
Friends and loves (the sailor) bas none, oor home nor blest abode. He has no
loyalties either for his ship or the shipowner. Home to him is a place some
distance from the pan he happens to be in. On the whole [seamen] linger as
a mental image ofa good natured group ofmen...doing work that scem[s] a
trifle unskilled and [is} probably paid for as such. [The ranks] sleep in the
slwn bowels ofthe ship and cat their food from agate dishes in rivet-studded
Samuel Plimsoll. Our Seamen: An Appeal (London: Vinue. 1873).20.
Healey, Foc·s'le. 4.
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mess balls. Gold stripes change each oftbem to swivel..chair potentates with
emissaries waiting to obey their every command. The seaman is all this and
more.'
This description is flowery and poetic but fils the popular image of the mariner.
Healey's description was geared toward mariners in the deep-sea trades. however. Such
seamen may have been among the best known of men. but the same was not true for his
coastal counterpart. The reason may relate to Healey's own romantic description of the
seafarer. The coastal trades.. while having their share oftribulations. lacked the allure ofblue·
ocean routes. While this can be overstated. the point is cenainly valid. In the long-distance
trades mariners might have found themselves in exotic climes and fantastic situations for a
number of years. The vicissirudes of such a tife were reflected in the record of frequent
drunkenness, deaths and the occasional mutiny provided by logs and personal accounts. By
nature, coasting was a more: mundane business. Coasters ranged over short distances to
places that even the 1andsman visit For the English coastal sailor. Ireland was arguably the
most exotic locale. Moreover, coasters wete -ugly ducldingsn compared to ships such as the
China tea dippel'S. Coastal cargoes were also quite often mundane; most vessels carried
nothing more inspiring lhan coal. iron., or china c1ayo' There was rarely a need for detailed
logs on shon-sea routes. When crew members depaned their vessel it was usually because
they had been "paid off' or "discharged:' The reality belUnd foreign seafaring was morc:
Ibid., 4-6.
See John Annstrong (ed.), Coastal and Short &a Shipping (Aldershot: Scalar
Press., 1996),xii.
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trying than might be inferred &om Masefield's poetry" StiU. it is the deeJHC3 trades which
bave caught the imagination ofoeophytes and mOSlscbolars. This chapter will help to put
amorevisiblefaceontheircoastalbrethrm..
The men who served aboard Maryport's coasters performed a variety ofjobs which
would have been familiar to their more celebrated foreign-going counterpartS. The most
common wen: able-bodied seamen (ABs). mates. runners, apprentices. ordinary seamen
(aSs) and of course masters. 11l
The most common of these ranks, the AB. is perhaps most problematic to define:. It
has been said that the AS "just is." He might have been any sailor who signed on who, in
Healey's context of 19305 America. could claim at least three year.; service at sea. In both
Healey's time and in ni.neteenth-<:enrwy Britain. certain skills were universal for an
experienced AB. He needed the ability to \enol. '"bend." splice and hitch ropes; to evacuate
a ship in distress; to handle a ship at sea; and to understand nautical terminology. This
John Masefield was a British poet and novelist. After serving an apprenticeship in
the merchant service his career at sea was ended by illness. Sail WaUr Bal/ads, his
first collection ofpoc1l)' appeared in 1902, inspired by his life at sea. In 1913 he
produced another work Douber. which also dealt with maritime themes. See
Magnus Magnusson (ed.), Chamber's Biographical Dictionary (Edinburgh:
Chambers Harrap. 1993).
These ranks were found on both sail and steam vessels. Peculiar to the latter were
jobs relating to the numing of the engines. such as engineers. donkeymen.
firemen. trimmers and stokers. For the most part this chapter will deaJ with crew
members of sailing craft. Although steamers became increasingly imponant in
Maryport after the mid-1870s. few Crew Agreements could be located for
coasting steamers. Those that were found consisted mainly ofa single coastal
voyage madebe~ deep-sea passages by foreign-going vessels.
%combination allowed rapid response to orders. In addition, skill with the compass and all
marine signals was essential. The main problem concerning the status of ABs involved false
claims about qualifications. As Healey wrote, "there are many such [unqualified] men to be
found on board ship. They are burdens to masters, officers and other members of the crew.
Because of the present lack of system of identifications. it is a difficult maner to eliminate
them,"I!
This same problem was a concem in Victorian Britain. Thomas Brasscy's 1877 work.
British Seamen, devoted a chaprer to unqualified persontlcl passing themselves off as ABs.
According to Brassey, part ofthe problem was that many captains had been lax in their post·
voyage rating of seamen. It was common to award top grades for conduct to sailors who did
not merit it. As a result, captains ofother vessels on which the individual signed had no way
of knowing about his lack of qualifications. It must be remembered. however. that such
ratings were very general. Masters may not even have paid much attention to them. especially
on coasters where men were locals and well known. RatiJ1gs were important mainly because
they appeared by law on discharge papers., which were presented to masters by men seeking
work. Brassey did not put 100 much blame on masters for trivializing the ratings. After
arriving in port. particularly in foreign trades. the master might have been relieved to be rid
of a troublesome crew member and might have given hint a good rating while vowing never
to deal with the man again. Brassey did not excuse carelessness by masters altogether. and
Healey. Foe's 'fe, 20-22.
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noted that many British consuls complained about the practice. En 1874 the Board ofTrade
affirmed the consuls' position by including a provision in that year's Mm:hMt Shipping Act
making it a misdemeanour for any captain to knowingly overrate the performance of a
seaman. InB~'s opinion this did not go far enough and he suggested a further remedy
for the problem. '2
Brassey felt the British merchant fleet should adopt certificates of competency for
anyone shipping as an AB. As a Liverpool comminec of shipowners noted, many men were
being shipped as ASs after only one or two voyages. In addition, the ease ofbecoming an AB
discouraged many boys from following regular apprenticeships. The committee's plan
would have made examinations compulsory for anyone wishing to become an AB. As a
reward, higher rates of pay were to be introduced for the newly certified ARs. Although
Brassey noted opposition to the scheme on me grounds ofdifficulty in testing, he felt such
fears were exaggerated. As proof be offered the example of the Royal Navy. which had
always had a system of ranking and provided gradations in pay by skilllevel. lJ
Brassey's observations, like much. octus writing, were geared toward the deep-sea
trades. How much. rus ideas applied to coasting is uncertain. It is true th.at most mariners in
Marypon's coasting fleet were discharged with grades of "Very Good." This migh.t suppon
Brassey's claims concerning competency, but sh.ould be treated with caution in the present
Thomas Brassey. British Seamen (London: Longmans, Green, 1877), 281-2.
Ibid., 282-4.
98
case. The Crew Agreements indicate that an unqualified man claiming to be an AS on a
Maryport coaster might not easily get away with it. The trade entailed short distances and
a limited number ofports. As weu. mariners tended to reappear on different coasters. Given
that captains probably knew each other. a tarnished reputation might force a man out of this
limited trading sphere into an arena where incompetence might go WUloticed longer.
Therefore. an AS appearing on a Maryport coasting agreement likely possessed the skills that
he claimed. In any event, it is important to recognise the ambiguity surroWKling this position
in the articles.
Another common rank on Maryport's coastal vessels is the OS. These men had less
experience than ASs and there were fewer ofthem. The latter characteristic might be due to
the nature of coasting or may have resulted from the faking of qualifications that Brassey
described. In Healey's maritime world.lhe as started out as a "deck boy.~ although the rank
ofboy was rare in Marypon. The duties of such young men included working in the kitchen,
ira mess boy, or doing a myriad of maintenance jobs aboard ship. After about a year at sea
the boy graduated to the rank ofas. The as would then unofficially leam more advanced
nautical skills. such as rope work and compass navigation. After three years the OS was
generally considered a full AB.I~
Another rank found on most Maryport sailing coasters was "runner." This position
is the most poorly-doc:umented of all the coaster rankings and few secondary works even
Healey, Foc's'/e, 19·20.
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mention iL Evidence in the CrewA~ents is limited as to exactly what these people did
From their much lower rates of pay it can be inferred that were general labourers.
performing a variety of unskilled tasks which experienced seamen were too busy to do or
which were considered beneath an AB. Unfortunately, the extent of their duties remains
vague. but it is fairly clear that their work was menial. Runners appear to have spent little
time on one vessel before moving to another. or possibly to a better life ashore."
Aside from these categories of sailors. a few more crop up on Maryport's coasters
under Healey's designation "unlicenced personnel." These include the boatswain. the highest
position aside from the officers. The "bosun" was responsible for keeping his craft ship-
shape and oversaw most work aboard the vessel. Healey referred to him as taking orders
from the first officer. In Maryport., the bosun usually appeared in place ofa mate and seldom
served on a vessel where a mate was present. This is because on coasters lhe master often
took a watch himself. reducing the nwnber of supervisory personnel needed. Aside from the
bosun, there were sometimes cooks on board. This position was neither highly regarded on
Maryport coasters nor did it have a high professional standing. Often it was filled by teenage
boys, who seldom lasted long in the job. In fact, the inattention to cooking services on British
vessels cropped up in Brassey's work. As with ABs he recommended introducing certificates
of competency for shipboard cooks. He noted that "Crews s-uffer because the cook is not a
See Crew Agreements, various years. Another possibility is that these men were
persons nired "by the run." This is unlikely, however, as pay dispersed in this
manner was usually noted. Furthermore, many runners were recorded as having
been paid in monthly, or ''per voyage:' installments like their crewmates.
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cook.... The Crew Agreements suggest that this was true of Maryport coasting as well.
Brasscy's grealc:sl concern in this regard was sanitary. with crews possibly becoming ill due
to badly prepared foodstuffs}'
Anotheraewman in the Maryport agm:ments was the apprentice. These~ simply
young men who were being trained., almost as indentured servants. for careers at sea. Once
their indentures were completed, these individuals would have been ready to begin a paid
career as seamen. During the first half of the nineteenth century apprenticeship was
widespread, espedally in deep-sea ttades. Legislation required owners of all large vessels to
carry set numbers ofapprentices with an eye to maintaining the number ofseamen. Although
not aJl Maryport coasters carried apprentices. they were certainly not ll:lcommon.17
These positions comprised the bulk of crews.. but such men were. or course. under
the command ofofficers. All Marypon coasters carried a master and frequently a first officer.
or mate. On larger British vessels, especially foreign-going cnft, the captain might have been
assisted by as many as three deck officers. Because most M8l)'pOrt coasters wen: under 200
tons, it was customary to carry only ODe deck officer, called simply the mate. Even be might
Healey, Foe's 'Ie. 22-3; Crew Agreements. various years; Brassey. British &amen.
287. British cooks in generaJ were well paid compared to their cOWlterparts in
other national merchant marines. The casual nature of the cook on Maryport
coasters may relate to voyage duration. Periods at sea were generally under a week
and the need for a professional cook may have been lessened.
V. C. Burton, "Apprenticeship Regulation and Maritime Labour in the Nineteenth
Century British Merchant Marine,'" International Journal ofMaritime History I
(June 1989): 29. This article is an in...<Jepth look at me institution.
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be replaced by a bosun., which was not surprising since coaster mates were usually
uncertified. The mate bad to demonstrate great skill in seamanship and navigation and gain
the respect and cooperation oflhe crew. By the time Healey wrote. albeit from an American
perspective, aspiring mates needed at least onc year's service as an AS before they could sit
for a third mate's "ticket." In Maryport's coastal trades the process seems less rennal. A
small number of men were promoted from the foc's'le during the course of voyages-
naturally, such men were already ASs or bosuns. In this case it is unJikely they were chosen
because ofa [annal ticket. but rather for their leadership qualities.
Although the mate had great responsibility. it was the master who ultimately saw the
vessel home safely and ~rofilably. He ideally possessed the most extensive knowledge of
nautical topics. Besides being expert in navigation. he was a firm disciplinarian and socially
graceful when dealing with passengers. II The master needed to be familiar with all types of
vessels, but especially his own. A good master would understand port facilities and the
nature of all cargoes he was expected to handle. He would need good business skills as well
in order to represent his employers. In addition, he should have been knowledgeable about
marine law. Although not often certified on coastal routes, the master was a ship's
consummate professional. Of all the crew who served in Maryport's coasting fleet, only
masters regularly remained with a particular crafL regarding it as their own. Healey wrote
that "the position is a responsible one. (The master's] task....is to bring the ship...its cargo,
Navigation was less of a concern for coastal masters, whose vessels traversed
short distances in familiar waters.
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crew and passengers. safely and expeditiously to port so that the voyage is as profitable as
possible to the owners of the vessel:,19
Mariners serving in Maryport's coasting fleet were quite homogenous insofar as their
places ofbirth.. British deep-sea vessels might carry mariners who hailed from any pan oCtile
country. empire. or even the world. A much different situation prevailed aboard Maryport
coasters. No foreign mariners were ever noted as serving on these vessels.20 Given the local
nature of recnnlmcnl, colonial subjects were also virtually absent from their decks. A few
isolated examples, such as a Robert Smith of Nova Scotia, who served on the brigantine
Farmer, and a single Newfoundlander. can be located. but these were exceptions. ~1
Men from the United Kingdom outside Maryport's trade sphere comprised only a
minority of crewmen on her coasters. although their importance increased during the 1880s.
Many in this category. although from outside Cumbria. came from parts of nearby Scotland
or from Ireland within Maryport's uading area. From the 18605 through the 1880s, an
average of forty-three per cent ofmariners came from Maryport itself. About seven per cent
came from other Cumbrian locales, such as Whitehaven, Wigtown and Carlisle. Just over
Healey, Foc's k37-8.
There were foreign mariners present on some of the steamship voyages examined.
However, these do not appear to be regular coasting voyages. They actually
represent deep-sea crews temporarily assigned home-trade status. See Crew
Agreements, various years. Several examples come from the Hine brothers'
Holme Line ships.
Crew Agreements, various years.
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fourteen per cent hailed from the major Irish trading partners Belfast. Dublin and
Londonderry. The remainder. abour: thirty-six per cc:ut, were bom in other parts aCme United
Kingdom. Again. it must be stressed thai: most were. in [act, from towns in Maryport's
tnIding sphere. OnJy a small proportion came from outside. In this context Maryport
coastennen might be regarded as a truly regional workforce. a characteristic which did not
begin to change until the I880s. Even in that decade, Cumbrian crewmen and those from
major Irish trade partnerS accounted for fifty·six per cent ofcoastal mariners. With Cumbrian
coal and iron mines competing for the labour of these '"unskilled" workers, it might be
expected tllat increasing numbers of sailors wouJd come from outside the region. This seems
to be the case after the 18705. but the trade maintained an essentially local flavour.
Obviously, the coasting trade continued to be an attractive. or perhaps the only viable. option
for certain men in the region (sec table 3.t).!:!
The local nanue ofcrews., especially before the. 18HOs.m~ have made for a tightly·
knit community. Census returns for the county ofCumberland. compiled by J.D. Marshall
and John K. Walton. indicate that persons employed at sea. or as boatmen comprised only
a small part of the county's workforce. In 1871, for example. 1746 persons. of which only
two were women. listed their occupation WM1er this heading; this accOlUlted for 1.66 per cent
of Cumberland's workforce. This compares with 23.12 per cent of workers engaged in
8griculnrre where the almost 25,000 workers made it the largest employer in the COWlty.
/bid.
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Reflecting the trend away from employment at sea" in the next census year the numbers for
sea-related occupations dropped. In 1891 only 1.5 percent orall Cumberland's workfOl'Ce
were so employed. amounting to 1545 persons. all males. Nonetheless. their proportiOlWe
influence on Marypon coasters remained substantial. even if it diminished over time.u
TableJ.I
Marvoort Coaster Crews. Pcn:enta£es by Place of Birth.
Decade Maryport Cumbria lreland.Major Trade Partncn· Other
18605 53% 14% 0"/0 33%
18705 56% 8.5% 8.5% 27%
18805 27"10 5% 24% 44%
TOlal 43% 7% 14% 36%
So~. Crew Agreements. vanous years. -includes Dubhn, Belfast and Londonderry only.
In addition 10 the phenomenon oC"locaJ boys." the Crew Agreements indicate that
the seamen comprised a fairly mature workfom:. Certain crew mmtbers. such as apprentiet:s.
were always youths. but there was a trend in MaJyport's coastal labour force toward mariners
over thirty years of age. In fact. a considerable number of seamen could be considered
rniddJe..aged.. By the 18705 and throughout the 1880s.just over eleven per ccntofMaryport's
coastal mariners were over fifty. During the 18605 about Cony-five per cent ofmari.ners were
J. D. Marshall and John K. Walton. The Lake Counties From 1830 (0 the Mid-
Twentieth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1981), 244. The
designation "Sea and boattnen" is fairly broad and likely covers not only
coastermen but also foreign-going mariners and fishers as welL It might also be
noted that 1911, although outside the temporal range of this survey. indicates a
mon: dramatic drop in this category of worker. For that year only 544 persons
gave this as their occupation. By now the group accounted for a mere 0.52 per
cent of all Cumberland's workforce.
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over thirty and by the next two decades a majority of Maryport coastermen were above this
age. From the 18605 through the 1880s the average age of mariners or all ranks was never
below thirty. For the 1860s it averaged thirty-one years, rising to thirty-five by the next
decade and levelling offal thirty-four in the 18805.14
David Alexander examined the issue of older mariners in .....an industry .dominated
by young men,... in his article "Literacy Among Canadian and Foreign Seamen. 1863_1899.":1'
Alexander's stUdy focussed on the port ofYannouth, Nova Scotia His introduction noted
that in the Norwegian, American and Canadian merchant marines. few persons continued at
sea beyond lheirtwenties or early thirties. At the outset ofms period over eighty-two per cent
of Yarmouth's Canadian sailors were under thirty. This contrasts with Maryport, whose
coaster crews comprised only fifty-five per cent of seamen under thirty at their high point.
Alexander nOles a drop in the nwnber arboys under twenty putting to sea by the 18805. Over
time the number armen over thirty on Yarmouth craft steadily increased. To Alexander this
indicated an aging workforce. He suggested that either seafaring was increasingly
unappealing to Yarmouth youth or it was becoming a lifetime career. not an occupation to
be abandoned at an early age.l6
Crew Agreements. various years.
David Alexander, "Literacy Rates Among Canadian and Foreign Seamen. 1863-
1899," in Rosemary Ommer and Gerald Panting (eds.l, Working Men Who Gol
WeI (St.John's: Memorial University, 1980),6.
Ibid.• 6-8.
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In the Maryport case, the pn:sence ofolder crewmen appears to have been the nonn
throughout. although with an increase from the 18605. large numbers of sailors over thirty
appeared from the beginning. During the 18605 about forty per cent of all the coastermen
were above thirty. By the 1870s this hadjwnped to forty-six percent. but by the 1880s it had
stabilized at forty-seven per cent. As rn.ight be expected. older mariners were concentrated
on the bridge. with younger crewmen more common in the foc' 5'Ie, although there were large
nwnbers of seamen over thirty even there. About half of all ABs were over thirty throughout
the period, with just under half orall other unlicenced personnel above thiny.l7
Table 3.2
Coastennen-A"e Distribution bv Rank. 1860s-1880s.
Rank Uader 30 Yean 30-49 Yean Above Age SO
Master
iWate
AB
12%
17%
49%
69"10
64%
44%
19%
17"/0
7%
Other Ranfcs 54% 37% 9010
Source. Crew Agreements. vanous yean;. Note. Rows may not equal 100% due to rounding.
Although crews did not seem to be aging after the 1860s. a variation on Alexander's
second theme may have some merit. Alexander suggested that coasting was a nanuaI cnoice
for aging mariners. As the percentage of seamen over thirty remained above forty per cent.
this suggests a stable workforce whose members tended to be older than their deep-sea
Crew Agreements, various years. It must be remembered that the designation
"other" includes such ranks as "boy" and "apprentice" who were. by nature, very
young.
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counterparts. Another traditionaJ argument bas been that coasting was a place in whicb to
start and end ODe'S carttr aJ. sea. Marypon figures give credeoc:e to the second pan of this
thcory.lf~ takctbc: rank of AS ann example. the proportion ofmariners above and below
thiny was about equal.lI
Table].]
Percenta2e ofMaJinen; bv Aile Gmun
D<cad.
186&
1870s
Uader 30 Yean
52%
4]%
30-49 Yean
40%
46%
Above SO Yean
8%
11%
1880s 41% 470/, 12"10
Source. Crew Agreements. vanous years. FIgures may not equal 100'% due to roundrng.
These data also call into question the old bromide that coasting constituted a
""nursery" for the more challenging deep-sea trades. AJ John Armstrong argued in his
inttoduction to Coastal and Short &a Shipping:
The viewoftbe Britishcoasta.l trade banded down by writers on deep-water
marine activity bas sometimes been patronizin@andhasdownplayedits role.
The notion that the coasting trade was the "nursery" of seamen suggests a
kindergarten for immature sailors who would eventually graduate to a higher
fonn ofeducation, preswnably the blue·water trades.~
Short of tracing the: careers of many individual mariners over time, it would be
difficult to prove conclusively that Maryport's coastal trade was not a training ground for
deep-sea sailors. Despite this, Crew Agreement evidence does seem to contradict this view.
Crew Agreements, various years: Alexander, "Literacy Rates," 31.
Armstrong (ed.), Coastal and Short Sea Shipping, xiii.
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The preseoce of fairly large numbers of~ overthirty and~ over fifty suggests that
coasting was more a place to end than to start a career at sea. With presumably some
experience at sea. sixty-t'M) per cent ofall masters., mates and ASs were alx)Ve thirty during
the period. With such a high proportion past their twenties it is clear that. wherever they
gained their sea training, these men were not abandoning coasting for a "'more mature"
environmcnt. JO
Apart from age and place of birth. another way of profiling Maryport's coaster crews
is via average levels of education. Although a person's sea training is indicated relatively
well by his position on a vessel. this gives little sense of the (onnal education a coastcrman
was likely to have. There is no provision in the Crew Agreements for displaying educational
backgrounds., but clues appear indirectly. As part of the recruitment process mariners were
required to sign-on to their potential vessel. This entailed giving one's signature. Ifany crew
member were illiterate he was forced to make a mart.. usually an ")C"' which the master
would certify as his. This does little to indicate the level an individual might have reached
in school. or if be attended school at all. but at the very least basic literacy points toward
some modicum ofeducation.Jl
Crew Agreements. various years.
Ibid.
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Table 3.4
Marvnort Coasl mil Crews: Percc:ntal!:c Able 10 Si2D Their Name
D<cod.
1870s
1880s
Able to Sip
78%
75%
84%
Va.ble to Sip
22%
25%
16%
Source. Crew Agreements.. vanous years.
According to Alexander. an ability to sign ooc's name was a middle-level indicator
of literacy. Although it is likely that fewer could sign their names than could read. more
could do so than could read and write fluently. Mariners signing articles were more likely to
need this ability than landward manual labourers. For this reason lhey may have had greater
cause to memorize lheir signature ifotherwise illiterate. Alexander WKlerstood the problem
this created. but acknowledged the difficulty of knowing when a signature marked the CXlent
oCHleracy. To guard against this. he believed the ability to sign onc's name must indjeate
some ability to n:ad and write.n Marsball and Walton agreed with this assessmenL For large
groups ..consistent trends appcar...aod it is evident they are DOt statistically meaningless. even
though they may well over..estimate by 5 or 10 per cenl the numbers ofpcople who were
genuinely literate.nlJ
Table 3.4 is indicative of a fairly well-educated workforce. assuming Alexander's
Alexander, "Literacy Rates:' 6; R. S. Scofield, "Dimensions of Illiteracy. 1750-
[850," frploralions in Economic History (1973): 440-1; Ira Dye, "American
Merchant Seafarers," Explorations in Economic History (1973): 340-1.
Marshall and Walton. Lou Counties, 138.
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literacy criteria. For the first two decades afthe period. the literacy rate among British and
Irish seamen can be compami to Carlo Cipolla's research on bridegrooms able to sign their
names on marriage registers. In fact, Maryport's coastermen were relatively literate compamf
to the populace as a whole, although their performance dropped offbetween the 18605 and
the 18705. Nonetheless, the coaster crews did make a large jump in literacy in the next
decade. Considering the working-class background of seafarers, their perfonnance is
certainly not lacking.J.I
Table 3.5
Marriaile Sil!1l.atures Comoared to Coaster Crew Literacv
IDecade Marriages ICrews I
1186'" 79%' I78% I
11870, 83% I75% I
Source. Alexander. "Literacy Rates. 19~; Crew Agreements, vanous years.• Includes the
years 1865-1869 only. Percentages above represent the proportion able to sign their names.
Given the fall in literacy among coastal seamen from the 18605 to the 1870s. and the
substantial rebound in the 1880s, there is no definite indication of whether mariners were
generally becoming more literate over time. On balance, the evidence seems to suggest that
they were. Of equal interest is the fact that they lagged behind the populace as a whole in
increasing their rates of literacy from the 1860s to I870s, as Cipolla's evidence suggests
Crew Agreements, various years; Alexander. "Literacy Rates," 19; Carlo Cipolla.
Literacy and Development in the West (London: 1969), 121-3. One must keep in
mind that Cipolla's survey included a broad range of the United Kingdom's
populace. The Maryport data concern only a tiny and specific: portion of the
working class in a limited geographic area For this reason broad conclusions
should not be drawn from this comparison.
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most Europeans did Indeed. even by the 18805 the percentage of literate mariners. eighty·
four per em!., was marginally less than the eighty-five per cent found in marriage registers
for 1875·1879. For the moment we can say that Maryport's coaster men were not badly
educated when compared to the UK's populace in general. They did. in fact. possess
language skills little inferior to COUDtrymen ashore.u
Given this. were there any advantages to Marypon coastennen in being literate?
Alexander suggests a number of reasons why this skill might prove usefuL Literacy was
essential in the Yannouth trades if a crewman wished the I~ve the forecastle for the bridge.
This role was not hard and fast in Cwnbria'scoasting sector. Still. the officers were generally
literate. In addition. Alexander suggested that sailors were not the irresponsible group that
they were often plnrayed as being. For a young Yarmouth or Maryport man. the possibility
ofnot advancing at sea might make a landward career a benet option. In this instance greater
education provided a buffer against hardship. much as it does lOday. Alexander makes the
further assertion that literate men on Yarmouth vessels earned more on average than did
illiterates. even as deckhands. Although there are wage data from Marypon. they are too
fragmentary to support such a conclusion. Nonetheless., a similar scenario cannot be ruled
Alexander. "Literacy Rates"; Crew Agreements. various years. The Crew
Agreements also provide a sense of the relative education levels oflrish versus
British mariners in this trade. Although in the 1870s. when large nwnbers of Irish
crewmen first appeared, they were less literate lhan their British counterparts. by
the 18805 the Irish were five per cent more likely to sign their names. It must be
remembered that many of these were natives of the larger population centres in
Ireland.. rtliteracy was more likely a problem among the rural. agrarian population.
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out. At the very least there may have been a perception among Cumbrian seamen that this
was the case. This may relate to the region's rural nature. Of Alexander's conclusions, the
most applicable to Maryport may be that seamen in DO way comprised a less-literate stratum
afthe working class. "Jack" by no means represented the dregs of his society.J6
The high literacy rate among Maryport coastermen was reflected in the county at
large. During the period 1839-1845 Cumberland and the nearby county of Westmorland
contained among the highest proportion of those who could sign marriage registers. a
position they maintained throughout the century. There were a fairly large number ofschools
and teachers in both counties. In remote agricultural areas. younger sons might encounter
greater hW'dles to employment than were generally found in industrial regions. For this
reason education might afford a better chance of work or bettennent. Given this, the literacy
rates among Marypon's coaster crews are not so surprising.J1
As these crews were for the most part functionally literate. did literacy impose any
barrier to filling coaster jobs? For the most part the answer is "no." Throughout the Crew
Agreements are examples of illiterate mariners filling a variety of positions. The jobs of AB.
as, boy. runner and cook were all filled in some instances by people Wlable to sign their
names. For lower ranks. this finding is hardly surprising.l '
Alexander, "Literacy Rates," 30-32.
Marshall and Walton., Lake Counries,138-9.
Crew Agreements, various years.
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Of greater interest are ships' officers. for whom writing ability may have been a
natural part of their social position. The vast majority of mates were at least functionally
literate. although mere were certainly exceptions. Forexample. two mates on the Creole were
forced to make their mark in lieu of signing their names. For first officers who could not
write. practical seamanship and experience must have comprised their primary credentials.)9
Coastal masters are a different story. The rank of captain marked one as a member
ofthe elite, as befincd a person controlling a seagoing vessel. Even in the "lowly" coasting
trades, the distinction existed. Ashore. a master mariner's prestige carried over throughout
the circles in which he moved. For these men literacy must have gone hand-in-hand with
their standing both at sea and in their community. Ofall the master mariners examined. none
were completely iIliterate.<OO In testimony before the Commission on Unseaworthy Ships in
1873. Thomas Gray noted some of the duties required of a captain. "The examination of
officers for the mercantile marine does not only include seamanship (but also] ...various
questions the master has 10 consider when away from Ihe owner: handwriting, spelling,
certain parts oflhe law.''''l
This fits well wilh Healey's description. Since a master had to act as a kind of
Ibid.
/bid.
Great Britain.. Parliament. House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers (BPP),
Preliminary Report From the Commission on Unseaworthy Ships with Minutes
and Digest o!Evideru:e and Appendix 1873.
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maritime lawyer and represent the interests of his employers, the ability to read and write
fluently would have been essential. HeaJey's point concerning the ability to interact
comfortably with upper-crust passengers might also suggest that he should have been able
to converse concerning books and newspapers, although this had little relevance on a coastal
collicr.42 It is unlikely that completely illiterate masters existed, even if all Maryport coastal
agreements had been located.
Using data from the Crew Agreements, a final insight might be gained into
Maryport's coasting crews by examining wages. This is onc of the more problematic
statistics from the agreements, perhaps even more so than literacy. Wages on coasting
voyages were nonnally dispersed "by the run," "per voyage," weekly, or monthly. Many
Crew Agreements give little direct indication of how pay was dispersed. Masters had a
number of choices on the form about how their crews were paid. They were then expected
to cross out all but the pay period that applied to that particular voyage. Evidently, this rule
was not strictly enforced, as the vast majority of agreements do not indicate pay periods.43
The first two period designations are further complicated, since their duration was
undefined. This is likely because a "run," or "voyage" was of variable length. A run appears
to consist ofa single trip between two points, say Maryport and Belfast. When a "by the run"
designation appeared, the agreements seem to indicate that this was an expedient way of
Healey, Foe 's 'le,37-38.
Crew Agreements, various years.
liS
Iliring men for a short trip, perhaps when crews could DOt easily be fowxl on short notice. In
some cases the pay for a run was quite high, even though a crewman was only engaged for
a limited timc. Therefore. "by·the-run" hiring seems to have been something of an
emergencym~. [ndeed., the designation does not appear at the top of Crew Agreements.
Generally, "by the run" dispersals were noted by being pencilled in next to the amount of
wages..14
The nextdesignation.. "per voyage." is me most common found on Marypon coasting
agreements. This designation is also problematic. There is never a statement as to how long
a voyage was, although a rough estimate can be inferred. When compared to monthly wage
levels for deep-sea mariners. as compiled by Lewis Fischer. "per voyage" pay for Maryport
coasting crews was higher. From the mid~1860s to about 1880. monthly pay for blue-water
sailors averaged £3.18. Wages peaked in 1873-4. but never went higher than £3.60 per
month. Given the greater risks involved, foreign trades would likely command higher pay
rates than coasting, assuming comparable pay periods. Since "per voyage" rates on Maryport
coasters are noticeably greater than Fischer's rates for their counterparts it is likely that
Maryport crews received wages at intervals longer than four weeks. The problem is being
Ibid. Marypon coaster crews had an added advantage in that their food was
usually provided. For this reason they were not required to buy their own supplies.
The provision of food is usually noted in the articles either by a specific ratio
table, or simply "[Provisions] sufficient without waste."
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precise about how long this was.4S
From the Crew Agreements it appears that the designation of"voyage" referred to a
round trip, including time spent in loading/unloading cargo. From Fischer's data. combined
with the apparent duration of voyages, it can be estimated that an average voyage was
between five and seven weeks. In more official tenns a voyage might refer to the six·month
duration ofa standard Crew Agreement; in the context of pay periods this classification need
not concern us. In any event. the "per voyage" designation is an unreliable indicator. Data
from the agreements indicate that each may have been something ofa unique case. We know,
for example. that arrival and departure times for sailing vessels were notoriously irregular.
For this reason. a sailor making the round trip to Dublin from Wigtown might be looking at
a time difference ora week or more, depending on the weather..06 Adding to the confusion
is evidence that "per voyage" pay rates to one port may not have been the same as to another,
even if this differential scale is seldom noted.
The brigantine Fairhaven, under the command of Heskett Hood, was employed on
the run between Maryportand Belfast, Dublin and Londonderry, most likely in the coal trade.
Although Hood did not give any insightful informalion concerning wages on most of these
Ibid.; Lewis Fischer, "International Maritime Labour, 1863-1900: World Wages
and Trends," The Grear Circle, I (1988), 1-21. Fischer argues that Britain's wage
rates for seamen remained low at this time despile the nation's maritime
dominance.
Crew Agreements, various years.
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voyages. two include a curious detail-wage rates "per voyage" by individual port.n Table
3.6 illustrates this.
Table 3.6
Fairhaven. Per Vov:u'e Pay Rates by Port July 1883·June 1884
Port Mate AD
Belfost £4140 £440
Londonderry £5140 £5 40
Dublin £5 40 £4140
Source. FaIrhaven. Crew Agreements, 1883-4.
If there were differential port rates. perhaps dependent on factors such as sailing
conditions. this further complicates using the "per voyage" designation to establish pay. In
addition to their uncertain duration, there may be no common ratc per voyage. If this is the
case. the researcher is further hindered by the absence of a rate scale for the trip to and from
any particular port.4' For this reason. the best choice in examining wages would be either the
weekly or monthly period.
The first is of little value since so few cases have been located. which makes any
conclusions drawn from them next to useless. It is therefore monthly pay periods that we will
examine. The only examples where monthly pay rates were definitely noted are found in the
18705 and 1880s. Even here not all years are included. Given this fact. average monthly wage
calculations can only be a rough estimate. Only wage rates for the positions of male and AB
Ibid., Fairhaven, 1883-4.
Ibid., various years.
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have been calculated, since these are the only occupations with enough cases (see table 3.7).
The small gap between mate and AB pay is much less lhan that found by Fischer and
Nordvik for Norway. In the 1850s, first matcs on Norwegian vessels received an average of
eighty-six per cent more per month than ABs. Although the differential declined by the
18905, it remained at forty-one per cent. It must be kept in mind, however, that these data
Ilo'tre for a deep-sea fleet, where mates were more commonly licenced than in coastal trades....
We might speculate that lack of certification devalued the role of coastal mates in the eyes
ofowners.
Table 3.7
A vcrage Monthl Pay Rates for Maryport Coaster Crews
Decade Mates ADs
1870s £41913 £456
1880s £J 100 £J 315
Source. Crew Agreements. vanous years.
Pay rates for masters were almost never noted. In those few cases where they were,
the dispersals are "per voyage." As a comparison, however, we have the articles for the
brigantine Farmer for the year 1878. During this period ASs on the Farmer were paid £5 4
oper voyage, mates received £5 14 0, while the master got £7 5 O. Given this difference, it
may be assumed a similar gap in wages was present for masters under the monthly scale.~
Ibid; L. R. Fischer and Helge Nordvik. "From Namos to Holden: Myths and
Realities in the History of Norwegian Seaman's Wages, 1850-1914,"
Scandinavian Economic His/ory Review XXXV (1987): 54.
Crew Agreements, various years.
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Although rough, there are a number ofthings to be learned from table 3.7. As might
be expected, mates were better paid than ASs. During the 18705 a fairly large wage range
was noted. Although the lowest pay for a mate was £4 10 O. compared to a low of £2 for an
AB, the top of the wage scale is a different mader. The highest monthly pay rate for a mate
was £5 14 6. compared to a high of £6 5 0 for an AB The number ofagreements using a
monthly scale is limited, however and too much should not be read into this. When
comparing the more common "per voyage" rates, mates were paid higher than ABs as a
matter ofcourse.'1
The most interesting feature of the wage data concerns the large drop in average
monthly pay from the 18705 to the 1880s. In Fischer's example. wages peaked in the early
to mid~1870s. This is somewhat different from the Maryport case, where wages peaked
around the end of the decade. The decline in nominal wages thereafter may have been caused
by the decline in freight rates that set in from the mid-l 870s. But at the same time prices in
Britain, as elsewhere in the western world. fell in the trans-Atlantic depression late in the
century. As a result while nominal wages declined, reaJ wages might have actually have
risen. as they did in Norway. Still, since nominal wages tended to be more important to
individual decision-making, at (east in the short term, the fall in money wages may help to
explain why there was a decline from the mid-1870s in the nwnber ofMmyport residents
lbid. The highest rates of pay for ABs seem to have been given to those crewmen
of long·standing service, or when no mate was actually present. fn the latter case,
an experienced seaman might be pcrfonning the duties of a mate and being paid
as such without a commensurate elevation in rank.
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serving on the town's coasters. Perhaps remuneration levels were not as atuaetive as in
industries like mining. Since data on monthly wages come from a limited number of
agreements-and since we know little about mining wages-this association can be no more
than tentativc.n
Wage rates fluctuated from voyage to voyage, perhaps dependant on availability of
cargoes and labour. Wage differences by port do not seem significant. The Farmer's January
to July articles for 1868 record all men as signing on in Dublin except two. For the second
halfofthe year all signed articles at Maryport and received the same tates of pay as Dublin-
recruited crewmen. The situation was similar in 1878. Mariners in the first half of the year
joined in Whitehaven. Dublin and Maryport. Under the next set of articles. all joined at
Mazyport. and again wages were the same in all cases. 1b.is suggests a divergence from
Fischer's findings. According 10 his data, blue-water sailors joining in Ireland were generally
paid better than those signing on in England. likely due to the relative abundance of labour
in the latter. Apparently, this was less ofa factor in the coasting trades. This wage stability
may also relate to the birthplace of the mariners involved. During both sets ofarticles all but
one were Cumbrians. Despite the place of signing, this factor may have created fixed
expectations about wage levels.JJ
Wages. like many aspects of the coaslerman's life, must have undergone some
IbM.; Fischer. "International Maritime labour;" Fischer and Nordvik., 49-53.
Crew Agreements, various years; Fischer, "International Maritime Labour."
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changes with the introduction of steamers. Aside from the obvious addition of engine room
personnel. the composition of crews in general must have altered. It is unfortunate that no
agreements could be located for Maryport steamers employed full-time in coasting. Those
that do exist for steamers reveal that lite differences between the foreign and coasting trades
were as great. or greater. than between sail and steam.
A major difference between the steamers and their sailing counterparts concerned
size. While few sailing coasters exceeded 200 tons. the majority ofsteamers were larger than
1000 tons," Wilfred Hine's Holme Line steamers were among the largest. One vessel. the
Thorn Holme. was just over 1100 tons. while another, the Fern Holme. was 1714(005. This
translated into larger crew sizes, the nonnal complement being ten or more. This compared
to an average of about five or six on sailing coasters. The diversity among crews was also
greater than on sailing coasters, where crews were mainly local. Many steamships carried at
least one Foreigner. usually a central or northern European. A voyage by the SS Thorn Holme
in 1887 had a Maryport captain and a Scandinavian crew. The most common countries of
origin for foreign mariners were Denmark, Sweden. Finland and Germany. Of those
crewmen hailing from the British Isles, places of birth were more dispersed than on sailing
coasters. Crew members come from all parts of Great Brilain and Ireland, with Liverpool
Crew Agreements, various years. The size ofthese steamers makes it unlikely
they were coasters. unless they were passenger steamers. In fact, their recorded
coastal voyages were simply single runs in between trips on foreign articles. The
nationality of foreign personnel suggests that the steamers were travelling at least
as far as Germany and Scandinavia.
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especially prominent. As on the sailing craft, however. there was little representation from
the colonies. Only one colonial seaman appeared, a lason Goldswonh from St. John's.
Newfoundland. who was second mate on the Thorn Holme in 1888. The steam agreements
also offered evidence ofwomen working onboard. something never seen on sailing coast~.
A July 1884 trip by the Fern Holme employed a stewardess named Annie Thompson.
recording it as her 'first ship.' Wages were also much different than on the sailing vessels.
For example. first mates on the Fern Holme and Thorn Holme in 1886 and 1888 earned £9
and £8 8 0, respectively. per month. This is far higher than similar rates on the sailing
coasters. This fits Fischer's thesis that crews on foreign-going vessels would have earned
higher wages than in coasting. Again. one should not take these differences as being true for
steamer.> employed full time as coasters. Although they were certainly larger than similar sail
craft, such vessels probably looked much alike concerning crew composition. leaving aside
the engineering department and other engine room staffs,
The data for both steamers and sailing craft more particularly, can tell us much about
Maryport coastennen. For all this. however, this evidence provides little insight into people's
life beyond the vessel. As an example we can look at the coasting career of Shadeach
Harrison, a native ofMaryport. Harrison was a fairly average Maryport coasterman. except
Ibid.; Fischer, "lntemational Maritime Labour." Wages for the engineering
department were even higher than those for mates, reflecting the value ofthese
skilled technicians in the early days of steam. For example, on a voyage where the
first mate earned £9 a month, the chief engineer received £15. On another voyage
the compar1l.ble rates were £8 8 0 and £14.
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for bis unique given name. He was forty-foue when first encountered and able to sign bis
name. Harrison first appeared on Maryport's coasters in July 1878. having served previously
on the Rapid. His position on his new vessel, the Faucet, was as an AB. as it had been
previously. During this period. however. Harrison moved on to a new vessel. the Robert.
Here he signed on as a bosun, an obvious promotion. By July 1879 Harrison had advanced
again, this time to mate, a position he maintained on the Robert until 1881.Sf>
Although this gives some picture ofHanison as a person, there are still large gaps.
Prior to 1878. no records on him have been located. Since crew agreements can only be
traced backwards. tracing his post-IS81 career is nearly impossible. unless more docwnents
are found by chance. In addition, details of Harrison's private Life are unclear. For example.
how many yean had he served in the merchant marine and where? Given his rapid
advancement, his experience and authority must have been substantial. We also have no
knowledge of his family life. We do not know if he was married. nor if Harrison had
children.lfhe did have a family, this might have motivated him 10 pursue a career in coasting
rather than engaging in the foreign trades. The impetus behind this decision and many others
in seamen's lives remains unclear when Crew Agreements are one's main source of
infonnation,H
What does this documentation record about Ihe "average" Maryport coaster
Crew Agreements, various years.
Ibid.
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crewman? First. Maryport crews were generally a regional and even a local workfon:e.
Drawn primarily from the port itself, but also from its main trading partners and Cumbria,
the Maryport coasterman was essentially a native. eitheroftbe east oflreland or nonh west
England. After the 1870s this situation began to cbange, possibly occasioned by wage trends.
Although wages for both ABs and mates stood at well over £4 during the 18705, they
dropped to an average ofjust over £3 in the next decade. Mariners appear to have possessed
good writing skills. only slightly below the populace as a whole. The officers as a group were
almost universally literate. If they were not wholly uneducated. for the most part, neither
were they youths hoping to gain experience before "graduating" to deep-sea trades. Young
men were certainly present. but there was a high proportion of seamen over the age of thirty.
(1 was fairly common to see coastennen active well into their fifties. The records give the
impression thai the average tar plying Maryport's coastal waters was an experienced sailor
who had chosen to make it a long-term career. It is almost certain that family considerations
played a role in this decision, but neither the agreements nor local folklore give much
infonnation in this regan:l.. This notwithstanding, little serious study has been undertaken on
the labour force behind Britain's vital coastal trades. The present study is in some ways a
stepping stone rather than an end in itself It sheds valuable light on a neglected group within
Britain's seafaring community and the work they performed. Bearing in mind that the
relationship between the working person and his job is often very close. we can now tum our
attention to the voyages themselves. The next chapter will concentrate on exactly where
coasters travelled and when, including the time needed to complete a voyage. This will be
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combined with information on the bandling of their main cargoes, coal and iron products.
Chapter 4
The "Celtic Mediterranean"
The voyages made by Maryport coasters, both along the coast of Great Britain and across the
Irish Sea. should be considered within the context of the sea itself and the industry which
prompted many oftbe trips. These facets are important since the sea's geography, including
its size and weather conditions. influenced the nature of voyages. while the coal trade. in
particular. made the voyages necessary. Once this context has been established we can
proceed to the actual voyages. both on a general and specific level. As a first step. we should
become acquainted with the sea on which the coasters traversed. a body of water referred [0
a century ago as "the British Mediterranean.'"
The Irish Sea lies between 52 and 55 degrees North and 3 and 6 degrees West,
running between the islands of Great Britain and Ireland. Channels on its northern and
southern extremities link it with the Atlantic Ocean. The southern channel. St. George's. is
forty-four miles wide between St. David's Head. Pembrokeshire and Camsore Point,
Wexford, widening to fifty·four miles between Holyhead and Dublin. To the north the gap
is much narrower. Only twelve miles separate the Mull of Kintyre from Antrim's Torr Head.
A further nineteen miles are added from Galway to Island Magee. In this context, the Irish
Sea has a length of about 180 miles. with a maximwn width of 150 miles. The sea's waters
have their own peculiar temperature and salinity which separate it from surrounding waters.
Michael McCaughan and John Appleby (eds.). The Irish Sea: Aspects ofMaritime
History (Belfast: The Institute of Irish SlUdies. 1986).3. This reference to the Irish
Sea was made by geographer Halford Mackinder. Lloyd Laing recently reiterated
this point, but instead called the sea, perhaps more aptly. ''the Celtic
Mediterranean."
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The Irish Sea, as the most encl~ body of water abutting the British Isles, has distinctive
CUlmlts., tides. waves aod wind patterns.. To an exte:nt, its enclosure protects the sea from the
full force oftbe Atlantic Ocean. A shallow sea, its depth is geoeraJ.ly under fifty mctrc:s. but
gn:au:rdepths can be found in the Nonh Channel. The beacbc:s. cliffs.. sand-filled bays and
rocky headlands which s\UTOund it give the [rish Sea its varied and scenic laodscapes.~
To appreciate the voyages made by Marypo['['s coaster crews it is important to fUlly
understand this sea. since it was here they plied their trade. As R.H. Buchanan remarks. "it
is the reality of wind and tide wttich confronts the seaman of every age. and his assessment
of prevailing conditions which ensures safe passages," The distances encompassed by the
Irish Sea translate into relatively short voyages. both in distance and duration. Coastal
features in the enclosed basin are often visible from the far shore. The coast itself played a
large role in acting as a navigational aid for marincB, and knowing its every feature was
importanL Some of Buchanan's examples illustrate this point aptly. The cliffs ofKin~ can
be clearly viewedac:ross the North Channel from the coast ofAntrim ona fine: day. From ML
Snaefell on the Isle on Man one can see the sea'$ edge at three different points: Slieve
Donard is found to the east. Galloway and the Cwnbrian hills lie nonh-west., and the
Snowdon range is to the south. From the same vantage point an observer can sometimes
make out the veil of cloud which sits atop the Wicklow Hills.)
Ibid.,l.
!bid, 1-2.
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A number of features affect navigation on the lrish Sea. Tides on the sea can range
from as little as two metres or less in northeast Antrim, to eight metres along the shallow
lancashire coast. This large range can present navigational hazards by concealing reefs and
sandbars offshore and making the construction of harbour-works more complicated and
expensive. Conversely, such works are sometimes rendered unnecessary. The tidal range
allows vessels to be hauled up onto a beach during outgoing tides and refloated when tides
come in. These tides are accompanied by tidal streams flowing in via the Atlantic at the north
and south extremities. The northern streams. constricted between Fair Head and Kintyre. can
reach speeds of up 10 five knots, making the shortest route across the sea among the most
dangerous. As one travels south the tidal stream rapidly loses velocity, reaching its weakest
point between the Isle orMan and the Irish coast at St. John's PoinL St. George's Channel.
three times the breadth ofthe North Channel. contains much more placid tidal steams, except
where local conditions intervene. Nonetheless, they still affect navigation. Even with
complementary winds, aday's sail south to north on the sea will be hampered by an opposing
tide during part of the trip.~
Winds, no less than tides, are shaped by the enclosed Irish Sea. Prevailing west and
southwest winds are significantly abated by the time they pass over the landmass of Ireland.
The Irish Sea bas its own meteorological designation: its weather is seldom as harsh as along
Scotland or Ireland's Atlantic coasts. It is not that the Atlantic has no influence. While the
Ibid., 2-3.
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sea is certainly not known for "light airs and tranquil waters," it is calmer than the Atlantic.
allowing small vessels to make safe voyages over much of the year. The sea may have been
a factor in the prevalence of coasters under 200 tons. On the Irish Sea wave heights are
generally between a third and a half/ower than those oflreland's Atlantic coast.J
According to Buchanan, differences in patterns of wind.. waves. tides and tidal
streams means that lhe Irish Sea itself is not a uniform body ofwater. It should be considered
an extension of smaller seas, each with its own characteristics. Of most concern 10 a
Maryport vessel would have been the northern section, named by Buchanan "the Manx
Sea.-.6 Around most afthe adjacent coast the Isle of Man's hills are visible and its harbours
of Peel. Castletown, Douglas and Ramsey offer shelter from the most narrowing portions of
the Irish Sea. To the north of the Point of Ayre is the Galloway coast. Here Luce and
Wigtown's shallow bays provide contrast. with the Nith and Dee'5 rocky inlets. The Solway
is ringed with mudflats and saJtings, while glacial till is found among Cumbria's older rock
fonnations. Morecambe Bay, south ofthc Isle ofWalney and the low coast, marks the (rish
Sea's largest stretch oftidal sands. home to much bird life and shrimp. Although navigation
presents a challenge, many pons are found along this stretch of coast. Lancaster, Heysham,
Fleetwood and Preston all had their time in the sun. as did the greatest Lancashire port,
Liverpool. Located on the Mersey's muddy estuary. its trade was founded on links to the
Ibid, 3-4.
R. H. Buchanan, "The Irish Sea: The Geographical Framework," in ibid.. S.
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Americas and Africa. After the Dee silted up, Liverpool became an important ferry pon for
Ireland. From the 17005 on, the Irish Sea became more meaningful than ever to those who
lived on its sbores.7
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the sea acted as a vital Conn of
conununication when transport was needed for a variety of commodities and persons. All
regions bordering the Irish Sea had something to contribute to its shipping. Slate came from
North Wales., grain and cattle from ireland, and. ofcawse. Cumberland and Ayrshire coal.-
Accompanying these cross-sea trades was traffic up and down the coasts, since bulk goods
could generally be shipped more cheaply by sea than by land.9
The importance ofcoal mining and iron extraction to the Cwnbrian region extended
further back temporally than the eighteenth centuIy.1Q Both resources were exploited in
McCaughan and Appleby (eds.), The Irish Sea, 4~5. There are numerous examples
of port studies in existence. although few are exclusively on coasting. See: Francis
E. Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey: The Development ofa Port. 1700-1970
(Newton Abbot: David and Charles. 1971); Adrian Jarvis. Liverpool Central
Docks 1799-1905, An flluslra/ed His/ory (Bath: Bath Press, 1991).
Irish canle provided Marypon with its most imponant impon. The trade ensured a
year-round supply of high-quality beef. Although first moving through
Whitehaven. the cattle trade later became centred in Marypon. See J.D. Marshall
and John K. Walton, The Lake Counties From 183010 the Mid-Twentieth Century
(Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1981). 64.
B.R. Mitchell. Economic Development o/the British Coal Industry 1800-1914
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984).30.
There are many good overviews of the British iron industry during this period.
One concise volume which gives an overview. with some reference to Cumbria, is
l.R. Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988).
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Cumbria as early as the twelfth century. It was not until the mid-sixteenth century, however.
that Cumbria's mineral resources were systematically exploited. At lhis time the Mines
Royal Company began to mine copper in Newlands. Borrowdale, Caldbeck and Grasmere.
By the seventeenth century coal mining grew rapidly in importance. based on west coast
collieries and the trade with Ireland. 11
Coal mining in seventeenth-century Cumbria was tied to this expanding [fish market.
The export trade to Ireland originated in the early part of the century. As 1. V. Becken
remarks, "(Coal mining) provided the base from which flowed all the other (economic]
developments in west Cumberland." The coal trade between West Cumberland and Dublin
shared a number ofsimilarities with the contemporary Tyneside-London trade. The capital's
demand for coal stimulated both primary and secondary industries in its trade partner. On a
reduced scale, Dublin played a parallel role in West Cumbria. Industries using coal as a fuel
prospered into the mid-eighteenth century. These included salt panning, glass manufacture
and ore smelting. Merchants in Cumbria. particularly in Whitehaven., branched out into other
trades such as tobacco. The productivity of such industry and trade made Cumbria an
attractive place. Newly.wealthy merchants drove up the price of coal-bearing land to the
point where the local magnate Sir James Lowther complained that they were '·mad" to pay
J.V. Beckett, Coal and Tobacco: The Lowthers and the Economic Development of
West Cumberland, 1660-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 6.
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such large amounts for small pieces ofland.1!
The !aDd was important to men such as Lowther-indeed. such lando'WDetS fired the
region's economic developmeoL As early as the 1500s landowners began promoting
agriculture and reaping the rewards of a growing coal indUStl)'. Mining coatnbuted greatly
to industrial development prior to the Industrial Revolution. Families such as the Lowthers
owned mineral-rich lands and possessed the necessary capitaJ for their exploitation. By the
late seventeenth century, however. their influence on British industry was declining.
Although a few large landowner-t continued mining into the nineteenth century, most had
retired from such enterprises. For them. an income from leases was more appealing than
continuing investment. West Cumbria went against this trend. The Lowthers in particular,
although maintaining die facade of country gentry and absentee landlords. ran a profitable
blLSIDess enterprise. In this respect. agriculture, the linchpin of the country gentleman. was
of only secondary importance: to their collieries. By 1750 ~ualters aCthe Lowthers'
Cumberland revenue came from the latter source. lJ
The coal trade's importance continued into the nal century. Despite a stagnation of
the trade after the mid-eighteenth century, coal remained central to Cwnbria's economic
well·being. As demand from Ireland continued to grow, Harrington. Workington. Maryport
Ibid., 6-7. For a time the value of tobacco to Whitehaven entrepreneurs threatened
to undermine the less-profitable coal trade. The continued importance of coal to
Cumbria throughout the Victorian era shows clearly that this scenario never did
materialize.
Ibid.• 13.
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and Whitehaven prospered. After mid-centuIy Maryport. Hanington and Workington
incrc:ased their market shares at Whitehaven's expense.l. In the nineteenth century. output
continued to increase. peaking in the third quarter. During this period. the only markets of
significance for England's northwest coalfields. apart from local use-eighty..-six per cent of
the total in 1869-were coastwise. The bulk of exported coal went to Ireland. with the
remainder travelling short distaoccs alODg the British coast to Lancashire. Cheshire and the
Nonh Wales coast. The geographic boundaries encompassed by Maryport coaster voyages
can be explained by reference 10 these coal import areas. IS
Although iron was very important to the Cumbrian economy as a whole. coal was the
focus of Maryport's trade with Ireland, accounting for a majority of its nineteenth century
coastal trade. Foe this reason. the coal industry is more important than iron when looking at
Maryport's coasting. The~ county of Lancashire. where the districts of Fwness and
Canmel now form pan of Cumbria.. dominated the region's coal ttadc. In 1869 coal mined
in Lancashire and Cheshire amounted to 8.5 million tons. ofwhich 2.5 million were used in
The decline of Whitehaven was closely linked 10 the foreign lIades. Spanish nOR-
phosphoric iron ore was imported through Cumbrian ports from the 1870$ in
competition with local ore. The Lonsdale Dock in Whitehaven was too small to
handJe the large vessels carrying the ore. After 1884 the Senhouse Dock.,
accommodating vessels of up to 6000 tons. hastened the decline. Marshall and
Walton. Lola Counties. 50.
McCaughan and Appleby (eds.), The Irish Sea, 8; Becken, Coal and Tobacco,
202; Mitchell. Economic DevelopmenJ. 30. The percentage of locally·used coal in
Northwest Britain includes steam transport and the iron industry, although their
shares were smalL
134
cotton milIs.ln that year the alkali industry used 580.000 tons of this coal and about 385,000
tons were used in British salt production. About 200.000 tons was shipped to LoDdon by rail
and sea, where it was used mainly for naked flame lamps. Such shipments comprised a
majority of the small export trade in north-west coal. Regarding coastwise shipments.
however. Cumberland dominated. As late as the 18505. three.quarters aCthe Irish Sea's
coastal coal originated in Cumberland and the county at the time had no additional export
markets. Twenty years later things had changed little. irrespective of the growing iron
industry. It was only by the 18805 that Cumberland figw-es began to falloff even slightly.16
Cumberland's coal export trade was aided by its price. 5s 6d a ton in 1882. close 10 the
lowest in England. where the national average was 85 3d. 11 As Marsball and Walton
remarked. "Each of the Cumbrian ports except Barrow continued to find coal a vital staple
in its handling trade and the lrish export remained significant well into the next century."·'
Table 4.1 illustrates the uses made ofthis regioo's coal production. UnfortUnately. given the
differences between coal-producing areas, Cumbria was lumped in with lancasb:ire. Cheshire
and North Wales in the original surveys. Although iron and other goods were found on
Maryport-registered coasters, only coal could claim to dominate the region's trade.
Mitchell, Coo/Industry, 31. In fact the decline in coal exports at this lime may
have had a direct bearing on shipping investment in Maryport and its decline after
the 1870s, although this is only speculative.
Marshall and Walton, 1..dk£ Coumies. 52.
Ibid., 53.
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But what about the voyages? There are a number of primary sources from which
coastal voyage information can be taken. There are shipping newspapers which carried
information on vessel movements, such as times ofarrival and departure from a pan. These
postings also included the pon from which a vessel arrived, or to which it was bound. For
our purposes. the Shipping aNi Mucantile Gazette is the most appropriate. 1be Gazme
reponed daily vessel entrances and clearances for British ports and reliably distinguished
between foreign and coastal voyages.19 ln addition to the Gazette. the British Parliamentary
Papers are also valuable. iroot for actual voyages then in providing information on aggregate
tonnage movements and import/export figw-es. The main drawback is that both sources
record statistics on the basis oftotal vessel movements. Craft registered in the port itselfare
not distinguished from those registered outside. 1berefore. vessel movements indicated by
these sources are DOl specific to Maryport coasters. but encompass all shipping that used the
port. This drawback notwithstanding, there is a great conespondencc: between these
moVttnents and the voyages undertaken solely by MllIYPOf1.--registered craft. For information
on these ships alone we must nun to the Crew A~ments.The documents gi~ detailed
accounts by vessel masters of their ships' movements., over six·month periods. These
accounts include not only the ports of caJl but also length of time in pon and travel times
between harbours. With only rare exceptions the commodities shipped on anyone voyage
The Gazelle's information was sampled by taking the month of June in every fifth
year as a representative sample for 1865-1910. This period was chosen because it
contained the best reporting of movements prior to World War L
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can only be guessed at. Likewise. there is little in the way of detailed logs for coastal
voyages., so api~ ofdaily life on board is somewhat hazy. Bearing these caveats in mind,
however, a profitable study of Marypon's coastal voyages is possible.
Table4.!
Estimated Consumption afthe Output of the lancashire, Cheshire, Cwnberland and
North Wales Coal Fields by Uses. 1855-1887 (In Million Tons)
Usc 1855 1869 1887
Exports (foreign) 0.5 0.8 0.6
Coastwise· 0.9 1.1 1.5
Ironworks 0.3 0.8 0.9
l.ocal General Manufacturing·· 4.5 7.9 12.7
Local Domestic 2.6 3.6 5.1
Railways 0.1 0.2 0.3
Steamships 0.2 OA 1.0
Collieries 0.6 1.4 1.9
Source. B. R. Mitchell. EconomIc Development of Ihe Coal Industry /800-/9/4,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1984), 17.· Includes some coal also included under
"railways" and "steamships" .. Includes gasworks and electricity works.
Records of vessel movements for the latter nineteenth century. as found in the
Shipping and Mercantile Gazelle, indicate extensive contacts with the west coast of England..
as well as Irish and Scottish ports. Coasters docking at Maryport ranged from as far north as
Greenock and Glasgow and, in later years, as far south as Cardiff, L1aneUy and Newport. The
nature oftbese trade linkages is suggested by data from the Bi/ls ofEntry, although from a
slightly later period. Maryport in 1910 exponed 790 tons of pig iron to Port Glasgow, while
in that same year importing 1321 tons of grains. meal and com from liverpooL The
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Liverpool example is expanded on in Burton's article. In addition to importing 5,460 tons
of pig iron directly from Marypolt in 1875, vessels bound for Liverpool also loaded iron at
Maryport for coastwise re-export. Maryport imported a variety of grocery products from
Liverpool as well as pitch and resin for its shipyards and salt for its herring processors.
Indeed, trade with Maryport at mid-cennny helped alleviate a decline in Liverpool's foreign
trade. 1be movement ofsuch goods supplemented coal and iron in maintaining a steady flow
of goods into and out of Marypon. Despite this network of trade along the west coast of
Great Britain, there is little evidence ofcontact with the extreme south or the east of England.
In any event, east coast linkages provided by the Maryport & Carlisle Railway and the
Newcastle & Carlisle Railway after mid-eentury probably made such traffic redundant.!O
In the late nineteenth century the bulkofMaryport's coaster traffic was employed in
the Irish trades. In 1880. for example, 26.681 tons of sail traffic cleared in the general
coasting trade. This was compared to 113.192 Ions cleared in the Irish trade. According to
statistics in the Parliamentary Papers, this disparity is typical of the entire period. It is for
this reason that coal, being the most important trade commodity to Ireland, is so important.
As seen in the introduction, Dublin alone imported 30,000 tons of Maryport coal as late as
1910. This volume is even more impressive compared to the quantities of other products
Shipping and Mercantile Gazette. various years; Bills ofEntry. various years;
Valerie Burton, "Liverpool's Mid-Nineteenth Century Coasting Trade," in Burton
(ed.) Liverpool Shipping, Trade and Industry (Liverpool: Icon, 1989), 48, 51. In
Burton's study year, 1853, seventeen Maryport-registered vessels. amounting 10
3124 tons, entered inward at Liverpool.
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noted above. Among Irish destinations. the most important were Belfast. Londonderry and
Dublin. Few vessels clearing from Maryport made the trip to western lreland. perhaps also
due to rail linkages, although a small number ranged as far as Lough Swilly and Sligo.!l
The Shipping and Mercantile Gazette provides insight into another aspect of the
voyages which Crew Agreements do not-some of the differences between sail and steam
deployment out ofMaryport. Again, this gives a picture only of coasters using Maryport, not
simply those vessels registeted there. However, the ports ofcall and presumably the cargoes,
were similar to those recorded in the agreements for Maryport coasters. Given this, it is
reasonable to assume that the panems, if not identical, were at least similar for both
MaryporHegistered craft and others. It should also be remembered that the breakdown
between sail and steam voyages only became significant following the mid-l 870s. Prior to
this. the vast majority of Maryport's coastal tonnage was sail.
According to a Gazef/e sample. from the 1860s until about the tum aCme century. the
main destination for all vessels putting into Marypon. whether sail and steam. was Belfast
During the period 1865-70 man:: than fifty-two per cent of all shipping movements into and
out ofMaryport were bound for, or had originated in, Belfast For the next decade and a half
this figure remained above forty per cent, dropping to just over twenty-five per cent in 1890.
Likewise, Dublin was an important destination for Maryport's coastal traffic however, it too
declined-and more rapidly than Belfast. Of vessels sampled for the period 1865-1880, just
Shipping and Mercanri/e Gazette, various years; Great Britain, House of
Commons, Par/iamenrary Papers (BPP), various years.
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over twenty per cent started or ended their voyage in Dublin. After that date. however. no
vessel movements involving MarypoI1 either originated or terminated in Dublin. Mitchell's
study of the British coal industry may shed light on this trend. We know that Maryport's
exports to Ireland consisted primarily of coal and that ttends in this industry would affect
trade. h is not surprising that at about the time vessel movements to Belfast and Dublin
began to decline. in the 1880s, Cumbrian coastWise exports of coal were also contracting.
From this period the Cumbrian coal export trade became stagnant. At the same time its
competitors in Lancashire and Chester increased their share of the trade. exporting 2.5
million tons per annum by 1913. While Mitchell does (lot elaborate on why this was so. it
clearly ties into the decline of Ireland's largest cities as trading partners.;Q
Of the main Irish ports Belfast inpanicuIar attracted both sail and steam vessels from
Maryport.!J Dublin was a different case. having declined as a trading partner prior to
Maryporfs "steam revolution." Aside from Belfast, however. the two vessel types were
generally employed in different ports. This is not to imply that most ports saw only one type
of craft from Maryport, but rather that there were definite preferences on where to send each
kind. Sailing craft ranged more widely in search of cargoes than steamers. suggesting that
Mitchell. Economic Development. 31; Shipping and Mercantile Gazette. various
years. These figures were compiled for a previous work on Maryport. For the
period 1865-90 it involved 253 vessel movements sampled during June.
This situation lasted only until 1900 after which most vessel movements in the
Maryport-Dublin trade were made by steamers. This is hardly surprising as
Maryport had generally switched to steam propulsion by this date. Shipping and
Mercantile Gazette, various years.
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many steamers were likely liners. The sample includes more than fifty ports ofcall in western
Britain and Ireland. Aside from Belfast and Dublin, the most important of these. in
descending order. were Dwnfries. Wigtown., Portaferry, Strangford and Carriclcfergus.
Steamers were more restricted in their choice of ports. calling at a total of thirty-three. Again
leaving aside the two main Irish ports. the "big five" for steamers were Londonderry,
Liverpool, Cardiff and Newry, with Carrickfergus and Lame tied for last place. Steamer
routes were even more restricted in terms of recorded movements to each port. Although
seven of the main sail ports recorded more than five movements, only the top three steam
ports were above this mark. As this trio. plus Belfast, were among the most developed on the
Irish Sea, it underscores the argwnent from Chapter 2 about steamers needing bener
i.nfrastructure.!~
Concerning specific voyages by Maryport-registered shipping, this is about as far as
we can go using newspaper reports. At this point the focus will shift to the Crew
Agreements. As there are literally hundreds oftbese, they will be examined 00 the basis of
individual voyages which were representative of larger patterns oftrade. While the best way
to proceed would be in chronological order, we will begin with a voyage from the 18705. Of
Shipping and Mercanlile Gazette, various years. Recorded movements in the
sample break. down as follows: Sail-Dumfries II movements; Wigtown 9;
Portaferry 8; Strangford 8; Carrickfergus 6; Drumore 5; Londonderry 5;
Dongahadee 4; Seven ports with 3 each; five with 2; twenty eight with only I
movement. Steam-Londonderry 8; Liverpool 7; Cardiff 6; Newry 4;
Carrickfergus 3; Lame 3; Glasgow 2; Whitehaven 2; twenty-three ports recording
I movement each. This represents not only the current sample period but the years
1890-1910 as well. All movements were sampled from the month of June.
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all the agreements examined thus far it is unique in listing the main cargoes carried on each
leg of the journey. Therefore, we can be cenain with which trade we are dealing-a
particularly useful fact, since in this case the vessel was employed as a collier.
Table 4.2
MllI'VDOrt Vessel Movements Involvine: Belfast and Dublin 1865-90
Year TolFrom Bel.fast (Yo) ToIFrom Dublin (%)
1865 52.5 24.5
1870 52.8 18.2
1875 40 18.2
1880 50 25
1885 40.4
1890 25.8
Source. Shlppmg and MercantIle Gazelte. vanous years. See Also DaVId Clarke. ·'Maryport.
A Late Coastal Switch to Steam Propulsion, 1865·1910." Proceedings a/the Steam at Sea
Conference (Hull: University of Hull Press. forthcoming),
This particular coal voyage was made during the period January to June 1871. The
vessel making the trip was a fairly average Maryport coaster. Built in Molbayne in 1851. the
brigantine Farmer had been previously registered to a Maryport owner in 1854. As was the
custom in Maryport it was re-sold in 1869 to eight individual investors. Chief among these
was master mariner Thomas Lowden.. who captained the vessel. Among the other investors
were Robert Ritson and William Ostle who owned four snares jointly. At 73.5 feet in length..
the Farmer was registered at 108 tons.1S
Crew Agreement, Farmer, January·June 1871; BT 108, Maryport Vessel
Registries., 1869.
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Nine men sailed with Lowden during the six·month period, although there were no
more than five on board at anyone time. The crew included about two ABs at a time and a
cook who doubled as an ordinary seaman. The first mate was Fletcher Lowden, probably a
relative of Thomas, although being older, certainly not his son. Both Lowdens hailed from
Maryport, while the majority of their compatriots came from either Belfast or Dublin.
Atypically for a Maryport coaster, the Farmer carried a colonial subject, Robert Smith from
Nova Scotia. At the end of the voyage five men, including the Lowdens, remained aboard
the vessel.26
The Farmer began her journey on 23 January 1871, clearing Belfast in ballast. After
a protracted voyage ofsixteen days it reached its destination, Garston. As voyages across the
Irish Sea were often made in under a week, even by sail craft, this seems rather lengthy.
Given the time of year, however, it may have been that, buffeted by wind and tide, the little
vessel made slow progress. The stopover in Garston lastcd more than six weeks, surprising
considering that the port had coal drops capable of loading a ship the Farmer's size, about
twenty wagon-loads, in two hours.27 A number of factors might explain this delay. Perhaps
the crew were given time off to visit family while in port, although this is extremely unlikely.
Shipping was profit-driven like all capitalist enterprises, and in the nineteenth century at
Ibid.
In fact, according to Jarvis, Liverpool Docks (106), Garston's four coal drops,
built by the country's largest railway company, were only nearing completion in
1876 and cannot have been used by the Farmer at this time.
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least, placing worlcers' welfare over profit would have been anathema to most owners. The
length of the trip itself might have been a factor in the long tie up in GamoR. A trip of over
two weeks across the sea in January was likely caused by severe weather. It may be that the
Farmer's time in port was spent not only unloading ballast and taking on coal. but also in
making repairs to [om sails and damaged masts resulting from its harrowing trip. This could
be more easily proven if records were made ofsuch things. but Lowden did not do so on this
occasion.2' A third explanation is suggested by Adrian Jarvis' study of the Liverpool docks,
mentioned in Chapter 2. It may be that. although such quick loading technology was
available. it was reserved for foreign-going craft. As Jarvis remarks for Liverpool:
...the berths [coaster owners] had to use in [Liverpool] were generally
allocated not on the basis of what the ships needed, discharging equipment.
well-lighted capricious sheds...for example. but on what they did nOl need.
such as great depths of water and wide entrance passages. Few of the coastal
berths were rail connected. with the result that such cargo was once again at
the mercy of the ubiquitous caner. to lake its chance in penny lots on the
congested and ill-swfaced avenues and quays...and the process was, of
course, repeated in reverse when coasters arrived bringing goods for export
overseas.29
This description of Liverpool's coaster facilities is unlikely to mirror Garston. or the
Farmer's other ports ofeall directly. but it is suggestive. Jfwe suppose. for example. that
Garston's facilities were not made available to the Farmer. loading would have been
considerably slowed. [f we asswne that the discharging of ballast, presumably rocks, and the
Farmer. Crew Agreement, January-June 1871.
Jarvis, Liverpool Docks, 125.
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loading ofcoa1 was done manually, a much longer time than two bours would be needed. In
fact there is evidence that in most cases some form ofequipment was used to load coal on
the Farmer after the lay.-over in Garston. Following that leg afthe voyage Lowden and his
crew returned to Belfast with tbeircargo. this time taking the more nonnal time of three days.
From there the Farmer sailed 10 Maryport and thence to Dublin. trips averaging two days.
After the GarnOR stopover loading was more rapid., with time in port averaging only six days.
When unloading its cargoes ofcoal. however, the average time was longcNixteen days. This
figure is inflated by one particularly long stop in Dublin that lasted over a month. Throughout
the month of June the vessel traversed between Silloth., Belfast and Dublin, with two stops
to unload coal taking only seven and five days. JO
Given these figures, a nwnber of conclusions can be drawn concerning the Farmer's
voyages. First of all. it is apparent Lowden's voyages were expected to pay for themselves
on only one leg ofthejoumey since all trips made west to east across the Irish Sea and into
Silloth were in ballast. Also. it is clear that conditions on the sea at any given time could
cause considerable delays for a sailing vessel. Given the Farmer's log, however, the nonnal
time would have been no more than two or three days. Finally, even with a short passage
across the sea, or along the Irish coast, delays were to be expected both when loading and
Farmer, Crew Agreement, 1871. For a discussion about loading/unloading
procedures in Liverpool, see Jarvis, Liverpool Docks, 100-116. The evidence he
presents suggests a port characterised by mismanagement and underutilised
potential. If the situation in Maryport's Irish Sea trade was anything like this, the
long delays in port by colliers are understandable.
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unloading-the vessel averaged twelve days in port in the six-month period.)1
The Farmer's voyage was similar to many others made by Maryport-registeJed
sailing coasters, even in the preceding decade. Another brigantine. the Robert. made a
comparable set of voyages between July and December 1869. This craft, part of the Ritson
fleet, had similar dimensions to the Farmer. Sixty-eight feet long, the vessel was about 104
register tons. During the six-month period in question, the Robert's runs were exclusively
between Marypon and Dublin. This six-month voyage represents many made when Dublin
retained a central role in Maryport's coastWise: trade. Given the pattern oftrade and the Crew
Agreement notation that it was "Coal & Coasting," there is little doubt as to the ship's
primary cargo. Whether she returned to Maryport in ballast or with some cargo such as cattle
cannot be ascertained. The vessel made eleven runs across the sea for the duration of the
agreement, beraverage time at sea being just over twO days. Like the Former, the Robert's
stopover times in port were fairly protracted. averaging about twelve days. There was a wide
range in these times. however, from eighteen down to only five days. In almost all cases
twnaround times were lower when the craft docked in Maryport This suggests that the
loading of coal was accomplished more efficiently than the discharge. possibly combined
with the acquisition of new cargo or ballastJ2
Farmer. Crew Agreement., 1871. There may be another ex.planation for
turnaround times. It is possible that there were intermediate ports of call not
recorded in the Farmer's log. This is only speculative, however. and must remain
so without corroborating evidence.
Robert, Crew Agreement. July-December 1869.
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The third and fmal example ofa Maryport coasting voyage comes from the 18805.
Although steam was being used more frequently than previously. the run for this period will
again be for a sailing coaster.J3 The focus in this case is a brig, the Defiance. At 244
registered tons. and with a length of 109 feet. the Defiance was somewhat larger than either
the Farmer or the Roben34 The vessel had been operating out of Marypon for almost two
decades. first having been registered in the port in 1864. The craft was sold again in 1874 to
another Maryport owner. In each case she was purchased by a single individual. The
Defiance's date of construction attests to the long use life ofcertain vessels. Built in 1852.
she was part of Maryport's "Canadian fleet," having been laid down in Yarmouth. Nova
Scotia. The vessel's longevity further attests to the quality of vessels being produced in
Atlantic Canada by the third quarter aCthe century.'s
1be Defiance's voyage of March [0 June 1882 was listed in the articles as being in
the "general coasting" trade. The lack ofa coal designation may have related to Cwnbria's
slow decline. but 100 much should not be read into this. After all. many coasting voyages
were made outside the coal trade prior to the 18805 and many in that decade continued
The decade of the 1870s is not dealt with here, as the Farmer's voyage was quite
typical of lhose surveyed for the time. The use of a sailing vessel as an example is
once again reflects the dearth of true coastal voyage agreements for steamers.
Indeed, the Defiance'S tonnage was larger than that used for vessels comprising
Marypon's coastal fleet. It should be remembered that the vast majority of the
coasters were under the 200 ton mark.
Defiance. Crew Agreement, January-June, 1882; BT 108, Maryport Vessel
Registries.
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operating under "coal and coasting" articles. If there is something definite that the Defiance's
voyage reflects. it is the uncertainties and delays associated. with all fonns of shipping.
Although the vessel's articles began in January, confonning with British regulations. she did
not get under way until late March. For the ftrst three months of 1882 the craft was laid up
in Troon undergoing repairs, and her date ofdeparture was the last of lhe month.36
Once the vessel was finally under sail she departed Troon for Londonderry in Ulster
and from there sailed to Ardrossan. The Defiance then returned to Londonderry. went back
to Troon and fmally sailed to Dublin, where she remained until the end of the half·year.
Compared to the earlier voyages examined, the progress aCthe Defiance was by no means
slow. Her trips averaged just under two days, with the range being from one 10 three days at
sea. l1tis was probably not hindered by the original date ofsailing, which missed the months
of January and February altogether. The vessel's turnaround time in port was also good at
about two weeks and two days. The longest stay was twenty-four days; the shortest was teo.
These fairly short times might be accounted for by the cargoes carried by the vessel. Unlike
the previous cases, however, there is no evidence as to what she carried. on any particular leg
of the voyage. This voyage was made at the twilight of the Defiance's career, as she was
"sold to be broken up" in 1885.17
These voyages represent a good picture of what voyages wtdertaken by Maryport
Dejiow:e, Crew Agreement January-JWle. 1882.
Ibid.
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coasters from the 18605 to 18805 would have looked like. especially the cros:rsea trades
which dominated Marypon coasting. Over the entire period. in fact. the ports ofcall the time
needed to reach them, and turnaround times remained fairly static-again excepting steam
traffic. 1be pictUre emerging from these voyages is one of f'airly secure and stable markets
for products like coal and a trade which was in no hurry to change. Voyages Conn the last
major component ofMaryport's coastal trade to be examined. As such. we conclude with a
summation aCthe role oCthe town as a coasting port.
Chapter 5
CoadusioD
Maryport's period as acoasting port began in the eighteenth century. It was based on the coal
industry that had spurred the town's early growth. By the mid-nineteenth century Maryport's
home county. Cwnberland, was host to an iron ore export traffic which further expanded
trade. By 1870 Maryport entered and cleared almost 300,000 tons of coastal shipping, and
this figure remained above the 200,OOO-ton mark until the First World War. In 1870
Maryporl ranked eleventh ofeighty-three British coasting ports in terms ofvessel movements
and tonnage. Coastal tonnage entering and clearing for the year amounted to more than a
quarter-million tons. This compared to the port's foreign and colonial trade ofonly 14,689
tons. 1
The introductory chapter addressed the question of why Maryport merits study, and
focused particularly on the dearth ofavailable material on British coasting ports. The figures
associated with the industry, as restated above, provide further justification for closely
examining this portion ofMaryport's shipping.
In chapter 2 we saw that Maryport's coastal fleet in the period 1855-1889 was
comprised largely of brigs and brigantines of under 200 register tons, although there were a
small nwnber of vessels over this tonnage mark, including a few schooners. Taking the small
brigs and brigantines as a measure, Maryport's sailing coaster fleet averaged about 1,346 tons
L. A. Williams, Road Transport in Cumbria in the Nineteenlh-Century (london:
George Allen & Unwin, 1975), 21, 92; Great Britain., House of Commons,
Parliamentary Papers (BPP), Annual Stalement ofNavigation and Shipping, 1872
and 1890.
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per annum, counting newly-registered craft minus those going off registry.l
These little craft proved successful for three decades after mid-cennuy. By the late
18005, however, steam technology began a wholesale replacement of sail. Nonetheless.
Maryport's sailing fleet lasted well into the age ofcoastal steam-indeed. almost into the days
ofrurbines and diesels. For this reason the port's sailing fleet should be counted a successful.
if not altogether innovative. component of British coasting.
Those who invested in such capital tcnded almost exclusively to reside in or near
Maryport. Apart from Maryport itself, which always accounted for more than two-thirds of
the port's shipowners. investors only appeared in numbers from nearby towns such as
Whitehaven and Workington. In terms of occupations these men and women were less
similar, representing over thirty professions, including sbipowners. Although many shares
were owned by those in marine-related industries.. such as master mariners and shipbuilders.
there were: also investors listed as butchers, gentlemen and painters. Almost invariably these
latter investors were tenants-in-eommon with maritime owners. who presumably had more
ex.perience with seaward industry. J
Once a vessel was engaged for Maryport's coasting trade it had to be manned. Like
the owners themselves. crews were generally from Maryport, its hinterland. or major coastal
Maryport Vessel Registries. BT lOS. Maryport Vessel Registries, various years.
There were a number of reasons vessels might go off registry, including being
lost. scrapped. or sold to new owners.
Ibid.
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trading partners. as we saw in cba.pter 3. lbey performed a variety of roles on board ship.
from master through the skilled seamen known as ASs. down to lowly apprentices.. preparing
for a career at sea. Most men Wtte fairly matwe. especially compared to the typical image
oflbe young, rowdy rar mgeodercd by blue-ocean trades. The officers-ma.sters and mates-
tended to be the oldest aewmen. as might be expected. However. even when considering aU
other ranks. including boys and apprentices,. about half were above the age of thiny. with a
fair proportion above fifty.·
Anotherimportant point regarding these coastennen concerns their level ofeducation.
Although largely working class. their literacy rates were comparable to levels for the
population in general.. It is tmelear ifliteraey aided promotion or resulted in higher pay in the
Maryport cootext but it at least demonstrates that these mariners were: not a less-literate pan
of the proletarial This challenges the popular image of"lack" as representing the dregs of
society.'
The voyages undertaken by these men are also inIonnative. as we demonstrated in
chapter 4. From the mid-nineteenth century on., there was extensive coastWise contact with
western England and Scotland and the east coast of Ireland. The Irish trade, dominated by
coal. accounted for the bulk of these voyages, the most important destinations being Belfast.
Dublin and Londondeny. The sailing fleet ranged over more than fifty pons of call in
Crew Agreements, various years.
{bid.
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western Great Britain and Ireland. The most frequent trading partners, after the "big three"
Irish ports. were Dumfries, Wigtown, Portafeny, and Carrickfergus.6
Voyages across the Irish Sea generally took less than a week., but might last more than
two, depending on weather conditions and the time afyear. Stopovers in port were fairly
lengthy. This may be accounted for by a Jack ofinfrastructurc:. especially in small ports like
Wigtown and Dumfries. or it may be mal the best facilities. even when available, were
allocated by a system of preference that put coasters at the very bottom.7
These facts give only a partial view of life on the Maryport coaster. This study has
relied primarily on official documents. These tell much about the town's coastal trade in
bureaucratic lerms. but in some cases are less forthcoming about the human side ofaffairs.
For this reason it may be fitting to conclude with an aneedote recounted by a local Maryport
writer. Annie Robinson. Although not as informative statistically as official records. it does
reveal the personal side ofcoasting. Robinson's story is worthwhile for a number of reasons.
First. it touches on the Irish coal trade. the most important comlXment of Maryport coasting.
The tale also gives a sense of the economic importance of the trade to Maryport and its
implications in this regard. Finally, it illustrates the peril for those who chose to make a
living on the coasters and the financial risks involved in owning the vessels.
The drama began on the last day of March 1859. On that day a large contingent of
Shipping and Mercantile Gazette, various years.
Adrian Jarvis, Liverpool Central Docks: 1799-1905 an Rlustrated History (Bath:
Bath Press, 1991), 125; Crew Agreements, various years.
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vessels departed Maryport for Ireland. laden with coal. Among their nwnbeT were the the
Ann and the Dove. The fleet was caught unaware by an early spring storm, although most
vessels managed to make harbour safely. Of the Ann and the Dove, nowever. there was no
word. On 12 April news aCthe worst finally reached Maryport when another vessel spotted
the masts of a submerged craft. which was confirmed as the Ann, captained by Thomas
Lowden! Ofthe Dove, ho....-ever. no trace was ever found; it was assumed that she foundered
with all hands. No survivors were located from either vessel.9
The weather during these months caused even greater distress for Maryport in
financial terms. As conditions had been especially severe since Christmas, many of
Marypon's coasters had been unable to make their usual coal runs. It was reported that much
aCthe town's shipping became stranded on the Irish side of the sea. As a direct consequence,
Marypon's trade temp:lrarily stagnated as colliers remained unusable. At the same time local
shopkeepers. dependent on seaborne provisions. were hard pressed to keep their shelves
stocked. III The little coasters which ranged forth from the town were an important link in
Maryport's economy. As with most ports., the great volume of trade they handled has been
As a point of interest, a coaster named the Ann was included as part of this survey,
but its records are from the 18705. It is not clear if the vessel were refloated, orif
this was simply another craft using a common name. It is also noteworthy that a
Thomas Lowden was one of the masters mentioned in the preceding chapter.
although for a later date. Perhaps the two namesakes were related, possibly even
father and son.
Annie Robinson, Maritime Marypor/ (Whitehaven: George Todd. 1978).23.
Ibid.
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largely fmgotten. Theircoottibution to the poIt's. and ultimately to Britain's, economic wen-
being is something that litis thesis has attempted to both recognize and celebra1e.
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